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“In any case, the scientist’s good reputation has been 
assured for quite some time now. Nature can no longer 
reveal itself in any sort of human form and every 
step forward in science has effaced from nature an 
anthropomorphic trait.”
(Jacques Lacan, Écrits, Discussion of the Objective Value 
of the Experience, 1999: 69) 
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foreword
I discovered Alan Drengson and his “The Trumpeter: A Journal 
of Ecosophy” during its 2nd year of publication.  Shortly after I 
became a Reviewer and then Contributing Editor. Two decades 
later I found myself unexpectedly accepting the position of 
Editor-in-Chief.  Deciding then to re-visit one of my favorite 
writers, I sent out a call-for-papers for two Special Issues of the 
journal dedicated to Paul Shepard.
 One of the first papers submitted delighted me so much that 
I emailed the author to request a chat by phone.  He acquiesced 
and that is how Dr. Jorge Conesa-Sevilla and I became friends 
and colleagues.
 Bill Devall was Dr. Conesa-Sevilla’s mentor at Humboldt 
State University and mine during my first few attempts at 
editing The Trumpeter.  Dr. Conesa-Sevilla and I are both taken 
by Paul Shepard’s work and have become friends of his wife 
Flo Shepard.  Alan Drengson has been influential in our doing, 
thinking and writing.  
 Dr. Conesa-Sevilla has kindly sent me excerpts and papers 
over the years and I have been delighted to read them.  As a 
Managing Editor of the Trumpeter for several years he and I 
often discussed submissions from folks both eminent and of 
lesser renown.  That we seemed to be in agreement most of the 
time, is I think, a testament to our shared knowledge and values.
 As Dr. Conesa-Sevilla has mentioned in Chapter Four, he 
has been sitting Zazen for many years.  I have been playing 
Taijiquan, Qigong and Zhan Zhuang for 35 years.  With our 
mutual friend, Terry Keenan (Keenan Roshi), we have published 
a small book of poetry: “The Way of Stubbed Toes and Bruised 
Knees”.  All this from a chance meeting (but aren’t all meetings 
by chance?)
 Dr. Conesa-Sevilla’s interests in semiotics, deep ecology and 
ecosophy have informed his thinking and writing for decades. 
He has developed a command of these areas second to none and 
is respected globally for his insight.  He is a foundering member 
of the European Ecopsychology Society.  His voice is one that  
xall people concerned about ecosophy and sustainability ought to 
know and understand.
 In personal communication, Dr. Conesa-Sevilla’s told me 
some of his reasons for this text.  There are, obviously, additional 
reasons but in my opinion, these are fundamental:
1. Revisit the history and changing definitions “ecopsy-
chology”
2. Introduce students to thoughtful examinations and de-
constructions of terms commonly used in deep ecology, 
“ecopsychology,” and ecosophy
3. To develop “a more scholarly approach to the study of 
‘nature affiliations’”
 Has Dr. Conesa-Sevilla achieved his aims?  Certainly, 
from my perspective he has, exceptionally.  As a text for 
both researchers and students it is “chock full” of historical 
information and detailed analyses.  It will be a standard reference 
text for some time.
Years ago, I stumbled upon a new friend and
We walked together along unfamiliar paths.
Deepening our budding relationship.
Some years later, my special friend and I
Continued our journey on now familiar paths
Appreciating our flowering association.
Now my cherished friend and I have found new paths
To stroll and new byways to explore, at leisure.
As we explore moments of mutual awareness.
Michael T. Caley, PhD
Edmonton, Alberta June 2017
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PrefaCe   
 
“Signification has […] two references, one to the thing indicated, 
and the other to the response, to the instance and to the meaning 
of the idea. It denotes and connotes. When the symbol is used 
for the one, it is a name. When it is used for the other, it is a 
concept.” (G. H. Mead)
 The first draft for this work was completed in June of 2013. 
Since then, and while exchanging notes with colleagues around 
the world, major edits were done to do justice and service to 
many perspectives and conversations. Despite the seeming 
plurality of these points of view, usually, the conversations fell 
into two groups. One spoke from a transpersonal perspective 
and the other from more philosophical and even scientific bases. 
 Missing from these voices, it seemed to me at the time and 
even today, was a willingness to deal with the question of self 
in nature (eigen-umwelt) from a deconstructive or beginner’s 
perspective. That is, various individuals speaking from these 
perspectives seemed to be sold on a particular idea or committed 
to a point of view that was satisfactory to them and that justified 
their careers and endeavors. Repeatedly, I observed the usual 
tactic of beginning a discussion at the self-nature (eigen-umwelt) 
level of discourse in order to justify and argue for a preferred and 
ultimately idiosyncratic eigen-mitwelt (self-society) formulation 
(e.g. there were no academic disciplines—science—in the time 
of our ancestors, therefore, children do not need schooling).  
 Generally speaking, conversations about “ecopsychology” 
wound up avoiding basic questions that most social scientists, 
philosophers, or natural scientists would have addressed as a 
matter of interest, discipline and as an obligation to the noble 
enterprise of foundational inquiry. 
 From June of 2013 to May of 2015, and during my spare time 
and academic breaks since, I have endeavored to capture and 
distill the essence of these conversations. However, it occurred 
to me that new ways of thinking and looking at these problems 
were needed. Thus, this work as a whole is doing two things: 
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addressing, revising, and updating the content of these conver-
sations while formulating new idea structures that can help us 
revisit what we all think we understand when we use the tag 
“ecopsychology.”   
What is “Ecopsychology”? 
 Generally defined, “ecopsychology” is an interest area 
in psychology and other disciplines. Unlike many officially 
sanctioned and recognized fields such as Cognitive Psychology 
or Psychoanalysis, “ecopsychology” is a collection of viewpoints 
and stances aiming to elucidate the relationship between human 
health and wellbeing, and natural processes (i.e., ‘nature’). “Eco-
psychology” goes one step further by intending to say something 
‘normative’ about these relationships. Whether its deontology is 
based on actual scientific findings (evolutionary science, human 
ecology, ecology) or on humanistic grounds (transpersonal 
psychology, narrative psychology, humanistic psychology), the 
intent is to define “nature connection” as a basic synergy toward 
authentic being. 
 The above (permeable) classification is an advantage, for 
“ecopsychological” inquiry and practice can be an important 
focus in any other field. 
 Despite the present critique, I agree that some reiteration of 
thoughtful, evidence-based, and scholarly serious approaches 
to “ecopsychological problems” can be very useful when these 
ideas are implemented as “therapies.” I believe that this endeavor 
is sorely needed as we face almost intractable global problems 
of our own making.  Furthermore, I think that to the extent that 
mainstream psychology has neglected basic formulations of 
eigen-mit-umwelten (self-society-nature) in favor of, in an an-
thropocentric manner, eigen-mitwelten (self-society) relations, 
it has done a great disservice to a more inclusive understanding 
of what it is to be a human being. Any psychologist who agrees 
with the latter criticism is already or is on her way to being an 
“ecopsychologist.” 
 One of the problems, however, with the tag “ecopsycholo-
gy” is that it implies, confounds, or reiterates both new and old 
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meanings. The old, and without the tag, pertains to contrasts 
and descriptions as old as civilization, or more precisely, as 
long as there has been an obvious cultural schism between 
“the countryside” and “the city”—resulting in psychologi-
cally different modes of perception, social organizations, and 
health. By any other name “ecopsychology” has been and 
continues to be a collection of observations--a critique--that 
amassing hordes of people inside citadels is not the best way 
to experience life—to derive its fullest and most authentic 
meanings. This criticism, then and today, elevates country 
living, the pastoral, and even “wildness” to an idealistic qual-
itatively higher status; never mind that human psychology can 
never hide its shortcomings and inadequacies. Specific ideas 
(philosophies and interventions) on how to address and correct 
the deficiencies caused by the schism, the countryside-the city, 
have sprung up since long before Lao Tzu walked away from 
humanity, Epicurus founded his garden, and Diogenes ran 
around naked.  
 Whether framed in negative terms, terms of “deficiency,” 
expressed as nostalgia for simpler times, or as folk psychological 
and cultural wisdom, some of the “ecopsychological insights” or 
proposals derived from more careful observations are: 
1. The countryside (The Pastoral) is intrinsically virtuous. 
2. “Happiness” is to be found in these simpler and more 
frugal interactions (times, recollections, activities). 
3. Alienation and estrangement from “nature” (The Pastoral) 
may result in illness and unhappiness (morbidity, 
cynicism, fetishism, “dysfunctions”). 
4. A return to the countryside (to “wildness,” to “nature”) 
reestablishes a genuine “connection”—bestows or 
renews virtue. 
5. Undue social complexity and urban development carry 
costs, foreseen and unforeseen, where fewer individuals 
stand to benefit, albeit usually in meaningless and unful-
filling ways, while many others sacrifice much more and 
receive much less.  
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6. Neglect or carelessness of deeper, actual or potential, 
relational meanings and affections (nature affiliations) 
inherent in self-nature gestalts can be read as non-bio-
philic tendencies and even psychological dysfunction. 
 The above list can be extended to include particular cases 
and ethereal arguments, regional idyll poetry exalting the virtues 
and wisdom of “a place” or of “a people” and of “its ways.” 
When we include all of the above, “ecopsychology’s” meaning 
and aims alternate between “consciousness raising,” changing 
behaviors, changing attitudes, changing lifestyles, changing 
discourse, changing language, changing culture and changing 
societies— revisiting “nature connection” norms. 
 So, in all the senses that matter, “ecopsychology,” new and 
old, stands for a symptom, or a collection of symptoms, of some 
larger combination of problems that bear down on a troubled 
population, on the very core of who we are as natural beings. To 
the extent that the most recent reiterations of ecopsychological 
sentiments emerged during the 1960s and progressed in tandem 
with other green movements, it is too a symptom and a nascent 
awareness of the implications of existing in a new context of 
urban and suburban life, the pernicious presence and conse-
quences of an industrial, corporate, militarized ethos, and the 
constant pressures to consume at an impractical and unjustified 
pace—the degeneration of good and simple values. 
 On the other hand, for any frugal group of humans who 
lives closely to natural processes and organizes activities 
around natural cycles, “ecopsychology” is a way of life taken 
for granted, its implications clear, a construct that needs no 
definition or scholarly affirmation. 
Meanings 
 In our desperation, eagerness, ignorance, and necessity to 
“live meaningful lives,” and with the specific aim to deduce 
what each of us understands by “nature” or “connection,” to 
discover it for ourselves, “ecopsychology” is newly represented 
by a plethora of ideas and presenters whose claims and proposals 
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are neither new, original, nor completely tested in their efficacy 
to close the almost incommensurable gulf that exists for most 
people, between “modern, neurotic life” and “idyllic country 
living.” 
 At the heart of the inability of professional nature apologizers 
or enthusiasts to “sell nature” is a lack of rigor when it comes to 
adopting or defining terms. A good number of self-appointed and 
self-defined “ecopsychologists” simply adopt some idealized 
version of “indigenous wisdom,” some version of “sustainabili-
ty,” some “mindful practice,” some social or behavioral platform 
particular to their interests and personal peeves (e.g., eco-fem-
inism, environmental justice, healthy food, animal rights), and 
produce their unique version of “ecopsychology.” 
 Meanwhile, and more importantly, few of these proposals 
and idiosyncratic admixtures ever question the validity or actual 
usefulness of coopting very specific indigenous or traditional 
practices or deconstruct in a convincing and rigorous manner 
what the terms “nature,” “connection,” “spiritual ecology,” 
“spirit,” “mind,” or “consciousness” mean.  
 That is, to the extent that terms and/or constructs such as 
“mind,” “soul,” “consciousness,” and/or “spirit” are used in-
terchangeably, on purpose, with the intention to obfuscate, 
inadvertently and in ignorance, or out of laziness, the enterprises 
collectively referred to as “ecopsychology” diminish in their 
discourse value to persuade a host of social and behavioral 
scientists, the more discerning public, and policy makers that 
“nature matters,” that our personal and collective relationships 
to “nature” are central to well-being.   
 Much of this book is an exercise in the deconstruction of 
terminology that is often employed in “green circles” and is 
assumed to have universal meanings. These criticisms can be 
seen as a general failure of misunderstanding and misusing 
metaphors as concrete and untested meanings. For example, 
when a cognitive scientist employs the word “mind,” one 
assumes that s/he means brain processes and not “spirit.” When 
the same group of professionals employ the word “conscious-
ness,” one also assumes that they mean some sort of brain 
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module (or collection of circuitry) whose function is to collate a 
seemingly unified experience (s) into qualia—that it has survival 
value. I do not assume that they mean that “consciousness” is 
“the human soul.”  
 Non-experts, who employ the above tags interchangeably, do 
so for reasons that could, generally and specifically, be described 
as non-scientific. This book would end right here if we were to 
claim that all “ecopsychologists” are disinterested in matters of 
science. In this case, the claim “I feel connected to nature and 
believe that nature has agency—a thing that has consciousness—
and will heal me if I only behave in a ceremonious sort of way,” 
is the beginning and the closing argument for “ecopsychology.”  
 Similarly, the claim “I feel connected to a god-head (a 
grand spirit) and believe that this being has agency—a thing 
that has consciousness—and will heal me if I only behave in a 
ceremonious sort of way,” could be, equally, the beginning and 
the closing argument about the “nature of things.” 
 However, to the extent that many people “live off the land” 
(cultivate, hunt, or fish), seek out recreation in natural or wild 
places, study nature dynamics and processes with avid affection 
and curiosity, or generally enjoy the immersion of self in 
nature, that is, otherwise experience deeply felt and authentic 
“connections” but do not give a hoot about “spirit,” then one 
must question whether “nature” or “connection” means the same 
thing to everybody. 
 Therefore, and for the most part, the phrase “nature 
connections” will be substituted with, “nature affiliations,” to 
suggest, throughout this book, long term, deeply psychological, 
and more integral ways of thinking about self-nature gestalts. 
 Generally speaking, “ecopsychology” is an important 
enterprise to the extent that some people may feel very strongly 
that preparing for or averting the environmental wows that are 
sure to visit us (that are now occurring because of human-caused 
activities) involves all people, regardless of how we engage in/
with natural spaces. To put it simply, either “ecopsychology” 
is a continuation and transliteration of nature spiritual practices 
applied to modern problems, or a systemic enterprise that seeks 
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to resolve what “nature” and “connection” mean in light of the 
complexities of modern life. Proponents of Integral Ecology 
may balk at this dichotomous presentation, but on the other 
hand, a bumblebee flies on gossamer magical wings and fairy 
dust, and that is why it flies, or the aerodynamics of its uniquely 
shaped wings beating against air at a certain speed keep it alight. 
One of these proposals is falsifiable and thus scientific, the other 
is not. One describes, makes specific predictions, and improves 
our understanding of the natural world, the other does not.   
 In the above context, the term “greenwashing” can also 
be used to describe the dumbing down of complex, scientific 
ecological ideas (e.g., human ecology, environmental philosophy, 
anthropological ecology, evolutionary science) into a facile, 
perfunctory, and/or idiosyncratic set of slogans that individuals 
themselves habitually employ. As in the case of companies 
attempting to do the same with profit in mind, “ecopsychology” 
can take this propaganda form.   
Organization of this book  
 This book will make specific arguments and raise questions 
with regard to the dubious practical usefulness of coopting failed 
“magical” solutions to attempt to solve very complex problems. 
Green movements in the humanities, social and behavioral 
sciences seemed very hopeful at first and made specific promises 
with regard to a shift toward “green consciousness” which never 
materialized at a scale that made a difference. Their failure to do 
so is examined here. 
 The arguments and questions unfold across eight chapters, 
as follows: 
Chapter One: For whom do the “nature” bells toll? Various 
forms of “identification in/with nature” are explored, including 
individual and collective projections onto “nature.” Historical 
and cross-cultural modes of “nature connection” are examined 
from psychological and anthropological perspectives which 
suggest and predict that no single approach or perspective in 
ecopsychology has primacy over others.  
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Chapter Two: Ten Misconceptions About Ecopsychology Tak-
en-for-granted notions of what “ecopsycholgy” is or what its 
practitioners do are revisited while employing a ‘misconcep-
tions’ framework. From this perspective, “ecopsychology” 
endeavors are shown to be potentially interdisciplinary and even 
open-ended.  
Chapter Three: Nature Affiliations: Self-Nature Gestalts The 
phrase ‘nature connections’ is substituted with another, ‘nature 
affiliations’ to suggest and inquire about deeper Self-Nature 
Gestalt ‘connections.’ Different psychological approaches 
are revisited and modified so they can be employed, as social 
scientific models, to describe and assess various types and 
processes here defined as ‘nature affiliations.’  
Chapter Four: Deconstructing Origins The recent history of 
“ecopsychology” has been multi-claimed and/or coopted by 
various groups attempting to legitimize their own origins and 
practices. A critical examination of these claims is undertaken 
based on archival data. 
Chapter Five: Psycho-Phenology: Applications of Ecological 
Panarchy to Psycho-Ecological Systems A dynamic and systems 
approach, Panarchy, to psycho-ecological thinking is introduced. 
Ideas of sustainability and resilience across several association 
levels are revisited as natural cycles of all systems that can be 
said to be “ecological.”  
Chapter Six: Nature as Madness A recurring theme in the eco-
psychology literature is that a certain proxy agency, “nature,” 
is directly responsible for healing, transpersonal processes, and 
other transformational events. In this sense, nature is understood 
as having produced or played a role in maintaining a sort of 
“madness.” In the context of this work, the word “madness” 
signifies the free flow of accommodations necessary in order to 
survive an environment constantly in flux.  
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Chapter Seven: We Know What We Know and Make Up the 
Rest Some factions within ecopsychology have overplayed the 
“spirit in nature” slogan or metaphor—and made money from 
it. At the same time, these factions are rejecting scientific meth-
odologies and data that would be valuable to anyone who is 
concerned with the importance of sound scientific designs put to 
the service of human health and planetary stability. They are the 
nature mysterians (Dennett, 1995).   
Chapter Eight: The Murmuration of Transfixitive “Wants” The 
value of ecopsychological discourse is undeniable if its proposals 
are consistent with established and testable paradigms (evolution-
ary science). When ecopsychological discourse is too idiosyncratic, 
extant from evaluative norms and processes, then it runs the risk 
of misrepresenting “nature” and “nature connections” entirely. 
Epilogue: Feathers, Crystals, and Plenty of Whiskey--in the 
Apocalypse Surely, we have never before stood teetering 
between rapidly evolving technologies whose use and effects 
cannot be duly vetted, a culture of universal glut, and the de-
terioration and corruption of so many natural systems, at once, 
without the benefit of past generations—recent memories—to 
advise and dissuade us of our folly, if it is simply folly. Appendix 
I: Marg and Précis. Appendix II: Illustrates applications of for-
mulations presented in Chapter Five. 
 Throughout this work, the words ecopsychology, nature, 
and connection, as well as others, often appear in quotations. 
This is to signify, in all cases, that personal and idiosyncrat-
ic ideas of what these terms mean, vary greatly. It is assumed 
that, presently, no definitive semiotic rendition can satisfacto-
rily summarize all the meanings implied by these complex and 
confounded constructs or interactions. When these terms appear 
without quotes, they refer to specific applications, kinds, views, 
descriptions, reiterations, or classes with specific signification 
that is apparent in context.
xx
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 As far as science can inform us, never has humanity been 
universally threatened by its own actions this perversely, nor been 
so “efficient” at altering so many Earth systems at once without 
the hope of rectifying the consequences of its own actions. 
As far as history can inform us, never has humanity been so 
universally acculturated into gluttonous patterns of consumption 
that defy the logic of sustainably obtaining sufficient necessities 
that make an individual healthy and secure.  
 With most of pre-history and history having been populated 
by humans who one supposes lived in more sustainable 
relationships with their natural surroundings, albeit in existen-
tially precarious and frugal conditions, disturbingly, none of their 
collective “wisdom” was able to offset the quick-and-dirty pre-
cipitation of “bad culture.” It seems highly questionable, then, 
that coopted and “greenwashed” wisdom, incomplete in form 
and content and lacking scientific methodologies, will succeed 
as a credible cantilever against these multi-determined forces.   
 For all these reasons, a self-critiquing, evolving, and scien-
tifically based reiteration of “ecopsychology” is needed and will 
be needed for generations to come. If nothing else, it is necessary 
to understand why humans are this self-deceptive in particular 
and general ways to the point of collective self-destruction and 
imminent oblivion. Equally, and across psychological work, 
it is necessary to understand why humans persist in delusion 
or wishful thinking as part of self-deception during times of 
collective self-destruction and imminent oblivion.
 Finally, throughout this book, the principal argument, in 
various forms and under several guises, is the exploration of a 
fundamental contradiction: to the extent that “ecopsychologi-
cal” perspectives and similar approaches contain a high degree 
of humanism, they fail to fully have trust in and live up to the 
phrase and deep ecological sentiment, “the intrinsic value of 
nature.” That is to say, when “ecopsychological” perspectives 
and similar approaches replace the open-ended enigma that is 
“nature” with yet another absolutist and recognizable form of 
anthropocentric and idiosyncratic thinking, they fail at the very 
task of promoting the opposite ideal: an inclusive but humbling 
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description of humanity, scaled way down to the inhabitation 
of an almost insignificant portion of time and place within a 
vast and unknowable cosmos which is utterly indifferent to our 
needs or desires. To signify “human” as more than that, without 
scientific evidence and on the basis of preferred over-simplifica-
tions, is to fall into the trap of anthropocentrism. 
*     *     *

1ChaPTer one 
 
For Whom do the “Nature” Bells Toll?  
 
“It has become fashionable to describe myths as though they 
were entirely about the psychic life of humans. The cosmos is 
exhausted as the projection of the unconscious life … Myths may 
illuminate unconscious processes, but the context in which that 
inner world came into being is ecological.” (Paul Shepard) 
 as introduced earlier, “Ecopsychology” is a generic term 
that encompasses the work of several disciplines and perspec-
tives. What they have in common is the following: As theory, 
science, or practice, “eco-psychology” assumes that there are 
ideal (optimal) natural parameters that give rise to and maintain 
physical and psychological health and sustainable communities. 
To be “whole,” in a sense that matters, in a sense that directly 
impacts our understanding of “human nature,” means to be an 
integral part of the natural world.  
 The closer these existential parameters resemble evolution-
ary, ancient, and traditional-sustainable modes of “being,” the 
more likely it is that humans will be “whole”--physically and 
psychologically healthy. 
 In this context, to be an integral human being has always 
meant having hourly or daily access to natural spaces--being 
physical-a deep understanding of these natural environments, 
and an authentic identification with various aspects of nature 
and relations within small-scale human communities in a way 
such that they were all one and the same (integral).  
 By logical extension, nature alienation implies a breakage 
or rupture—a disorganization—of the integrity of these evo-
lutionary, ancient, and traditional interrelations. However, 
“ecopsychological” questions, approaches and practices 
examine both the causes of the human-nature rupture and also 
the means of reconciling these factors and forces toward optimal 
wellbeing, including failures to make truly integral affiliations. 
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 Because “ecopsychological” questions, approaches and 
practices are diverse and come from multiple areas of interest, 
these examinations also include, for some professionals, 
questions about spirituality, the integration of both male and 
female roles (principles), and sensual or intimate modes of 
human nature interactions. 
 These diverse approaches are worth studying to the extent 
that an “identification with nature” is a psychological projection, 
and individuals will interpret this identification in ways that are 
personally meaningful and thus satisfying. 
 When it comes to studying “human-nature-connections” 
from both ecologically and psychologically credible (i.e., 
useful, evidence-based, pragmatic, scientific) perspectives, it 
pays to ask the question: “Who interprets ‘nature’ and for what 
reason(s)?” For the poet, a hunter, an ecologist, a pagan, a hiker, 
or a miner, “nature” may be very different things. 
 From both a psychological and an ecological perspective, 
asking the question “Who interprets ‘nature’ and for what reason 
(s)?”, leads one into a study of motivations (goals & objectives), 
behaviors, and thinking—a study of Psyche-Natur.  
 As a self-reflective tool or process, the same question is likely 
to deepen our affiliation potential when immersed in natural en-
vironments. As foundational questions go, it is the disciplined 
query that sustains reflection, that reduces the probability of 
hubris, and that ultimately enumerates and elucidates basic psy-
chological commodities regarding nature affiliation.     
 Without this basic deconstructive groundwork, we are left 
with muddled, confusing, and even contradictory proposals. 
Attributions 
 Our many direct ancestors and those of closely related 
species, some of whom are now known to have contributed to our 
human genome (e.g. Neanderthal), faced the daily challenges of 
survival and opportunities for thriving, and equally, from time to 
time, catastrophic situations that brought some of those species 
to the brink of extinction. Some died out completely. Their 
collective wisdom, their “magic,” their exquisite knowledge of 
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flora, fauna, and atmospherics did not prevent the cyclical or 
surprising lethality of natural disasters and accelerated modern-
ization.  
 That is, their collective wisdom, their “magic,” their inclusive 
knowledge of flora, fauna, and atmospherics was applicable and 
effective as long as the conditions of their existence did not vary 
widely outside a limited set of critical functional and adaptive 
parameters. Most of their collective wisdom and “magic” has 
been lost to us and even when reinterpreted, it is very doubtful 
that it could address the complexities of the deterioration and 
spoilage of so many systems at once. To believe otherwise is 
pure fantasy. They themselves did not or could not prevent—or 
were themselves directly responsible for— the extinction of so 
many species they depended on. Verily, wisdom and shortsight-
edness are oftentimes traveling companions on the same road.  
 With close to seven billion people on this planet and 
millions already facing various degrees or forms of apocalyptic 
doom-these large numbers acting as a buffer against complete ex-
tinction--and facing dramatic changes that are already happening 
and surely will worsen by the end of this century, and even while 
employing simple math, this could translate into many more 
unknown millions suffering starvation and death. To be “happy” 
in these troubled times brings up an immediate sense of guilt if 
one cares even a little bit. To be affluent in these troubled times 
seems more like a desperate acceptance and last gluttonous act 
before dystopia fully settles in. It is already dystopia for millions 
of human-animals and non-human animals.  
 One of the many ways green psychological practices are 
carried out (thought about) is through various forms of identifi-
cation in/with “nature,” with specific elements, entities or aspects 
of nature, or with actual organisms. Whether these exercises 
(interventions) are self-directed, mediated by somebody else, 
or undertaken with others, they all have one thing in common: 
they are projections of “self” (insecurities, certainties, questions, 
hopes, vague assumptions), onto “nature,” however dimly 
understood or defined. To the extent that these exercises are part 
of personal growth practices, and every now and then, they do 
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provide some insight into “self” or “nature,” and nobody gets 
hurt badly, then they are innocuous enough and sometimes a 
little helpful.  
 We could ask, “An ecopsychology that is innocuous enough 
and sometimes a little helpful cannot be bad, right?” When 
globally shared environmental problems are as grave as they 
are and our sense of alienation is this acute, “innocuous and 
sometimes a little helpful” may not be enough. At worst, the “feel 
good” moments do not squarely address the darker depths and 
truths that now define human relations in the ambit of ongoing 
destabilizing natural systems.  
 That is, some aspects of “ecopsychology” do not seem 
serious enough, adult enough, informed enough, and resemble 
more the stuff that children would engage in when playing 
‘house’ or ‘doctor’ or ‘fort in the forest’--‘tis infantile, and 
if some of these less mature aspects of “ecopsychology” are 
indeed, clinically infantile, they are significant in their own right 
as a reflection of the psychology that drives these behaviors and 
well-wishing.     
 In addition to channeling “animal spirits” while wearing 
cardboard masks, there is no question that a chance meeting with 
an actual wild creature in its own habitat could be an unforgetta-
ble experience. Some folks might even describe these encounters 
as “magical.” Even a fleeting glimpse of a fox’s glyph-eye and 
sinuous red body is likely to endure as a significant memory, 
salient above many others. Such excitement is understandable, 
and its energizing potential, its impressionistic value for making 
us more aware of grander ecologies, of our humble place in their 
habitats, cannot be underestimated.  
 Conversely, if one has little experience with wild animals, 
understanding their behaviors and their ecological function, 
these moments could also be exalted above and beyond their 
basic reality experience. Meaning is added that makes this not 
simply an encounter between two organisms in the forest, but 
much more— depending on the semiotic interpreting agent. 
Swimming with dolphins and all sorts of incidents or accidents 
of “connection” become manufactured spirituality. By manu-
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factured spirituality, I mean the almost instinctive impulse to 
describe any odd moment, however prosaic, as possessing an 
otherworldly meaning. That is, any odd experience that the 
observer sees/feels fit converges on the singular explanation 
“miracle.” Attempting to understand why humans tend to do this 
and, in particular, why they do this at all when interacting with 
natural environments, is a question of interest for a scientifical-
ly-oriented “ecopsychology.”  
 The flight of the bumblebee is said to be “sacred” because the 
person decides that it is, or somebody else decides for her, that it 
is so. But is that all there is to a fox’s glyph-eye or a bumblebee’s 
flight? The all-explaining moment, the all-inclusive explanation 
that it is magical and it made someone feel good-special, seems 
like a poor cousin to the myriad things we could understand 
about foxes, or about foxes in forests— anatomy, physiology, 
ecology--while gaining with this knowledge, more, not less 
appreciation, sympathy, and even love for these creatures. 
Although a rare, “special,” or unique experience can be translated 
(designated or interpreted) as “spiritual” by an observer, on 
a whim, it does not make it so if standards of objectivity and 
rationality are applied.  
 In this chapter, we are also addressing a problem of “false 
equivalence.” False equivalence occurs when there seems to be a 
need to devote equal time to competing ideas, voices, ideologies, 
and constructs. Democratic societies with truly independent 
media tend to accommodate “opposing views” even when, 
clearly, one side of the debate has rationality, experience, and 
science on its side. The persistence of wanting to devote “equal 
time” to debate the known against the unknown, data against 
wishful thinking, began when modern so-called democratic 
societies came into existence, when the scientific method did 
not exist and citizens depended on their “opinions” to make 
arguments, to express their points of view.   
 Truly, most scientists and the educated public do not think 
there is a “debate” between evolution and creationism with 
respect to their power to explain natural phenomena. Fallacies 
of false equivalence aside, most scientists and the educated 
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public do not think there is still a “debate” to be had between the 
reality of human-caused climate change and a corporate effort to 
continue making profits from dirty energy sources.   
 The list of “false debates” can be extended to plate tectonics, 
the age of our planet, the similar genomes between humans and 
bonobos, and the demise of thousands of species due to habitat 
loss. No amount of equal time will erase the fact that genome 
data, agreed to by most scientists across disciplines, describe 
bonobos as primate kin. Scientists themselves constantly vet, 
weigh, and judge the merits of new data and decide if these are 
compelling, worthwhile, or not. They are the experts.  
 Interestingly, in mundane practical life, most of the time, 
we do not think we know more than the plumber, an architect, 
an electrician, an auto mechanic, our butcher, or our medical 
doctor, when it comes to their knowledge, expertise, and ability 
to solve the problems they are experts at addressing. In other 
words, everybody would agree that, except in rare circumstanc-
es, our opinions are not on equal footing, do not count the same 
or more, as those of experts. Experts deserve that designation 
because of their demonstrable understanding, what they can do 
and accomplish. Said differently, skills and knowledge matter 
most, uninformed opinions and wishful thinking, less or not at 
all. 
 When an “ecopsychologist” passes h/herself as an expert, 
and the so-called expertise is ephemerally built upon well-wishes 
and bad science, do we need to trust them at all?   
Swimming with Dolphins and All Sorts of 
“Magical” Incidents 
 Many years ago, while swimming with my brother and 
cousin in the frigid Pacific Ocean waters near Seal Beach, 
California, a most amazing event occurred, at least to us. All of 
a sudden we were surrounded by a pod of a dozen or so of what 
we later learned were common dolphins (Delphinus delphis). 
I have encountered and handled wildlife before and since, but 
this experience was then and continues today to be very unique. 
Many elements came together to make it also special. It was 
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sudden, we were swimming beyond our normal range and 
comfort zone, it was a confirmable throng experience, and we 
also felt extremely vulnerable and grateful that none of these 
wild animals took any interest in us. They briefly surrounded 
us and swam away with gracious porpoising speed. California 
surfers experience what I just described routinely. To some of 
them, these encounters are part of the excitement of being in the 
water. Both, at least momentarily, share an out-of-the-ordinary 
space and moment: two species regard one another and allow 
each other to pass or engage one another in play.   
 Some people pay good money to swim with dolphins. They 
report a similar sense of awe when they encounter an alien intel-
ligence, animal “otherness,” so removed from our own, in such 
an intimate and precarious situation.  
 Some people would (but I did not then, nor today) describe 
similar experiences as “magical.” I am not sure if they are 
using that word metaphorically, hoping even that magic was 
happening, that is, imperfectly expressing in one word simul-
taneous emotions and sentiments too new and extant to express 
otherwise. Others might be inspired to become marine biologists 
after similar encounters. Another group might come to believe 
that these dolphins were there for them, as part of some cosmic 
dance and communication that is delightfully mysterious and 
will be, forever, enigmatic and beyond scientific understand-
ing. Finally, still others may exploit this sense of wonderment 
and awe and make it into a profession where as “nature gurus” 
they mediate and facilitate forces assumed also to be beyond 
scientific understanding: They speak “for dolphin.” 
 It is a fair observation that a good number of ecopsycholo-
gists seek out this diverse platform as a means to express and 
broadcast already deeply felt convictions--beliefs. Oftentimes, 
ecopsychologists are coming from a transpersonal (humanistic) 
psychology perspective already saturated with unknowns and 
the giddiness of “mystery”: “spirit,” “Gaia consciousness,” 
“collective unconsciousness,” and other gossamer winged 
fantastic ideas. The transliteration from these collective beliefs 
(this ‘text’) and their extension into “nature” and human-nature 
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interactions come ready-made-affected by similar conclusions, 
their transliteration made in very easy and confident steps 
without questioning the underlying principles.   
 And therein lies the Achilles heel of most of what passes 
for “ecopsychology”: the uncritical acceptance of one sort of 
psychology under a new, green guise. Thus, it becomes a question 
for detached, professional historians to inquire and describe 
how this process came to be. Perhaps humanistic psychology 
was already in decline at a moment when the green movement 
provided a useful conduit-tonic for reiterating unscientific but 
emotionally evocative and attractive dogma. Perhaps scientific 
training or science in general were suspect to begin with. 
Perhaps, individually and collectively, they are disillusioned 
with “mainstream psychology,” the colder facts of evolutionary 
science and human ecology, a harsher text of graphs, numbers, 
and figuring they do not understand.      
 To be fair, one very good argument for transperson-
al (humanistic) psychology (or for other forms of religious 
counseling) is that most people believe in something already, 
anyway, thus it pays, would be the claim, to start therapy, 
counseling, or clinical work at the mind-place where they are 
already, even if we do not subscribe, really, as professional psy-
chologists, to the notion of “souls.” However, judging by the 
cross over humanistic-ecopsychology literature, their Jungian 
insinuations and elaborations, it is clear that more than detached 
(measured) sympathy for clients is going on here. As attested 
to by specific approaches and claims in the literary records, 
their “nature spirituality” seems genuinely sought and impart-
ed--proselytizing. 
 The problem, for it is a problem, I have outlined above spills 
over into or originates from other spheres of public discourse 
where “mysterians,” folks who prefer easy but enigmatic answers 
to a protracted and disciplined study of natural phenomena, 
insist on having “equal time” for their ideas—their beliefs. Un-
fortunately, if influential enough or obedient to others, they are 
involved in public policy making with potentially unhelpful or 
even harmful consequences. 
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Adoring Idols 
 To reiterate, understanding, dispassionately and with a 
degree of scientific skepticism, why some people have the need 
for hugging trees; petting rocks; making offerings to mountains 
and rivers; sincerely (hoping that it will have an effect) placing 
flowers at the effigy-feet of the patron saint of tigers; that is, for 
understanding why some people attribute agency to inanimate 
objects, should be an object of study for Ecopsychologists.  
 Of interest also, is what makes some people generate, 
internalize, or manage strong emotions and feelings that they 
interpret as originating in a “spiritual realm.” Understanding 
the reasons, scientifically so, why any person would believe, 
feel, and behave as though they have a personal and particular 
“connection” with spiritual aspects of an entity they personify as 
real, Gaia, should be a focal interest for those who deal, directly, 
with constructs of “nature connection.”  
 The significance of the belief that nature-at-large, or that 
particular elements and organisms in it, have singled any one of 
us out so that certain subtle “transcendental” truths can be shared 
and that no other form of understanding is on parity with it, 
cannot be underrated or underestimated. To the extent that these 
relational tendencies are persisting and common across time and 
cultures, and across domains within cultures, says a lot about 
how the human mind evolved. These relational tendencies, if 
common during early stages of human development but less so 
as we age and mature, also say something about the intricacies 
of a developing brain and its cognition.  
 To walk in the cool shadows of sycamore trees, by a 
noisy creek, and feel part of an ecological ensemble of expe-
riences—-dynamics and meanings potentially graspable--is 
very human. To believe that the night wind and the unseen 
“chattering” leaves are delivering a personal message to us is also 
human, but equally in need of addressing if we are to understand 
something about our fantasy-prone minds. This is an important 
scholarly task because a comparable or even larger number of 
fantasy-prone minds come to very different conclusions, some 
of which are antagonistic to a sense of “nature connection,” or 
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interpret these as mediated by “some unfathomable otherness” 
who decides our fate, including the apocalyptic demise of our 
planet. The latter are the nefarious mysterians.  
 As far as philosophy and scientific psychology are concerned, 
neither group should be let off the hook.  
 Persevering in believing in something, an idea or feeling, 
that cannot be confirmed by logical argumentation or scientific 
analysis seems irrational to most educated people. The repeated 
rebuttal of these arbitrary notions would seem to be central to 
the practice of a scientifically oriented psychology. Yet, even 
within psychology departments, debates flare up over what, in 
the guise of “equality” or “diversity,” are more likely to be false 
equivalencies—unwarranted lassitude.  
 For example, the right of a student to skip a Saturday class 
because of religious beliefs, the expectation that special provisions 
must be made for a student to retake a test or receive lecture 
notes that other students who attended actually endeavored to 
compile, seems like the fair thing to do. The irony might be that 
this very student might be taking a course in psychology while 
studying cognitive errors of reasoning. Except in specialized 
courses, no one ever questions whether there is something 
fundamentally unhelpful with carrying on with such beliefs. 
The slippery slope might continue if one day the instructor is 
asked to devote equal time to the presentation of this student’s 
religious beliefs as some sort of psychology. Unless this was a 
class (psychology of beliefs, psychology of religion) devoted to 
the skeptical examination (thoughtful inquiry) of why it is that 
humans believe “in something” no matter how farfetched and 
irrational it may be, there seems to be, at first glance, passive 
acceptance, tolerance, and/or the active sustaining, of what 
seems to be, religious entitlements.   
 A recent example may be in order. While teaching a history 
and systems of psychology course, a student complained that 
although h/she wanted nothing more than to become a “psychol-
ogist,” ‘everything’ h/she read in our textbook was ‘toxic’ to h/
her religious beliefs. Seeing this as a teaching moment, I asked 
politely and compassionately whether the student felt that the 
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authors of the textbook were overtly and decidedly anti-reli-
gion (to share the page numbers where these ‘toxic’ claims were 
made) or whether certain facts, stated clearly and dispassionate-
ly were only interpreted to be ‘toxic.’  
 It turned out that anything at all in the text (concepts, theories) 
that conflicted with h/her established notion of “mind-spirit” 
was interpreted as a personal affront to h/her beliefs. Through 
the years, and while teaching other courses and covering 
many different topics, nursing students and future teachers, for 
example, openly declared that they had to “learn all this stuff” 
to do well on tests, to pass the course, but that once they became 
nurses or teachers they were going to practice their professions 
according to the directives of their pastors, beliefs, and religion. 
I do not know what percentage of the student population they 
represented or, today, represent. It is disturbing for me to consider 
that almost nothing of the best that scientific psychology could 
offer to these students would ever again be applied in the actual 
practice of their professions.   
 If ignorance passes for and poses as knowledge, and 
scientific psychology cannot make gains in key professions 
where its findings could change society, the questions raised 
in this book are not trivial. These questions are part of a wider 
inquiry, made more poignant and downright scary during our 
recent and perverse political discourse. The questions are the 
same: Does ‘reason’ matter? Do independently verified and 
objectively derived facts matter? Does ignorance pay? Do we 
accept only the bits and pieces of ‘science’ that are convenient 
to us or should we apply its principles across the board?   
 The summary point here is that schools (psychology 
courses) are meant to challenge, correct, and provide additional 
information—methods for critical thinking—in order to prepare 
citizens to evaluate the increasingly complex and scientific 
information and to be better at self-examination. How useful 
can a citizen be in a real “debate”? How prepared can this 
person really be where scientific information challenges the very 
foundations that make up h/her “beliefs”? If the idol “rules,” and 
“that is that,” what’s the point of an education?  
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 In this context, substituting one idol for another is neither 
progressive nor constructive. At worst, substituting “spirit” 
for “Gaia,” or “soul” for “Earth consciousness” is either bad 
psychology, bad theology, or both. If ecopsychology is merely a 
transliteration from one idol to the next, how is it advancing the 
cause of psychology, that is, of a psychology that purports to be 
a process for thoughtful inquiry?    
For Whom do the “Nature” Bells Toll?  
 The psychological answer to the question, who interprets or 
seeks to interpret a voice, vague feeling, or clearer insight that 
they perceive as divine (or feels divinely inspired), applies to 
all religious experiences, anywhere. Both question and answer 
can be further explored via other inquiries that deal with the 
specific constructs of identification, transference, projection, 
commitment, attribution, attachment, conformity, reasoning, 
and many other useful means of triangulating why and how and 
in what context a person believes or came to “believe that ‘P’.” 
 That is, vague and amorphous categories such as “god” or 
“nature” necessitate a grounding of meaning and experiences in 
order for them to be useful—intimate and personally satisfying. 
In this sense, it is easier to see how the transliteration “god” 
> “nature” > “waterfall that makes me feel holy” becomes a 
common formula in ecopsychological exercises. However, more 
neurocognitively precise questions could be asked about the 
basis of “credulity” itself. To the extent that different areas of 
the human brain are more resilient than others to the onslaught 
of questionable information (propaganda), all kinds of psy-
chologists should be jumping at the opportunity to follow in 
the research and verification steps of scientists who are already 
contributing to these efforts (Asp et al., 2005; Gilbert, 1991; 
Gilbert, 1993). This type of work, has potentially, greater social 
value: to address the ineffectual propensities of “credulity” and 
the negative consequences of people’s credulous natures--their 
continued dysfunctional effects across cultures and time. 
 The “nature” bells toll for everyone even though their tones 
might be distinctly and differentially heard. The chaparral 
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ecologist, upon discovering a dry vernal pool, almost sees 
the future of true fairy shrimps and frogs dormant in cysts or 
burrowed in tunnels when most of us only see cracked dirt. He 
almost smells flowers that only bloom after rains. The casual 
dog walker worries in the same terrain about snakes, other dogs 
and people. The true hiker counts meters of altitude and miles 
to go to the next signpost announcing many more meters ahead, 
other trails splitting on their way to other signs.   
 The ceremonial walker is off-trail picking up a rock here and 
a quail feather there, pausing to smell the scent of Artemisia, 
praying to many gods past and newly invented. The horseback 
rider and her ensemble of equine enthusiasts wonder why 
walkers do not yield her right of way to a six-legged monster 
that barely fits between precipice and peñascos. The mountain 
bikers, riding faster than anyone around, wonder the same. There 
is no one “nature.” There never has been. What there seems to be 
is many psychological profiles identifying with parts of “nature” 
and projecting some parts of themselves onto “nature.” As with 
any relationship, two partners, one passive or imagined, the 
other active, one conscious and the other oblivious, share bits 
and pieces of themselves as best they can. To the extent that no 
single entity “nature” has been shown to exist, then, furthermore, 
it seems that only one itty-bitty mind does most of the identifi-
cation-projective sharing; the complexity of natural processes 
being so vast and interconnected for most human minds to grasp 
in one lifetime.  
 While being generous and inclusive of all dispositions and 
manners of walking the earth, the question remains, if one is 
deeply invested in helping clients through some type of “nature 
therapy”: Who shall we hear “nature” interpreted through? 
Which one of those interpretations is “true-er”? If the authentic 
semiosis is the interpretation of forces that shape natural spaces 
themselves, their phenology and ancient history, their food and 
medicinal applications, why not go directly to these forces to 
learn? Why should mediating “nature” take the diminished 
forms of “spirits,” “trails,” “treaded rubber,” or “horseshoes”? 
Why only that or only so little? And if the ancient inhabitants 
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are definitely gone and only their forgetful and conflicted 
descendants are left to share only partial “stories,” who is the 
true-er “keeper of stories”?  
Privileging, Confusion, and Confabulation 
 The next chapter addresses ten common assumptions, 
referred to here as “misconceptions,” to the extent that when one, 
with critical eyes, reexamines the historical antecedents of eco-
psychology and deep ecology, for example, disentangling them 
from each other, and from humanistic psychology (and other 
narrow and privileged interpretations of “Buddhism”) one can 
begin to appreciate how tags “nature,” “connection,” or “nature 
connection,” in the ambit of green psychological counseling and 
therapy (“ecopsychology”), are vague and unhelpful at best.  
 Practitioners and clients hold both idiosyncratically specific 
and/or overly simplistic ideas of what these tags may mean. 
The lack of social scientific and behavioral rigor with respect to 
these assumptions may be a real obstacle to whatever benefits 
might be derived from “green counseling.” It is proposed that 
concepts of alienation and estrangement (a negative definition 
of “connection”) allow for a testable continuum along which 
sentiments or statements that pertain to “nature connections” 
may be judged and classified (Stokols, 1975).  
 This could be the case provided that specific ideas and 
definitions of what “nature” means to each individual (client) 
can also be fixed, since a plurality of “natures” is more likely 
to exert testable influences than any singular and oversimplified 
notion (an abstraction) of the complexity of natural processes and 
their potential effects on psychological well-being (Kull, 1998). 
For example, Kalevi Kull’s semiotic distinction between Zero, 
First, Second, and Third natures pays due service to most of the 
relational possibilities implied in the phrase “nature connection” 
but how many ecopsychologists are so nuanced and rigorous in 
their understanding? 
 It matters less what a given subject defines as “nature,” 
“connection,” or “nature connection,” as long as these sentiments, 
concepts, and/or statements can be correctly (relevantly) 
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discerned and evaluated during psychological work if one is 
serious about codifying and normalizing—scientizing— “eco-
psychology.” 
 Therefore, a high degree of introspection and self-reflection 
is required to avoid falling in the trap of anthropocentrism. As 
previously noted, to the extent that “ecopsychological” perspec-
tives and similar approaches contain a high degree of humanism, 
they fail to fully have trust in and live up to the phrase and 
deep ecological sentiment, “the intrinsic value of nature.” That 
is to say, when “ecopsychological” perspectives and similar 
approaches replace the open-ended enigma that is “nature,” with 
yet another absolutist and recognizable form of anthropocentric 
and idiosyncratic thinking, they fail at the very task of promoting 
the opposite ideal.
 Proxy humanism (e.g. gods in the sky, water spirits, forest 
hades, Gaia) is still anthropocentric humanism (i.e. proxy 
agency). Animism and artificialism are still aspects of magical 
thinking. Propping up various types of titanic exo-humanity of 
our own fabrication while asserting that they are really at the 
center of our universe and existence are, on closer examination, 
variations and reiterations of antiquated philosophical bait-and-
switch arguments—justifications for things we wish to believe 
in or things we want to do; or things we are told to believe in and 
do.
 A human walks in the forest. A branch crackles and then 
intrusively breaks the inner silence and contemplation of a 
forest wanderer. Raven is surprised and loudly protests. Further 
down the canyon, another responds while the maiden veils fall 
in thunderous acclamation. For whom do the nature bells toll? 
 
*     *     *
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Ten Misconceptions About Ecopsychology 
 
“…nature is the negative figure at the heart of our making. 
Nature is complexity in simplicity. Nature is a god in ruins. 
Nature is a rightness of self. Nature is constant regeneration. 
Nature lets us speak. (Poetry is its excess.)” (Jeffrey Yang) 
 In 2005, surrounded by the Italian Alps and during the first foun-
dational meeting of the then European Ecopsychology Society 
(EES), it took a group of seven eager and passionate profes-
sionals almost two days to arrive at a more or less acceptable 
definition of “ecopsychology.” Most of us were well versed in 
so-called American ecopsychological literature such as it was at 
the time. To boot, we also distilled and quoted various writings 
from Italian environmentalists and nature poets (Barron & Re, 
2005. Italian Environmental Literature: An Anthology).   
 Twelve years after its foundation, with EES morphing into 
the International Ecopsychology Society (IES), the number 
of definitions or qualifications to that original descriptor have 
multiplied without necessarily bringing definitional clarity to 
this tag.  
 As in the opening quote to this chapter by Yang, to the extent 
that constructs such as ‘nature,’ ‘self,’ or ‘connection’ mean 
something different to different people, there might never be a 
completely satisfying or inclusive definition of “ecopsycholo-
gy.” Short of this goal, if it is even a goal, an effort to define 
something in its negative form rather than trying to settle on 
restrictive and possibly ambiguous definitions may be a more 
fruitful enterprise.  
 In this light, the following ten misconceptions of ecopsy-
chology are meant to negate all-too-easy definitions that may 
be too narrow or idiosyncratic in favor of an affirmation of the 
complexity that this tag, “ecopsychology,” entails or implies.
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1. The Various Approaches Termed “Ecopsychology”  
are New  
 One might assume that as long as humans and closely 
related species were able to determine (via affective, behavioral, 
and cognitive means) that a thriving and sustainable affinity 
to natural processes made them feel well (contributed to their 
well-being), helped their families flourish, and challenged 
them to discover new means of maintaining these sustainable 
parameters, there has always been an “ecopsychology.” With the 
advent of enclosed, highly moralized spaces--city states--and the 
privations that these exerted on optimal development, personal 
freedoms and all around “thriving,” there have also been critics 
who spoke of civilized decadence and dysfunctionality (e.g. 
Lao-Tzu, Diogenes, Epicurus). In this sense, “ecopsychology” 
is a study and critique of life and social systems and in particular 
of umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt systemics. Any form of significant 
alienation or degradation from evolutionarily tested parameters 
can potentially lead to dysfunctional outcomes.   
2. “Ecopsychology” is Inherently “Religious” 
(“Should Be”) 
 To the extent that a religious perspective (e.g. Shinto, Taoism) 
embraces and philosophically yokes a sensitivity for “nature,” 
then, and only in this sense, can “ecopsychology” be said to be 
religious. However, the appreciation of natural processes for their 
own sake, the scientific exploration of natural processes, and 
the personal and secular enjoyment of the “outdoors” can also 
foster positive emotions, encourage physical activities, or lead 
to new knowledge or insights and can be described as inherently 
“ecopsychological.” To the extent that ‘a person apart,’ that 
is, that individuals without ties to social structures are able to 
thrive in natural settings, then “ecopsychology” is independent 
of religion. Moreover, “nature” and “nature connection” have 
been proposed (e.g. Rousseau) as critiques of religion and, in 
particular, of dysfunctional aspects (e.g. fundamentalist, an-
ti-science) of religion.  
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3. “Ecopsychology” is Inherently “Spiritual”  
(“Should Be”) 
 Any form of significant alienation or degradation from evo-
lutionarily tested parameters could lead to suboptimal outcomes, 
some of these dysfunctional. To the extent that many species 
possess behavioral-affective-cognitive systems devoted to 
gauge a homeostasis of well-being, then, one suspects, feelings 
associated with optimal thriving might be emotionally confab-
ulated with “a spiritual sense.” Equally--an inverse relation--an 
awareness of dysfunctionality, different types of morbid pertur-
bances, personal failings and needs, may all serve as signs of 
umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt dissociations that need correcting. 
Only in these senses can it be said that “ecopsychology” is 
“inherently spiritual.”   
 A caveat: statements or positions that, in idiosyncrat-
ic fashion, force (“should be”) a diversity of personal nature 
affiliation styles and dispositions (e.g. introverts—extroverts) 
into a reduction of human-nature relational possibilities are 
suspect. In the final analysis, the onus is on those who make 
‘spiritual’ claims for “ecopsychology” to demonstrate, via ev-
idence-based approaches, that their positions are ontologically 
real.   
4. Little of “Ecopsychology” is “Scientific” 
 To the extent that “ecopsychology” is the study and 
critique of life and social systems and, in particular, of um-
welt-mitwelt-eigenwelt systemics, then any empirical method 
(scientific) that sheds light on the etiological dynamics of the 
problem “Significant alienation or degradation from evolution-
arily tested parameters can potentially lead to dysfunctional 
outcomes” is scientific. Admittedly, like other sciences (e.g. 
astronomy, psychology, physics), the speculative, free-form, 
and projective qualities of the word “ecopsychology” open the 
door for unproven, uncritical, and personally satisfying notions 
that are ultimately non- or pseudo-scientific preferences (e.g. 
astrology, new-age psychology, pseudo-physics). The complex-
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ities of umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt systemics demand more, not 
less, science.  
 
5. Serious Academic Preparation in Psychology and 
Ecology is not Needed in Order to be a Professional 
“Ecopsychologist” 
 This statement implies (begs for) an empirical examination 
and procedures which aim at determining a correlation, at 
least, between the degree to which any professional has been 
thoroughly educated in these fields and other related areas (e.g. 
biology, sociology, statistics, human ecology, physical anthro-
pology, resilience studies) and the quality and seriousness of 
what passes for “ecopsychology.” Means and ends (preparation 
and outcomes) are indicative of the measure of the professional 
referring to her/himself as an “ecopsychologist.”      
6. Everyone Knows What the Word “Nature” Means  
 Like most tags containing highly projective value, “nature” 
is a construct similar to other vague, potentially ambiguous, and 
universal constructs: god, happiness, love, freedom, personality, 
or intelligence. Although everyone may have a sense or even a 
personally satisfying definition of “nature,” that is not to say that 
they understand what the word “nature” means, inclusively, or 
what it refers to. The word “nature” is not a clearly descriptive 
map. “Nature” is, at best, an incomprehensible vast territory. 
Our immediate (physical, cognitive, affective) relations to this 
territory define, in small part and dynamic fashion, the vastness 
that is (are) “nature.” One ought to be a bit suspicious of any 
claims that singularly answer the question, “What is nature?” 
with, for example, simplistic tautologies: Nature is love—god, 
consciousness, the ethereal realm.   
7. Everyone Knows What the Phrase  
“Nature Connection” Means  
 The complexities implied in umwelt-mitwelt-eigenwelt 
systemics, via personally and culturally diverse (affective, 
behavioral, and cognitive) vectors, suggest that the phrase 
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“nature connection” is a multi-determined and multi-variate 
construct, not easily defined for every person, every time, or 
by any one person for another. However, deviations of basic 
and evolutionarily thriving and sustainable affinities to natural 
processes could be a starting point for identifying the causes of 
“disconnection.” The very phrase “nature connection” seems 
limited when contrasted with other phrases such a “nature 
affiliation,” the preferred usage in this book, which implies a 
greater complexity and depth of “relations.” However, even this 
latter and more preferred phrase and sense needs to be vetted 
with a precise science of “relations.”  
8. “Ecopsychology” Implies “Diversity”  
 Many proposals exist under the tag “ecopsychology,” with 
some individuals justifying the value of any idiosyncratic 
idea by conjuring the word “diversity.” Although a necessary 
deconstruction (critical, evidence-based) and questioning of 
the function of male-dominated, militaristic, tyrannical, and 
destructive tendencies and their concomitant results in the 
denudement of once thriving and diverse ecosystems, is an 
example of serious scholarly work that enhances and expands 
(diversity) the scope of “ecopsychology,” other enterprises 
may not be as useful or relevant. To the extent that “anything 
goes ecopsychology” borrows a continuing laissez faire from 
“anything goes psychology,” then bad habits and misinterpreta-
tions of serious and diverse approaches could become an obstacle 
to fruitful ecopsychological inquiry. Bad ideas, when they are 
demonstrably bad, need not be protected under the hubris and 
laxed heuristics, “diversity.”  
 As stated under #5, means and ends (preparation and 
outcomes) are indicative of the measure of the professional 
referring to her/himself as an “ecopsychologist.”  
9. “Earth” is a “She” 
 A feminist voice in green psychology might be emancipato-
ry in nature. That is, “ecopsychology,” for example, can become 
yet another vehicle from which to erect a given platform, 
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“feminism,” sadly, without due criticism of what we all mean 
or understand by “feminism” or “nature.” Ideological stances 
and spiritual beliefs aside, a critical and interesting question for 
“ecopsychology” (continuing from mainstream psychology) is 
why individuals feel strongly about attributing “humanness” 
to abstractions (“nature”) or to various elements in/of “nature” 
(thunder, water, fire, tree, lion, lamb). 
 Earlier, we referred to these psychological dynamics as 
self-nature gestalts—of various kinds. Uncritical feminism, as 
emancipation, while rediscovering traditional ways of relating 
to earth processes, without delving deeply into the psychologi-
cal reasons for these identifications, is in danger of becoming not 
only lazy psychology and bad science but may also amount to 
novo-spirituality. The need for spirituality itself is a psycholog-
ical question that must be addressed no matter its reappearance 
under new guises—“ecopsychology,” feminine spirituality. 
 Is “Earth” a mother, a father, a snake, twins separated 
at birth, a raven, a lion, an egg, or a butterfly? What all these 
designations have in common is a real human need to reduce 
complexity to simpler and more graspable ideas. (By the way, 
the previous question is of the same type as: Is “God” a bearded 
man, a woman, the devil, the sun, the moon, all of the stars— 
raven?). Genderizing the ghost does not make it more real; it 
only makes the delusion more familiar. 
 The socio-cultural and psychological mechanisms by which 
the genderization of “nature” or natural forces, as male or female 
processes, takes place might be the same as those occurring as 
part of the arbitrary designations and functions during any psy-
chological projection or identification. The abstract-complex and 
engulfing qualities of the natural world cry out for oversimpli-
fication. The genderization of nature is only one more example 
of these oversimplification tendencies. People “humanize” 
anything—cars, rocks, smart phones. 
 Feminine aspects and qualities projected onto nature are not 
intrinsic at all. Thus, the re-appropriation and re-application of 
feminine principles as part of “feminist perspectives” that deal 
with “nature” and reduce it to an entity (e.g. Mother Nature) do 
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not erase the psychological question: Why do women and men 
read gender in anything natural to begin with?   
10. “Indigenous Wisdom” is Superior to Other Approaches 
 In certain cases, it is entirely appropriate to view the mis-
appropriation and misapplication of “indigenous wisdom” as 
another case of “green washing,” particularly if some person, 
group, or organization employs marketing approaches in order 
to sell “products.” 
 As part of this marketing ploy, idiosyncratically selected 
aspects of indigenous lore, beliefs, diets, artifacts, or 
“ceremonies” are packaged and sold for profit. 
 In addition to financial gains, there is an assumption that 
ancient European wisdom, for example, is faulty or lacks 
provenance to be relevant. At this very moment, thousands of 
villages across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia continue on 
a path of sustainability that was established long before humans 
crossed The Bering Strait.  
 In contrast, if feathers, dots, crystals, incense, didgeridoos, 
or bones are not part of the “magical mix,” then it isn’t 
“indigenous” enough.  That is, for reasons that have more to 
do with exoticism and strangeness (as if tobacco, chiles, and 
cocoa weren’t enough) some new world indigenous practices 
are exalted as being superior forms of “spiritual enlightenment.” 
 The fact that at least three species of ancient humans 
coexisted in Europe and Asia long before the appropriated and 
preferred new world cultures came into being, successfully 
adapted and lived sustainably for tens of thousands of years, is 
mostly overlooked. Even so, these peoples, their geography, and 
fauna are gone. We can only infer what their “ecopsychological 
attunement” was like.   
 In this light, a serious “ecopsychological” science should 
inquire into the reasons and motivations (psychopharma-
cological, consumerist, behavioral necessities, boredom, 
rationalizations, etc.) for the allure offered by exotic and strange 
practices and beliefs. The desire for novelty itself or nostalgia 
might explain quite a bit. In an age of rampant consumerism and 
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easily replaceable and disposable goods, these very talismans, 
feathers and crystals, stand for ages, peoples, practices, and 
ways of life no longer accessible or replicable to well-intended 
practitioners.  
 Moreover, one presumes that local wisdom is partly an 
expression of a unique set of survival strategies which developed 
in specific geographical regions, ecological circumstances, 
historical contexts, and as cultural expressions originating from 
unique ethnic identification necessities. 
 To the extent that only a limited subset of these practices 
and attitudes are universally transferable, and that only locally 
do they represent pragmatic arrangements for successfully 
navigating evolutionary challenges, then one must conclude 
that focusing on one or more of these approaches outside their 
autochthonous terroir and place has more to do with personal 
preferences than with the notion of “indigenous wisdom” as an 
absolute and universal epistemology. 
 If and when the white “ecopsychologist” trades in “indigenous 
wisdom,” and h/she is not an authentic representative of those 
traditions, one is right in suspecting “green washing” at the very 
least. The fraudulent potential of misrepresenting, misappropri-
ating, and repackaging “indigenous wisdom” for profit should 
give the overly eager neophyte some pause before investing 
monies in sure bet psychological fixes and fetishes. 
 Nevertheless, the truly desperate or the credulous will always 
pay good money for the “right” talisman. 
The Empty Egg Shell 
 When “ecopsychology” is thus viewed, it opens up the 
constructs of “connection” and “disconnection” to many more 
and diverse interpretations of nature affiliations, not less. The 
advantage of this is its inclusiveness. If one sort of “ecopsy-
chologist” were to claim, for example, that “ecopsychology” 
relates uniquely and exclusively to the religious or spiritual 
experiences of the Yanomami people, and furthermore, insists 
that not partaking of these specific experiences suggests a be-
ing-deficit with respect to nature affiliations, then a good number 
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of folks who are avid gardeners, who feel connected to this labor 
and don’t give a hoot about jungles, magic or ghosts may be 
incorrectly “diagnosed” as having a diminished sense of “nature 
connection.” 
 Of course, the same “agnostic” gardeners may not give a 
hoot anyhow, for their degree of intimacy to soil, sweat, toil, and 
land (nature affiliations) is ample and sufficient recompense. 
The obsession, at times, with prejudging the great richness and 
varieties of the nature of “nature connections” and restricting 
unknowable parameters to a few inches of a moralistic measuring 
tape seems elitist. 
 Agnostic or atheist kayak woman, hunting Joe, scientist 
Lucy, and sea diver Kathy, experience as deeply a range of 
emotions and insights that are, on the one hand, incomparable to 
other experiences of “nature,” and equally one and the same.  
 To the “ecopsychologist,” professionally defined, goes the 
burden of making ever deeper and more inclusive inquiries of 
what it is to be human in natural spaces and explaining how and 
why, sometimes, a human apart from natural processes seems to 
behave in dysfunctional ways (e.g. a relational science of nature 
affiliations). This type of deep inquiry suggests more scientific 
and philosophical training, not less.  
 Ironically perhaps, the diversity of “nature connections” 
demands a refinement and an exactness of methodologies that 
aim at studying the multi-variate nature of nature affiliations.  
 Conjuring up any old notion that satisfies a given individual 
and making it into some sort of “ecotherapy” may only work 
for a short while. Afterwards, many more folks wise up. Even 
placebo effects make more sense when studied in the well-struc-
tured context of science.
     
*     *     *
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Nature Affiliation: Self-Nature Gestalts 
 
“The Passenger Pigeon’s adaptations, the strengths that allowed 
it to be the commonest bird on Earth, were also its weaknesses 
when we disrupted its habitat.” (Mark Avery) 
 one of the many ways to connect “ecopsychology” to the 
dual discipline and etymological roots of its tag and to many 
enterprises that seem to operate under its name is to look for 
and utilize recognizable psychological and even social scientific 
methodologies from which to develop structural, functional, and 
meaning (semiotic) theories. 
 The author has proposed two, both revised and original, 
approaches (Conesa-Sevilla, 2006; Conesa-Sevilla, 2016) with 
which to understand “nature connections” (Self-Nature Gestalts 
SNGs) and as a way of empirically assessing the therapy value 
(judge the effectiveness) of so called ecotherapy systems and 
exercises (Integral-Experiential Nature Affiliation Dimensions). 
Both ideas and this present effort are an attempt at formulating a 
science of relations-in-nature affiliations.  
Self-Nature Gestalts  
 A self-nature gestalt, SNG (see Figure 1), represents a 
dynamic and holistic organization, that is, an organism’s inclusive 
interpretative coda and behavioral plans in correspondence and 
interplay with its environment. SNGs as inclusive experiential 
representations, although varying and changing from moment to 
moment, can be used to describe or predict an organism’s degree 
of affinity and affiliation with its original and natural evolved-in 
environment.
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 In short, an interpretative coda (biosemiotics) and its 
complex (conscious and unconscious) meaning interac-
tions with inclusive aspects of ‘self,’ ‘culture,’ and ‘nature,’ 
are manifested in behavioral plans and actions toward some 
personality cluster of self-nature gestalt. At any point during 
personal growth or therapy experiences, there is the potential 
for new accommodations of meaning-action-direction vectors 
toward new self-nature gestalt configurations (a Psyche-Natur 
‘personality’ ensemble).   
 Ideally, if they are to be adaptive, SNGs are moment-to-mo-
ment evaluations with accommodations which are normally in 
complex psychodynamic and ecological states of flux. Simply 
put, new interpretations and habits can change the meaning-ac-
tion-direction of agency (in the social scientific sense of this 
word).  
 As Figure 1 suggests, a SNG includes, structurally speaking: 
a) Cognition 1 (Meaning): interpretative codas (semiosis), 
b) Behaviors (Actions): plans and actions, c) Cognition 2 
(Intention/Motivation Vectors): the potential of new opportu-
nities and accommodations--meaning-action-direction vectors. 
Factor Cognition 1 is best described as “past experiences and 
their present meanings.” In contrast, Cognition 2 is analogous 
to J. Piaget’s description of learning as accommodation where 
new information challenges and reshapes cognitive structures 
and schemas. To reiterate, given past behaviors (X) and their 
Figure 1
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meanings (Y), new stimuli (S), and new circumstances (Cs), any 
organism has the potential of redirecting its agentic purpose. 
 In the ambit of ecotherapy, to the extent that nature alienation 
is assumed to be pervasive and that it runs deeper than any 
person might suspect (at an unconscious level), consequently, it 
shares important elements or features with trauma that must be 
similarly addressed.  
 Its dynamic description suggests that the totality and the 
integrity of an organism’s relation to its environment (a species 
‘goodness of fit’) rests on its ability to make use of past and 
useful experiences (both innate and learned), and judge these 
to be in accordance with present, ongoing circumstances, and 
should major anomalies occur, the very integrity (existential 
momentum) of a SNG would prompt new interpretations and 
evaluations, thus driving adaptive behaviors. 
 Just as it is impossible to think of a bone-tendon-muscle-skin 
gestalt configuration existing outside integral bodies, nutritional 
requirements, rest, and a supportive environment, so, too, it 
is impossible to think of unintegrated ‘self,’ ‘culture,’ ‘nature’ 
(self-nature) gestalts without imagining that their disconnec-
tion may have something to do with health or well-being. When 
individual self-nature gestalts are studied in a larger context 
of societal upheavals and dysfunctions, it becomes clear, as it 
was to writers such as E. Fromm and K. Jaspers, that a semiotic 
description of all these interacting life spaces becomes necessary 
if one is to begin a serious study of social and nature alienation, 
as illustrated in Figure 1b.  
 This fashion of tracking “nature affiliations” and alienation has 
the benefit of incorporating and synthesizing ideas from the social 
and behavioral sciences, biosemiotics, and evolutionary science.  
 As “ecopsychology” approaches go, the notion of SNGs is 
too abstract to be useful to many “ecotherapists.” The presumed 
dynamics of SNGs can be, nevertheless, a theoretical language 
with which to discuss, in general terms, nature affiliations. 
Therefore, a more practical evaluative tool is needed to directly 
assess the quality of these affiliations. 
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 To this practical end, it may be more useful to precisely 
describe the nature of distinguishable (testable) sets and processes 
of Nature Experiential Affiliation Dimensions (NEADs). 
  
Integral-Experiential Dimensions: 
Nature Affiliation Features 
 When describing practices that make use of “nature” as a 
whole, the outdoors, or (some) natural elements, it pays to differ-
entiate between various degrees of “connection” across several 
nature experiential and affiliation dimensions. The following 
four Nature Experiential Affiliation Dimensions (NEADs) 
can then be used to judge whether the intentionality, possible 
outcomes, and actual eco-therapeutic practices are producing 
greater or lesser integrity—whether they are “integral” or not: 
1. MEANING--A Biosemiotic Dimension: Nature itself 
and by itself or human mediated (designed) therapies 
and approaches 
2. ORIGIN--An Ontological Dimension: Accepted (agreed 
upon) human needs (origins) or idiosyncratic and psy-
chologically ideological 
3. TIME--Time Dimension: Long term or short term  
4. GOALS--Purpose Dimension (Aims and Goals): 
Inclusive and integral-authentic relations or “activities,” 
“tasks,” or “experiences”  
 Even though Table 1 lists all four NEADs in terms of 
functional polarities, one suspects that measurable continua 
exist between them. For the purposes of this presentation it is 
easier to introduce them as either-or dualities. 
 Table 1 also suggests a way of applying these dimensions 
during a comparison, and ultimately an evaluation of what might 
come closer to integral nature affiliations. To the extent that a 
given practice or approach can be best described as having most 
or all of the components listed under column A, one can be 
confident in saying that there is a higher probability of achieving 
more integral nature affiliations. 
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 On the other hand, if a given “ecotherapy” (or ‘way of 
life’) shares most of the dimensional components listed under 
column B, one can be fairly confident that it is, by definition 
and speaking in relative terms, less integral. Congested urban 
life, passing and short-term diversions (parks and recreation), 
and weekend therapies might all share features of Column B. 
 To be fair, it is important to note that although meaning-action 
vectors (progressions) that culminate in more diversely integrated 
self-nature gestalts represent an ideal of human nature connections, 
realistically speaking and in practice, the typical urbanite wishing 
to embark on these projects of self-discovery for personal growth 
or therapy reasons may not ever fully accomplish this. 
 Notwithstanding this realistic limitation, any person is 
sure to gain something of significance even when involved in 
practices that lead to less integral nature affiliations, hence their 
therapeutic value. 
 Also, some elements that are important to some practitioners 
may not be as valuable to others. Referring back to the list of 
ten misconceptions about ecopsychology, to the extent that 
any given nature therapy (approach) has a spiritual or religious 
 Given its ecopsychological emphasis, and for the purposes 
of the present work, the phrase “integral nature affiliations” is 
both an evaluation and a classification applied to organisms in 
relation to their natural, sustainable environments.
Table 1
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component, then it needs to be weighed against the practical 
value (pragmatic outcome) of belief itself as part of an integral 
self-nature gestalt.  
 In some cases the spiritual or religious component is a 
null factor, that is, it adds little or nothing fundamental to the 
self-nature gestalt—‘tis “window dressing.” In other cases, the 
spiritual or religious component might be in opposition or con-
tradictory (a real obstacle) to a progression toward more integral 
self-nature gestalts.  
 Finally, if a person is already spiritually inclined and finds 
comfort in religious associations, it is very likely that they shall 
seek “nature therapies” that fulfill this personal need. 
Toward Better Informed Constructs of 
“Nature Connection” 
 It is proposed that concepts of alienation and estrangement 
(both negative definitions of “connection” understood in terms 
of “affiliation”) allow for a testable continuum along which 
sentiments or statements that pertain to “nature connections” 
may be judged and classified (Stokols, 1975; Conesa-Sevilla, 
2006). This could be the case provided that specific ideas and 
definitions of what “nature” means to each individual (clients 
and therapists) can also be fixed, since a plurality of “natures” 
is more likely to exert testable influences than any singular 
and oversimplified notion (an idiosyncratic abstraction) of the 
complexity of natural processes and their potential effects on 
psychological well-being (Kull, 1998).  
 For example, Kull’s semiotic distinction between Zero, First, 
Second, and Third natures pays due service to the complexity 
of most relational possibilities implied in the phrase “nature 
connection.” Although in casual and personal engagements with 
the natural world it matters less what a given subject defines as 
“nature,” “connection,” or “nature connection,” when it comes 
to therapeutic, clinical and counseling claims these sentiments, 
concepts, and/or statements should be correctly (relevantly) 
discerned and evaluated during serious (evidence-based) psy-
chological work.  
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 However, if constructs such as “nature,” “connection,” or 
“nature connection,” are incorrectly discerned and evaluated 
during psychological work, then actual practices in wilderness 
therapy or in so-called “ecopsychology” are bound to be “false.” 
That is, if natural processes are imperfectly understood, psy-
chological and physiological responses misinterpreted, and 
conclusions drawn that assume a certain “connection” has taken 
place, then, one may suspect that these conclusions are idiosyn-
cratically and/or even “desperately” confabulated.  
 So, for example, despite apparent “success,” being clueless 
(uninformed and naïve), both clients and facilitators (therapists) 
may feel superficially and temporarily “good,” and take 
euphoria (terpsis, euthumia) and tranquility (ataraxia) to mean 
“connection” or an actual “communion” with “nature.” 
 On the other hand, if the same constructs are correctly 
discerned and evaluated during psychological work, actual 
practices in wilderness therapy (in “ecopsychology”) are bound 
to be “true.” This would be the case if natural processes are 
studied critically (e.g. ecology), psychological and physiolog-
ical responses anticipated and known, and conclusions drawn 
about their likely interactions, empirically tested and confirmed. 
In this context, and ironically, with a measure of practical 
knowhow and expert knowledge, both clients and facilitators 
(therapists) may feel horrible in the wilderness, their mind-body 
systems tested by sharp rocks and freezing rain, and take the 
constructs “connection,” or “communion” with “nature” to be 
entirely different processes/experiences, yet still have a transfor-
mative experience. 
The Implication of Self-Nature Gestalts  
 Every experience involves elements of projection (top-down) 
and reactions to ‘the real’ (bottom-up). Even though it is next 
to impossible not to project “culture” onto “nature,” natural 
processes provide the most authentic semiosis in situations of 
“nature connection.” We evoke, raw “nature” does not. 
 Thus, “falsely” interpreting “nature” via an idiosyncratically 
arbitrary or intentionally deceiving therapeutic lens, “the guru” 
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may bring about temporary changes and some momentary joy 
(terpsis, euthumia), but is it lasting (credible) therapy? 
 If semiosis (communication, interpretation) is significantly 
modified from “nature-as-it-is” to “what-the-guru-says-it-is,” 
we have us religion, not psychology. If so, and as in other areas 
of psychology, some clients and therapists may purposely and as 
a matter of personal need erase the line between evidence-based 
psychology and religion. In such cases, “ecopsychology” 
becomes yet another instance and vehicle for finding solace and 
meaning, an extension and continuation of previous (or found 
anew) religious pursuits.  
 To add confounding circumstances, any number of outdoor 
activities which do make people physically fit, healthy, and 
“happy” could be co-opted and disguised, through other activities, 
as “ecopsychology.” If so, are they honestly “pure” and unique 
forms? For example, if most of these practices share essential 
components (variables) of fresh air, more intimate social inter-
actions, physical activity, intentional doings, relaxation, solitary 
wandering, or attention to different visual and auditory dynamics, 
then it would be easier to build up a science of “ecopsycholo-
gy” by controlling the function and contribution of these more 
“prosaic” variables. Even simply walking outdoors produces 
measurable psychological changes (affect) and measurable 
cognitive changes without therapeutic interventions (Bratman et 
al, 2015a; Bratman et al, 2015b).  
 Furthermore, more intimate and relational attributes 
(variables) when involved in equine and/or horticultural 
therapies, for example, could be similarly assessed for their 
cognitive and physiological underpinnings--value. If so, “horse 
spirit” and “magical gardens” can be evaluated for their more 
cognitive, affective, or behavioral qualities. Here, a science 
emerges that is serious and predictive.    
Natural Restorative Arcs 
 As far as “eco-therapy” goes, there exist long proven 
therapies (e.g. Morita Therapy; Chang, 1974; Morita, 1998) 
which seem to have ecological and even evolutionary validity. 
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Perhaps universal and ubiquitous in the animal world, recogniz-
able restorative arcs (functions) in/of the “wounded animal,” as 
illustrated in Figure 2, if and when combined with amenable and 
congruent “nature therapies,” may speed up recovery because 
their timing and etiologies are based upon real physiological 
processes as understood in medical terms.                            
 The healing processes described by the above restorative arc, 
if understood as a basic therapeutic imperative and sequence, 
again, ubiquitous in the animal world, may be improved by 
infused “naturalness” as evidenced by faster patient convalesc-
ing recuperation times (Ulrich et al, 2004). 
 To clarify, at every turn in this evolutionarily sensible 
therapeutic sequence, some sort of “ecopsychology” may be an 
ideal form of intervention if only we understood what sort of 
animal we were at each curative phase (e.g. Morita Therapy; 
Chang, 1974; Morita, 1998). And if ideas of alienation or es-
trangement are theoretically and empirically useful, how does 
agency, for example, change during the curative process with or 
without the assistance of “naturalness”?  
 A basic and psychological understanding of alienation and/
or estrangement, applied to the vague phrase “nature disconnec-
tion,” seems to be key if psychologists are to have a clear sense 
Figure 2
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of how their clients come to “nature therapy” or for clients to 
be informed with respect to who carries out these practices. The 
work of Daniel Stokolos (1975) is still relevant today and could 
provide this needed foundation. If nature is “proxy agency,” 
“welcoming” all and “allowing” for any projection, would it be 
useful to know how “agency” operates? Who are the agents and 
the structures in these interactions? 
 At a minimum, if human-nature relations are understood in 
terms of “love,” then Robert Sternberg’s Triangular Theory of 
Love (Sternberg, 1997), to name another approach and example, 
could also be a foundational work from which to begin assessing 
affect and “connection” from theoretically sound and empirical 
grounds. 
 “Nature,” “spirits in nature,” or “nature connection,” plus all 
sorts of other words and catchy phrases, when vaguely understood 
or purposely misleading, may seem attractive panaceas for 
desperate people (both clients and therapists). In light of the 
above assumptions about restorative arcs, the following are all 
understandable, credible, and valid pursuits: understanding that 
organismic and reflexive human needs exist to seek solace in 
nature, to make its forces catalysts for psychological change, to 
ease pain and accelerate healing, and to find respite in the midst 
of overwhelming and unjustifiable social complexity.     
 Walking in the woods remains, without fuss, occultism, 
ulterior motives, or adornment, the “talking cure” of feet and 
minds. There is an effective “agent” there partaking of the 
oldest “structure” that there is—or ever was. Confounding this 
intimacy with less rigor than it takes to walk one or two miles 
seems suspect.  
*     *     *
37
ChaPTer four 
 
Deconstructing Origins 
 
“The seagulls are always starving. That’s why they follow the 
boats.” (Carlo Cassola) 
 It is neither an accident of human affectation nor disingenuous 
to think of particular places as “homes,” or of an entire planet as 
our home. An excerpt from the Uruguayan poet Mario Benedetti, 
entitled “Ésta es mi casa” (This is my home), is very telling 
about the ease for cognitively transliterating the concrete to the 
abstract and from the abstract to the concrete (home><self): 
Without a doubt, this is my house. Here I happen, here I 
deceive myself, immensely. This is my house held in time. 
(No cabe duda. Ésta es mi casa aquí sucedo, aquí me engaño 
inmensamente. Ésta es mi casa detenida en el tiempo.) 
The poem, an apt and profound psychological study in its own 
right, is very telling of our human capacities to locate and live 
within the material confines of a special place with whom we 
identify; the processes of psychological becoming in the ambit 
of a chosen or significant place; the forces and opportunities, the 
potential for self-deception, that exist when we have decided to 
inhabit a personalized space; and, as in Benedetti’s poem, the 
time-bending possibilities that might aid, distort, or stand in the 
way of the very processes of becoming.  
 As an extension of our own psyche, a home is a projection 
of our faults, our present realities, our potential, and of our most 
farfetched dreams. But even when incorrectly or imperfectly 
signified, “our home,” is cherished and valued as a sanctuary. 
Both the positive and pernicious nature of these identifications, 
self > home, may be useful metaphors and analogical vehicles 
from which to understand the plethora of attributions made 
about places, identity, and the otherworldly phenomena humans 
associate with natural spaces. Plain “space” being a daunting 
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abstraction, is transformed into a familiar location and intimate 
space. In this chapter I will focus on how and why people who are 
known writers, scholars, and otherwise perceived to be intelligent 
individuals betray deep seated wishes, fantasies, and insecurities 
by the very public process of misappropriating, distorting, mis-
understanding, and sharing their own interpretations about the 
tags, “nature,” “connection,” or “nature connection.”   
 What follows is an honest attempt at reviewing and critiquing 
publicly accessible material that tries to make sense of our sense 
of place, and of our sense of self in places. This is a summary of 
at least three aspects and effects that deep ecology, in particular, 
seems to propose or have as philosophy, how it energizes 
“feelings” or sentiments—insight—into righteous activism, or 
as a scholarly product and its influence on “ecopsychology.”  
Some Anomalies are Introduced  
 Deep ecological themes introduced in this chapter include ex-
plorations of: 1) the assumption that Self-realization (Goldstein, 
1939; Naess, 1979; Devall & Sessions, 1985)--a still ambiguous 
term that the author shall address first—and “intuitions” should 
have epistemological primacy or equal footing as a counter-
weight to other ways of knowing “nature” (“shallow ecology”), 
2) the still relevant reiteration of traditional ways of “knowing” 
or understanding “nature,” and 3) the contradictions and even 
logical impasses that DE as philosophy creates when its original 
proposal (and particularly Arne Naess” Ecosophy T) is misun-
derstood and/or misapplied. These themes are approached and 
treated with a critical eye, humorously, and even with face-value 
acceptance, to a degree, but also with a humbling and proverbial 
“grain of salt” caveat that no person who feels “deeply connected 
with nature” really needs to justify the intensity and phenome-
nological veracity of these sentiments and feelings with some 
sort of eco-philosophy or “ecopsychology.” 
 The author’s basic position throughout this chapter and book 
is that, verily, neither a day in the woods needs to be justified nor 
the sentiments that might ensue from a sylvan insight need to 
be applied, as “principles.” Notwithstanding my own personal 
39
Chapter 4
sentiment of “interactions in/with nature,” and in keeping with 
Alan Drengson’s continued and important reminder that authors, 
for clarity’s sake, keep an unambiguous distinction between the 
DE platform and fundamental principles (Drengson, 1995, and 
personal 4 communication; Glasser, 1995), I too shall be mindful 
to keep these distinctions clear, including my own personal in-
terpretations of DE. In the words of Drengson (1995):  
Supporters of the principles have a diversity of ultimate 
beliefs. "Ultimate beliefs" here refers to their own metaphys-
ical and religious, basic grounds for their values, actions and 
support for the deep ecology movement. Different people and 
cultures have different mythologies and stories. Nonetheless, 
they can support the platform and work for solutions to the 
environmental crisis. A diversity of practices is emerging, but 
the overlap is considerable as can be seen in hundreds of en-
vironmental conflicts all over the world. (p.3) 
However, and despite, Glasser’s (1995) warning that one could 
mistake Naess’ own sense of “Self-realization” as “singular 
fundamental norms of deep ecology,” in practical actuality, some 
readers do not see or perhaps even care about this distinction and 
continue to interpret Naess’ DE as the “go to” DE—or however 
they wish to interpret it. That is, readers persist in conflating, 
understandably, conveniently or inconveniently, the messenger 
with the message, even despite DE’s own founder’s clarifica-
tions (Naess, 1984). 
 Consider this, on the surface, sensible-sounding statement 
from Naess (quoted by Drengson and Inoue, 1998, p.8): “By 
an ecosophy I mean a philosophy of ecological harmony or 
equilibrium.” Particularly when bold-typed and highlighted in 
the fertile imagination of an “ecopsychologist,” this statement 
begs for deconstruction on several grounds, and ecologically 
principally, to the extent that system models like Panarchy would 
assert as physically impossible to conceive that a central feature 
of ecological “well-being” could be described and qualified as— 
privileged as—teleologically harmonious or in equilibrium. 
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Extending this description further, into human physiology and 
psychology as ecologies, then the very notion that either can be 
described as ‘harmonious’ or in ‘equilibrium’, specifically, that 
both tend toward a definite ontological teleology, suggests little 
understanding of development, developing, being, and becoming 
as what they truly are: shearing and destabilizing processes—
change as a norm—in growth (Holling, 1973; Gunderson & 
Holling, 2002). 
 Even when unintended as such, a static and idealistic view of 
nature (ecology and/or human nature) has the danger of quickly 
disintegrating into greater horrors. In the words of mathemati-
cian Marco Janssen (2002): 
The utopia-dystopia approach can be used to explore a variety 
of images of the world’s future…However this approach is 
static in the sense that an emerging dystopia does not include 
adaptive behavior. If the system collapses, the agents do not 
respond. Hence, the scenario outcomes are rather implausible, 
both for utopias and dystopias, […] Surprises are an essential 
and certain element of the future. In exploring possible 
pathways of the future, surprises should be explicitly taken 
into account. (pp.250, 260) 
Another case in point: my first introduction to both DE and “eco-
psychology” was through William (Bill) Devall. His textbook for 
our class at Humboldt State University (circa 1987) was Deep 
Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Devall and Sessions, 
1985; & Naess, 1973). On one hand, the amorphous and idio-
syncratic presentation of so many concepts (“ecopsychology,” 
eco-feminism, spiritual wisdom, the poetry of Gary Snyder, and 
DE) in a saltatory, quizzical, and ingenious format, was the ideal 
introduction, for a sophomore, to how these ideas might be in-
terrelated—useful and important. 
 On the other hand, and after years of reading the original 
sources of those very entries, more questions have arisen that 
were not obvious or evident in the mind of an eager young 
student with Bill Devall as his teacher and, later, mentor. Mostly, 
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these inquiries generally arrive at the question of whether it is 
practically possible to disengage DE from its metaphysical roots 
or the persons we associate it with: both the initial theoretical 
contributions of its founder, Arne Naess, and the subsequent 
and expanded spiritual ideology of its beat poets, and Buddhist 
co-founders (e.g. Robert Aitken, William Devall, Joanna Macy 
and Gary Snyder). 
 That these foci or emphases might be the first and lasting 
introductions of Naess’ ideas cannot be ignored and it might 
explain why it is perhaps difficulty to separate a core (and 
secular) Naess Environmental Philosophy and ethics from his 
own personal philosophy and that of others. For better or worse, 
these works dominate the field of ideas about DE and are the 
most frequently quoted sources. 
 The legacy of DE in toto is then perceived as rich and mul-
tilayered and as a branching out and hybridizing force merging 
with other movements (e.g. “ecopsychology”). This state of 
affairs may make some grumpy, others very happy; however, in 
this work this situation is treated and stated as a matter of fact, as 
the way things really are. This excising, this splicing (selecting) 
from the spiritual to the secular, from the sacred to the profane, 
if it is even possible, may only be useful or even a scholarly 
necessity to those who seek to align DE with other proposals 
within environmental ethics and who are still suspicious that 
DE’s platform and foundations are irrevocably connected (Cone-
sa-Sevilla, 2006).  
Experiences are Experiences—Feelings and Sentiments
and “Other Things”  
 Before continuing this discussion, it might be useful to 
anticipate the tenor that holds together these sections and 
discussions by utilizing and explaining a quote by William 
James which illustrates a common theme across these sections 
and work:  
Apart from anything acutely religious, we all have moments 
when the universal life seems to wrap us round with friend-
liness. In youth and health, in summer, in the woods or on 
42
Ecopsychology Revisited
the mountains, there come days when the weather seems all 
whispering with peace, hours when the goodness and beauty 
of existence enfold us like a dry, warm climate, or chime 
through us as if our inner ears were subtly ringing with the 
world’s security. (1902)
 
Captured by James’ eloquent and still relevant description, we 
read, yet another iteration, in a long history of quotes and ob-
servations that could be taken to mean two confusable and/or 
confounding experiences. One is secular or profane, purely psy-
chological, and the other sacred with a “spiritual” basis. James is 
careful to leave his description open to a secular (even profane), 
personal interpretation and appreciation of the sentiment and 
feelings associated with “being one, happy, in/with nature.” 
Under this guise, there is a sense of democratization about the 
accessibility of these experiences by anyone, irrespective of an 
absence of a particular religious orientation or learned interpre-
tation. That is, “nature,” potentially, is the source of seemingly 
endless but also, ironically, psychologically convergent familiar 
(recognizable) experiences, that when coming together in a 
precisely poignant moment and manner, or quite by accident, 
could trigger a collection of sentiments and feelings common—
recognizable—to all people. If not common to all people, these 
experiences (sentiments and feelings) are at least common 
(and recognizable) to enough people (writers, sages, outdoor 
enthusiasts, forest dwellers or wanderers etc.) that they, over the 
span of human history, feel strongly that their sentiments and 
affectations be known and understood. 
 Whether we are talking about experiences particular 
to individuals in large or small groups, the fact that these 
experiences are, to be sure, psychologically convergent, do not 
make them, necessarily, objectively (irrevocably) metaphysical. 
 In the same statement (James’) there is also an obvious 
opportunity for projecting the sense of a source-force that 
presupposes a designing and ordering intelligence (generally 
benign and in charge of “harmony,” “equilibrium,” or 
“balance”). This tendency is shared by some “deep ecologists” 
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(and “ecopsychologists”)—see later in the text--who adhere to, 
purposely infuse, or even force a particular or personal religious 
view while interpreting their experiences in “nature,” as of 
the certain-luminous-otherworldly type (i.e. Numinous). It is 
at least a psychological curiosity to wish to study why certain 
people make one sort of projection or another onto “nature” 
and under what circumstances, and then, ascertain how they go 
about justifying their experiences as beliefs (i.e. a psychology 
of religion).  
 To be clear, the author sees continuing value in DE as an 
important intellectual contribution to environmental ethics but 
does not subscribe to that certain-luminous-otherworldly sense 
(Numinous) of “connection with nature.” 
 Ironically to some, even confusing, the author is also a 
regular zazen “sitter” who has experienced “things,” both 
in nature or inside a zendo, but nevertheless adheres to early 
Zen-Taoists traditions and suggestions that dissuade one from 
further speculation about what these experiences might mean 
or be about. With this disclaimer aside, the author shall attempt 
to explain why some of these exclusively spiritual presentations 
of DE might be erroneous and confabulated with other notions, 
mainly, coming from psychology and/or “ecopsychology.” 
 From a neuroscientific perspective alone, a reasonable 
assumption such as a specific fallen apple came from a specific 
apple seed, tree, and soil, to use a metaphor, might have 
something in common with the equal presumption that feelings 
and sentiments are products of a particular brain/mind system—
no more and no less. In the words of neuroscientist David Linden 
(2011): 
…most experiences in our lives that we find transcendent— 
whether illicit vices or socially sanctioned ritual practices 
as diverse as exercise, meditative prayer, or even charitable 
giving—activate an anatomically and biochemically defined 
pleasure circuit in the brain…They all evoke neural signals 
that converge on a small group of interconnected brain areas 
called the medial forebrain pleasure circuit. (p.3) 
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That, more and more, a neuroscientific perspective seems to be 
a testable and reasonable “middle way,” as far as our growing 
understanding of “transcendence” goes, then it pays to examine 
these fruits with equal interest and earnest. To merely keep 
repeating that this set of experiences is of a “transpersonal” or 
“transcendental” sort, and let’s leave it at that, sounds a lot like 
saying the apple fell for me alone; let’s leave it at that. 
 I have adopted three narrative approaches for describing 
ideas, aptly I think, from a movement that runs from the phil-
osophical to the poetic. The next section adheres more or 
less to a scholarly narrative. The second employs a first-per-
son perspective with relevant and personal examples. Lastly, 
the conclusion of this chapter exploits poesis, impressionistic 
elements found in some of the presentations of DE in order to 
more appropriately consider “living with” some of the contra-
dictions inherent in DE.  
Ultimate Norms: Self-Realization 
 Naess’ choice of the term Self-realization (Naess, 1979, 
1984), one could claim, the one sense that most readers starting 
a discovery of DE ideas might encounter, is used to indicate 
both an ontological origin (a metaphysics) and the subsequent 
logical primacy of evaluations about “nature” based on personal 
insight and affiliation—confirmation thereof. As affiliation (and 
even teleology), it describes an innate connection and partici-
pation with planetary and even universal consciousness—their 
possibility. In this sense, Naess’ “self-realization” is in keeping 
with contemporary (his) uses of that term, for example, found in 
the Indian religion and philosophy of Paramahansa Yogananda 
who introduced the term in the United States in 1920. Coinci-
dentally, Yogananda knew and admired Mahatma Gandhi, whose 
principle of non-violence and social activism Naess himself also 
admired and later emulated. 
 Interestingly, in one way or another, the precepts of 
Yogananda’s Self-Realization Fellowship Order (SRF) 
(Yogananda, 1972, 1997) of “meditation and prayer, service, 
spiritual study and introspection, exercise and recreation, and 
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time for solitude and silence” can be seen as the antecedents 
and/or prescriptions of many forms of deep ecology by various 
authors (Devall & Sessions, 1985). 
 In a circular discursive form and manner, not uncommon to 
the traditional privileging of philosophical terms whose aims are 
to add authority to certain arguments (Rorty, 1979), it is perhaps 
by borrowing and creating both a metaphysical teleology and 
a phenomenological ontology that Naess is able to argue that 
personal insights of this kind have equal (or even superior) value 
and authority with respect to scientific discoveries and knowledge. 
Without this metaphysical scaffold, it comes down to, basically, 
his “insights” against scientific proposals of ecology—to “insight” 
versus “science.” Now, it is important to stress that Naess did not 
wish to do away with “shallow ecology.” However, as part of any 
convincing argument or dialectics, he needed “a decent leg to 
stand on.” He chose metaphysics, thusly the dice was thrown.  
 In psychology, this very term, Self-realization, in a very 
restricted and secular sense, is first proposed by the German psy-
chologist Kurt Goldstein (1939) to suggest human, latent and 
untapped resources from which to achieve greater vocational 
heights and psychological potential. Goldstein (1956) is very 
adamant that the very steps/levels that Maslow later reintroduc-
es in his own hierarchy of needs, do not have to be sequential or 
hierarchical toward “Self-actualization.”  
 In Goldstein’s (1956) words: “It seems to me doubtful 
whether it is really possible to assume a fixed hierarchy of needs.” 
This was not only the case of Maslow changing Goldstein’s 
little “s” to big or capital “S,” but also, deciding that human 
“drives” should be arranged in hierarchical fashion. One can 
also understand Goldstein’s common sense caveat from a Zen 
Buddhist perspective: When hungry, eat; if you need to do zazen, 
do it; when thirsty, drink; when you need to go to the bathroom, 
by all means, go! Nothing divides these actions as being any 
less “sacred” or important—all “profane” is equally “sacred.” 
All so-called “drives” (the skills and functions expressed by 
these drives—e.g. eating) are in this sense equipotential in their 
possibility to serve self-realization.  
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 Even from a neuroscientific perspective, let alone Goldstein’s 
caveats or my own “zen” argument, such a hierarchy of needs 
is questionable to the extent that brain circuitry is close-ended 
and finite with respect to satisfying them—perhaps even tightly 
recursive in managing both mundane (profane) and serious 
(sacred) experiences by a limited set of or even the exact same 
circuitry. According to Linden (2011): 
[…] some people, acting on their religious principles [i.e. as 
Self-actualization or Individuation], can forego sexual activity 
in service to what they perceive as a more important goal. 
Likewise, the politically or spiritually motivated hunger-strik-
er is activating her pleasure/reward center by furthering her 
own ideas, even when this requires acting in precise opposition 
to one of our most basic and ancient drives. (p. 169) 
Perhaps not Self-actualization per se but Self-Transcendence, a 
final rung that supposedly Maslow introduced toward the end 
of his life (Cloninger et al, 1993; Koltko-Rivera, 2006), and 
when it is assumed to be an actual spiritual path, is also judged 
in parity or concordant with another spiritual model of human 
psychology, C. G. Jung’s (1967, 1972) notion of Individuation: 
“The Self (“For the self alone embraces the ego and the non-ego, 
the infernal regions, the viscera, the imagines et lares, and the 
heavens,…” p. 125).   
 Less appropriately perhaps, but even the parity between 
Maslow’s Self-Actualization and Individuation comes in the 
form of analogies during teaching or in casual conversations, 
and even more explicitly, while presenting these ideas in intro-
duction to psychology textbooks (Gross, 2009). In the words of 
Gross: 
“The self: This is the central archetype (‘the archetype of 
archetypes’), which unites the personality, giving it a sense of 
‘oneness’ and firmness. The ultimate aim of every personality 
is to achieve a state of selfhood and individuation (similar to 
self-actualisation). (p.753) 
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Furthermore, it is worth noting that although Devall and Sessions 
(1985) make a distinction between Naess’ sense of self-realiza-
tion and its psychological use or sense in the work of Maslow: 
It is also crucial to remember that this top norm or 
ultimate norm, Self-realization, is meant not in the sense 
of narrow ego realization nor in the sense often used by 
Abraham Maslow and other Western humanistic psy-
chologists, but in the sense of universal self as described 
in the perennial philosophy; a self with capital “S”[…] 
(p.227)  
Obvious contradictions aside, this distinction may not be 
accepted by run-of-the-mill transpersonal psychologists who 
take it at face value that Maslow is talking about self with a 
capital “S” and really assume a “hierarchy of needs” with 
S-A at the apex, and really assume that some sort of “spiritual 
enterprise” is afoot.  
 The writings of A. Maslow, C. Rogers, and K. Goldstein are 
to be found, together, in Clark E. Moustakas book (Ed., 1956), 
the very work that launches Humanistic Psychology. Moustakas 
himself (1956) “plays with” and summarizes these nascent ideas 
of Humanistic Psychology in ways that can be adopted into a 
philosophy and psychology that could be termed “deep”:  
The organism has different potentialities, and because it has 
them it has a need to actualize or realize them. The fulfillment 
of these needs represents the self-actualization of the organism, 
a constant emerging of self, of one’s “nature” in the world. 
Failure to actualize essential capacities is equivalent to not 
being…Intrinsic nature, being, and becoming are involved in 
every true experience. (p.273) 
Again, these words, from a psychologist writing almost 
twenty years before Naess introduces DE, can be just as easily 
adopted as a psychology and a philosophy of “intrinsic value,” 
and further, cemented in some sort of ethics that seeks (even 
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demands) the protection of any organism’s “intrinsic right” 
toward self-realization. 
 In either case, or in all cases, whatever the case may be, 
coming from ultimate premises or even platform principles, one 
should be cautious of not committing an Is-Ought Fallacy. In the 
particular case of Naess’ Ecosophy T, a definition of Self-realiza-
tion (“Is”) that is metaphysically obtained from thin air, and then 
pushed as “intrinsic value” ethics (“Ought”) warrants further 
scrutiny. In short, that the profane easily becomes the sacred, or 
that the secular the spiritual, may suggest—profoundly for psy-
chology--that as part of human nature some individuals are willing 
to go further, with language and actions, to differently evaluate 
and value (Conesa-Sevilla, 2006), perhaps an identical set of 
sentiments and feelings, as being ontologically more mysterious 
and hierarchically of greater standing or significance given an 
as yet, unidentified by science, identical set of neurochemical 
“happenings” such as in the phenomenology that William James 
described or what Dr. Linden alluded to earlier (2011).  
 Not to be glib, that is to say that where some folks see 
cherubs in their bread toast and immediately have a profound 
mystical experience (the perceptual projection called pareidolia) 
with/about this object (Gantman & Babel, 2014), others continue 
spreading butter and jam and proceed to devour it with great sat-
isfaction—without a second thought. 
A DE/“Ecopsychology” Exotic Cocktail 
 By proposing, describing, and finally juxtaposing self-re-
alization as a fundamental ontology with ensuing “ultimate 
norms,” in retrospect, and in light of what the term self-reali-
zation (self-actualization and self-transcendence) has come to 
mean in DE and in psychology, some aspects and presentations 
of DE waded in murky waters from the start. In a sense, it is not 
a very surprising cocktail of familiar—relatable—ideas. Some 
may read these distinctions as having a fight inside a thimble 
while a flood is coming—irrelevant or unimportant. I would 
agree. There are real environmental and environmental-psy-
chological challenges ahead, the likes of which humanity has 
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not seen before—even adapted to. However, again, it is hard to 
ignore that coincidental and historically contemporaneous with 
the ideas generated and proposed by Naess, there already existed 
a pre- or supra-scientific ethos around the very term Self-reali-
zation that then becomes central in a distinction between “deep” 
(intuitive, self-affirming with nature-cosmic interrelations in 
mind) versus a “shallow” (scientific, mechanistic, academic, 
technical) ecologies.  
 In the same breath, none of us who have a soft bone or two 
for DE should ignore that these distinctions matter to many who 
still perceive DE as a product of religion, and its close cousin 
“ecopsychology,” as its virgin priestess. The following passage 
(Noel, 1998) illustrates, for example, an “ecopsychologizing” 
of Jung, and then the regilionazing of “ecopsychology.” This is 
a rather lengthy quote but necessary in order to establish the 
ease with which some authors weave a tale from one specific 
sort of psychology to another and then to religion in a few 
sentences. To anticipate, Noel’s argument goes something like 
this: a) Let’s make way too much of a tiny percentage of what 
Jung ever wrote that even remotely resembles “ecopsychology,” 
b) Then, as it is customary when talking positively about Jung, 
let’s deemphasize the merits of “psychoanalysis,”—the “other 
guy,” c)Conveniently, let’s also forget that many, many schools 
of psychology exist that could have a scientific crack at “ecopsy-
chology,” and d) Let’s do a “bait-and-switch” quick maneuver 
and, somehow, make this sort of “ecopsychology” a “Nature 
Religion”: 
Let me begin by quoting words I take to be both exemplary 
for the tradition in question and pertinent to our discussion 
of "nature religion":[Jung] Yet there is so much that fills 
me: plants, animals, clouds, day and night, and the eternal 
in man. The more uncertain I have felt about myself, the 
more there has grown up in me a feeling of kinship with all 
things. In fact it seems to me as if that alienation which so 
long separated me from the world has become transferred into 
my own inner world, and has revealed to me an unexpected 
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unfamiliarity with myself.[…] Beyond modest if valuable 
ecopsychological efforts to psychoanalyze attitudes toward 
environmentalism or to use diagnostic categories to assess the 
mental causes of our historical divorce from nature, psychol-
ogy’s sense of the boundaries of the self will need to expand, 
so that the individual psyche, losing its familiar isolation, 
might become an “eco-psyche,” participating in the subjec-
tivity of the more-than-human as well as human realms. […] 
To reiterate, a post-Jungian ecopsychology, collective as well 
as individual, emotional as well as intellectual, does not have 
to succeed politically at present for it to be of value to those 
of us seeking to understand "nature religion" as a theoretical 
construct. (One Page)  
Once again, for me, it is difficult to even decide where to begin 
a critical evaluation of these exaggerated and confounded claims 
except to consider the source and context, be generous, and leave 
it at that. We could then find some comfort in saying something 
like, “This could be another case where, in matters of “religion,” 
anything goes.” But critically speaking, by unduly focusing on 
a (possible) failure of a certain brand of “psychoanalysis” to 
more fully explicate “nature connections,” myopically so, this 
author seems to prematurely disregard the entire potentiality of 
all sorts of “psychologies” (cognitive, evolutionary, developmen-
tal, psychobiological, etc.) to have some scientific say in matters 
“ecopsychological.” Whoever said or decided that “ecopsycholo-
gy” must be a single flavor enterprise? Mr. Noel did in this case.   
 More problematic yet, take some of the actual “ecopsy-
chological” work, for example, of recognizable figures like 
John Seed, Joanna Macy, and Molly Young Brown. Here is a 
description, in Macy’s words (1998), about how the Council 
of All Beings, a now popular “ecopsychology” workshop, was 
originally conceived: 
One day after a weekend workshop, John Seed, founder of 
the Rainforest Information Center, took me to one of the last 
vestiges of his continent's primordial forests, saved from the 
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timber companies by blockades mounted by John and other 
local protesters. On that excursion John and I discovered 
that we shared a passionate interest in deep ecology and the 
writings of Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess about the 
"ecological self." As Buddhists, we both resonated with these 
concepts, finding them close to the Buddha’s core teaching on 
the interdependence of all life. John expressed the wish that 
my workshops include a “deep ecological” group experience 
to directly challenge the anthropocentrism of industrial 
society. So together, that day, we invented the Council of All 
Beings. It was introduced shortly afterwards, in the course of 
the weeklong training that culminated my workshop tour. At 
a camp north of Sydney, on huge flat rocks by a waterfall, 
some forty people took part. And soon they were taking the 
ritual back with them to their local communities. Within a 
year, by word of mouth--and through John's and my travels-- 
the Council of All Beings spread to North America, Western 
Europe, and Japan. From the Grand Canyon to the banks of 
the Rhine, in redwood groves and classrooms and church 
basements, people were gathering to shed their personae as 
humans and give voice to the plight of the Earth. They spoke 
as whale and wolf and wind, aspen and marsh and any other 
nonhuman they felt called to represent. […] I like to begin the 
proceedings by inviting the beings to identify themselves in 
turn, a kind of roll call: Wolf is here, I speak for all wolves. I 
am Wild Goose; I speak for all migratory birds. […]  
No doubt, the strange but equally creative idiosyncratic amal-
gamation of interpretations of some brand of “deep ecology” 
and some brand of Buddhism, in a metaprocess of interpersonal 
authentication and mutual affirmation, turned into some kind of 
“ecopsychology,” is likely to be well-received by folks who are 
desperately seeking immediate and impressionistic (emotionally 
satisfying) explanations to reconnect, at some emotional level 
with “nature, but is this work also critical of DE, Zen Buddhism, 
or “ecopsychology”? What ensues is almost foretold in the Rune 
Stones: very sincere folks, so-called “ecotherapists,” run for the 
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hills, replicate “the workshop,” dawn paper masks, speak for 
some sort of “otherness,” without any one critic (a scholarly 
examination) voicing an opinion about the validity of these 
“forest experiments” with respect to their purported theoretical 
foundations or psychotherapeutic benefits or outcomes. 
 To the extent that these exercises are labeled “deep ecology,” 
Buddhism, and/or “ecopsychology,” by their creators, they 
encompass most all of the wishful-thinking (also real emotional 
needs) that is present (or latent) out there by sincere folks who are 
seeking remedies for their own existential woes, angst-eco-anx-
iety or work as professionals--as planet-attuned mediators. Not 
surprisingly, “shallow” ecologists, environmental scientists or 
philosophers are quite justified—who can blame them—after 
witnessing this Sylvan drama, in their suspicion of the whole 
of DE-thing—guilty by association, once again. Then, when 
and if we wonder why DE is not an overriding paradigm in en-
vironmental philosophy—at least— forty years later, we have 
to consider that if one is already perceived as being “guilty by 
association,” espousing some form of Eastern religion and/or 
Humanistic Psychology, then not much will happen afterwards—
DE’s critics will point this out (Marshall, 1988). Ironically, DE 
has been described in some cases as not being radical enough or 
not being self-consistent (Bookchim, 1987).  
 However, and to be fair to all these “cocktail” ideas, in 
the final analysis, little of this matters, really, if one is not a 
philosopher or social scientist and “simply” needs an impres-
sionistic “value” structure and/or frame of reference from which 
to justify certain actions or express deep and genuine feelings of 
“connection.” In fact, I doubt that any person who has felt the 
feelings/sentiments described in the quote by James, and/or has 
gone onto making them a regular aspect of their lifestyle and 
psyche as some sort of “ecopsychology,” and/or has used them 
as a justification for righteous—in their view—activism, ever 
needed DE principles to begin with, in Naessian or other forms. 
 There is, no doubt, something “true,” something enchanting, 
something valuable, something even delirious about the 
rediscovery that humans are organisms like any other and are 
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forever locked into an interconnectedness “dance” with the 
whole of “nature.” We are all beautiful forms.  
Beautiful Forms  
 There is much about DE that is instantly recognizable to 
those readers who delve in ecosophy, ecopsychology, Buddhism 
and ecofeminism, particularly in the work of Devall and 
Sessions (1985). Their continued connections with and elab-
orations of DE as when presenting Paul Shepard’s Human 
Ecology and ecopsychology, or the work of Dolores LaChapelle 
and Theodore Roszak, poets like beat-Buddhist Gary Snyder, 
and Zen Buddhism proper (Robert Aitken) made me giddy and 
validated my own feelings and sentiments: these people were 
all right—good eggs. My own heart had fellow tree-kissing 
comrades. For that matter, any reader of DE just as easily, and 
for similar reasons, may study and embrace Whitehead’s and 
Cobb’s (Whitehead, 1919; ix Cobb Jr.,1972/1995) derivations 
from metaphysics to ecology preceding DE, or merging these as 
instances as a similar family of insights: ecological interrelated-
ness is inescapable in “god’s” (or “Gaia’s) ecology.  
 To disclose again, I have been a student of, sat in meditation 
with, and gone hiking with Bill Devall. I destroyed the invasive 
lupine plants he ordered me to eradicate—for no extra credit. 
For four years, I lived in a small ohana that Robert Aitken built 
with his wife as their first Hawaiian zendo (Haiku, HI). Most of 
the present work was written there. These are not empty abstrac-
tions. To this very moment these experiences are felt like cool 
tropical rain and hot spicy tea. For years I have been nourished 
by beat poetry and my South American Animus has been fortified 
by eco-feminist works, in particular. Their combined language 
and messages are about beautiful forms constantly emerging 
and ever sustaining. Above all, they balance, then and now, my 
tendency to measure and tally—which is as strong. At some 
point though, I “grew up” and without parting with their wisdom 
I delved deeper into why DE owes much to Eastern philosophi-
cal traditions, for example, but equally important, I learned why 
DE cannot make certain claims with respect to the traditions that 
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color and contribute to its very real and contagious fluorescence, 
without receiving due and healthy criticism. 
 Before sitting in zazen and many years since I have had 
experiences that can poorly be described as “profoundly 
ordinary.” This is the language that Alan Watts translates and 
shares to characterize, in essence, some of the experiences that 
have been passed down to us from the early Chan Taoist monks 
as “insight” or “satori” (1957). And the next section will perhaps 
not sit very well with many individuals who profess some kind 
of spirituality, and in particular, a nature spirituality. 
The Spell of Sensuous Ordinariness  
 Whether my experiences (“zen moments”) occurred 
outdoors or indoors, whether they happened early in my life or 
later, one thing was common to all: there was never a specific 
sense that “nature” existed apart from my own experience. 
More importantly, at least to me, there was no specific sense 
of “nature,” period, distinct from a broken bit of glass, a dirty 
shoe, a house, another person, etc., from the whole collection of 
perceived objects and happenings that I describe as my “reality.” 
That is, in these states, no distinctions were relevant, useful, or 
meaningful. A sense of ever-present “ordinariness” (the thing 
was the thing, no more no less) pervaded my psychefield of 
experience. Only afterwards, and with great difficulty, while 
employing poor analogies, I could have declared any or all of 
the following without ever saying anything pertinent and while 
being pertinent: 
 I am one-third with the world I am several natures depending 
on the weather…Love is life, life is blood…Some teeth are 
sharper than others…The tea smells of gardenias and smiles 
of ginger… Look at my left shoe; it needs new laces…I do 
not exist, but co-exist with lots and lots of bacteria— Lots!...I 
really love pecans, especially when swimming in a pie—not me, 
the pecans!... That bit of green glass, it’s sure pretty…I am as 
ordinary as any other thing can be, but today, now, more so…All 
is beautiful, beautiful forms are all… All is ugly, ugly forms are 
all… All or none of above is quite extraordinary!  
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 Perhaps, in this context, some readers would appreciate 
my own sense of confusion when some of the literature of DE, 
or of “ecopsychology,” or new age psycho-edifying treatises, 
combine almost willy-nilly, spirits, voices, different measures 
of religious traditions, profound water fall fairy revelations, 
ayahuasca wisdom, secret and intimate encounters with bears, 
sex with dolphins, in short, an amorphous glob of super-natu-
rality as aim and purpose of, or final destination for “natural 
connections.”  
 So, in the end, the questions are both philosophical and psy-
chological: 1) Whose set of experiences--whose epistemology-do 
we hold as the “gold standard” for evaluating and valuating the 
authenticity of some experience we call “nature connection”? 
and assuming that this could be done—I doubt it—2) What sort 
of ethics ensues from these experiences, intuitions, feelings, or 
sentiments? 
 Interestingly, the very, recalcitrant at times, traditional 
literature coming from Chinese and Japanese Zen traditions and 
texts (Watts, 1957), upon which many of the ideas or extensions 
of DE applications are based, over and over, explicitly or 
implicitly, warn against easy classification-with-words about 
these very experiences. Apropos, for a Chan-Zen master, acts of 
“compassion” involved actually chopping bodily limbs in order 
to diminish self-centeredness, in order to “transcend” a petty 
ego. This is not the flower-in-the-vase variety of compassion 
but acts that are so extant and removed from their historical 
and experiential context that their reification by selecting some 
exclusive subset of “acts of compassion” do little to elucidate 
the tradition from which these emerged. In particular, and 
according to the great Chan masters (Watts, 1957), there is 
no reason to exclusively or directly link profound “ordinary” 
experiences with “nature” per se. So, how does one go from, 
DE enthusiast to the non-metaphysics of “say-no-thing” and “no 
categories exist,” to very precise and exclusive formulations of 
“compassion” ethics or intrinsic value? 
 And should DE ideas be expressed while employing Zen 
Buddhist terminology, contradictions arise anew if one stays 
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with primary sources and/or personal experience, centrally, the 
very notion of “self.” In the words of Alan Watts, “Zen points 
out that our precious ‘self’ is just an idea, useful and legitimate 
enough if seen for what it is, but disastrous if identified with our 
real nature” (p.120,121). 
 Here is the problem, perhaps only my problem. Going back 
to that phrase Self-realization as a central motif in Naess’ DE, 
empirically speaking, there is no testable/credible justification 
in assuming that merely from experiencing personal feeling or 
sentiment “A” we can generate principle “B,” that is, going even 
further and formulating, specifically, an intrinsic value system 
that makes our “connection with nature” some sort of ethics. That 
is, there is no testable/credible justification in affirming that some 
sort of Self-realization(self-transcendence) process exists—a 
universal principle—and that as a consequence, all forms, 
beautiful and ugly are irreducibly engaged in “this business,” 
and therefore, everything shares in this value, Becoming. If so, 
it can be said that DE never needed to, nor needs today, to make 
value statements consistent with otherworldly metaphysics, or 
with sentiments and feelings based on insights--formulate a code 
of ethics based on these hard to measure ontologisms or make 
unlikely statements such as in (my own characterization) “the 
self-realization potential of this tree is as important as mine.” 
 More importantly, as far as anybody knows, the strange 
experience of overriding “ordinariness” or other feelings, 
sensations, and sentiments that ensue thereafter as part of a 
“Zen experience” are a unique condition and predisposition of 
a human brain/mind system without psychological correlates 
or any profound and objectively significant relations with the 
rest of the natural world and universe—a very un-Batesonian 
statement to make. Simply, and in James’ words, the “days when 
the weather seems all whispering with peace, hours when the 
goodness and beauty of existence enfold us like a dry, warm 
climate, or chime through us as if our inner ears were subtly 
ringing with the world’s security,” is nothing but, and exists only 
in our brain/mind imagination-as far as we know. If so, “we save 
the planet” because we decide we must, because we want to and 
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not necessarily because that tree or this lion has an “intrinsic 
value or right to exist.” Ethics—morality—is, if sufficiently 
inspected, self-serving even in the face of apparently noble and 
impartial motives.   
 But, that’s OK! Lions and trees are saved nevertheless, 
because without them WE WOULD BE LONELY (Shepard, 
1996). Building canoes by hand, manipulating simple tools 
pleasant to the fingers, being impressed and ennobled by the 
behaviors of animal otherness (Shepard, 1996), deriving satis-
faction from the wabi sabi ordinariness of an old wooden bench 
or a tree trunk—our many enchantments or obsessions with all 
their beautiful forms— reside, until or unless proven otherwise, 
inside human brains/minds and only there. These feelings and 
sentiments are intrinsic to the human brain/mind system and 
this seems to be quite enough. “I want to save lions because 
they are beautiful and powerful animals” seems to me as good a 
reason as any, without having to invent questionable metaphys-
ical predicates to justify my actions and wishes—to direct my 
behaviors. We can go further and codify this very sentiment and 
henceforth make new laws that declare: “Lions must be saved 
because they are (have) beautiful forms and powerful animals.” 
But laws are arbitrary. 
Paradoxically Perplexing Songs  
  There is no one “Gold Standard” for “an appreciation of 
‘nature’.” Instead, there are many golden means, many ways of 
relating to “nature,” many ways of justifying what we do “there,” 
as many, in fact, as there are eyes and brains, hands, wings, or 
paws. Our individual-intimate ways of “becoming one with 
nature” or simply enjoying and appreciating all the beautiful 
forms, all the strange places, require no authority—philosoph-
ical or “ecopsychological” predicates.  
 Therefore, there could be many ethical proposals invented to 
justify all these actions. Much like grammar is an afterthought 
of fluid and natural speech, of language, our intimations with/
in “nature” may be followed through by capitalizing on one or 
another formal system of inquiry which “simply” rationalizes 
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intuitions, insights, sentiments and feelings after the fact. In 
that spirit…I have thought long and hard about this. The feral 
hens I feed every day make paradoxically perplexing sounds, 
sometimes even songs if they are in the mood. They sound 
satisfied, testy, frustrated, angry, perturbed, or scared. None of 
their songs seem to say: “Jorge has intrinsic value.” That is, I am 
either there for them or not, and if I went away tomorrow they 
would, I suspect, still make the same chicken chatter.  
 I look deep and far into the starry night sky and not a single 
corpuscle of light knows my name, much less says: “There, 
over there, Jorge exists and he has intrinsic value.” I can make 
something up, like, Hoku-ke’ax protects me, but I know in my 
Haole heart of Haole hearts and in my Catalan head of Catalan 
heads that it ain’t true.  
 I take DE to mean what it can say or mean, but no more and 
no further than the night starry sky that I can see can say. All 
their voices are linked to mine but none speaks louder or clearer 
than the other:
 Father Naess: There is a profoundly beautiful Norwegian 
“chatter” about mountains— climbing them—silence, and what 
could happen if this beauty or silence were to disappear just 
because some other human thought that building a chalet and 
ski resort was a pretty darn good way of making a living. 
 Fathers Devall and Drengson: There was a Zen climber in 
Northern California or an avid walker in BC Canada who, both, 
moved mountains and they in turn were moved by mountains.  
 Father Snyder: There is a testy, crafty, and crusty beat poet 
that still sings paradoxically perplexing verses so that the rest of 
us can smell what he sees. There was an old veteran who became 
a lay zen “monk” and founded a zendo in a tropical paradise 
even though he himself suffered the pain of the world. 
 Myself in Haiku, at this very moment: There is an invasive 
diurnal mongoose that lives near my hut, which can never 
quite catch a circadian-antipodal bunch of succulent and furry 
nocturnal rats. By light of day, he steals eggs for a living and is 
quite content, or so it appears. The rats seem relieved and go on 
stealing our bananas.  
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 When my body allows it me, I run on a long stretch of beach. 
Crabs and stilts scamper away. The green and rugged hills to the 
west, sometimes the moon setting in the early morning hours, 
the dry or brackish salty marshes, turtles, dolphins and whales, 
every now and then, appear and then disappear, filling me with 
wonder and appreciation. I am put in my place and humbled. 
Awestruck is the very word I want to use to describe all these 
happenings. We are all doing our business, I on two older legs, 
they on faster and strange ones. DE makes sense HERE on these 
occasions. Who or what can deny any other “who” or “what” the 
privilege of appearing and disappearing, running, scampering, 
posing majestically, or taking turns at eye-spying? Also, any 
who or what, can and does deny any other thing or process its 
flow in our almost daily life-and-death “plays,” oftentimes, for 
reasons I shall never know. 
 Really, that certain and that simple: Who or what can deny 
any other who or what the privilege of appearing and disappear-
ing, running, scampering—being-both, an extraordinary and 
also a very ordinary multitude of comings and goings, living 
and dying beautiful forms?  
Some Paradoxically Perplexing “Things” 
 We affirm with terror, love or care, We negate in joy, at 
leisure, or in jest, We carelessly take more than any one thing 
could eat or hoard, We exist as unfettered imagination and in 
minute, lucid moments, We are invasive species and are too 
ravaged by the intrusion of many-a-foe, We enact laws that no 
deer or wolves obey, but their rules always seem to matter more, 
Mountain-slides raze towns and kill infants without a thought 
in mountain or of child, We see and not see, want and not want, 
wish and stop wishing, And yet, “nature” does not care, we do, 
Above all--and here is the paradoxically perplexing thing—we 
live inside ourselves every second, and every second that counts, 
we live outside ourselves and become the beautiful forms we 
affirm with terror, love, and care. 
 If nothing else, because of all of this, one needs a deep ecology 
or some kind of “ecopsychology” to help us begin to sort out our 
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existentially inescapable relations to the natural world, and us 
too, as part of this naturalness-ness. But these paths begin in 
the middle. They are neither the trailhead nor a destination. No 
person has yet invented a microscope that peers into the paradox 
that is life and death with clarity. Most likely, even if such a 
device existed, we would be instantly and precisely perplexed, 
when the silly scope magnifies absolutely nothing of worth, 
nothing worth being perplexed about. From an “ecopsycho-
logical” perspective, if nothing else, we need some kind of DE 
when we realize we have gone too far--when we have killed too 
many things and heaped too many bones and then wish to atone 
for these sins—wish to amend our transgressions. In short, DE 
can be seen as an epistemological structure that facilitates not 
only catharsis, a necessary social and psychological need, but 
equally, suggests meaningful-to-the-person positive behavioral 
outlets, activism, even though, at its core, it is metaphysically 
questionable. 
 Mostly, we need some sort of DE and/or some sort of “eco-
psychology” in order to, again, have faith in ourselves. Perhaps, 
no other justification is needed for wearing a cardboard bear 
mask and pretending to be a bear (speak for bear). Similarly, the 
existential psychologist Otto Rank (1956) remarked: 
The patient needs a world view and will always need it, 
because man always needs belief, and this so much more, the 
more increasing self-consciousness brings him to doubt. Psy-
chotherapy does not need to be ashamed of its philosophic 
character, if only it is in a position to give to the sufferer the 
philosophy that he needs, namely, faith in himself. (p.75) 
There is “ecological” and even “ecopsychological” wisdom that 
has been passed down to us from long ago ages and thinkers. 
In a nutshell, this wisdom is a continued exultation of the vir-
tue-habits of frugality, simplicity, non-attachment, and humility. 
Epicurus, Buddha, St. Francis are notable and salient voices 
espousing the connection between a simple life and nimble or 
unburdened psychology. 
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 That these voices and wisdom often originate in the context of 
a religious tradition, does not make “ecopsychology” a religion 
any more than medical cures, architecture, animal husbandry, or 
agriculture are “religious” when these sciences too emerge in the 
context of a dominant cultural paradigm. Religious and spiritual 
overtones are not intrinsic to any of these pursuits unless a 
person, idiosyncratically so, forces or needs this connection.  
   
*     *     *     
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Psycho-Phenology: Applications of Ecological Panarchy to 
Psycho-Ecological Systems 
 
 “…the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with 
the blood of patriots & tyrants. It is it’s [sic] natural manure.” 
(Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Williams Stephens Smith, Paris, 
Nov. 13, 1787)  
 
 The above quote by Jefferson might give uncomfortable 
pause to any sensible and socially stable person. One suspects 
a “positive psychologist” may balk at this notion on some sort 
of personal or empirical ground. Nevertheless, the unsettling 
declaration speaks to the recurring dilemma, a historical-
ly corroborable fact, that the human psyche negotiates from 
time to time (must, according to Jefferson), the quality of its 
human standing and health vis a vis unfavorable, diminishing, 
or crumbling social and natural structures. More often than not 
the “negotiations” with an established order are bloody and 
disrupting. On the other hand, a Taoist or Buddhist monk might 
not be at all surprised or perturbed by the factual nature of this 
claim.
 Given the fluidity and projective potential inherent in the 
words “ecology” and “psychology,” it is not surprising that there 
could also be multiple approaches that attempt to justify their 
relational dynamics. Chapter Four reviewed several approaches 
that make use of existing systems (e.g. Buddhism) with which 
to make these terms seem amenable and congruent to each other. 
Some of these proposals run the gamut from simply paying lip 
service to these tags, that is, they are through and through non-sci-
entific idiosyncratic proposals, to, in mainstream psychology, 
attempting to understand some deeper connections within and 
between various eigenwelt, mitwelt and umwelt systems.
 With respect to the latter, this is the case, for example, 
when J. J. Gibson presents us with a dynamic understanding of 
perception in context (Gibson, 1986) or when seen in U. Bron-
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fenbrenner’s complex and truly ecological approach to human 
development (Bronfenbrenner).
 The position taken here is that it is clear that both tags 
determine, from the start, a scholarly conversation about systems 
and systemics. Throughout this work, it has been emphasized 
that “ecopsychology” seems to be addressing or readdressing 
eigenwelt-mitwelt-umwelt relations with an eye toward un-
derstanding the degree to which nature affiliations could be 
described as optimal for an individual, groups of individuals, 
and/or societies. The same approach might produce descriptions 
of sub-optimal and even dysfunctional affiliations (nature es-
trangement and nature alienation).
 An aspect of the relationship that exists between these two 
types of descriptions, optimal and sub-optimal, includes the 
revisiting of ecological proposals that look at the challenges of 
sustainability and resilience from psychological perspectives. 
Paul Shepard’s work, Nature and Madness, does so comprehen-
sibly well, but it is not a work that was intended to develop a 
precise science of nature affiliations. His work orients us in the 
right direction and begins to ask fundamental questions about 
the possible arcs of human development vis a vis changing so-
cio-cultural structural and normative dynamics.  
 In ecological terms, humans have burned savannah and 
prairie alike in order to ensure constant and renewed grazing 
by large herbivores to make for easier hunting. Particularly 
vulnerable megafauna (e.g. on islands, flightless birds, slow 
reproducing) have been hunted to extinction by humans (Stuart, 
1991; Holdaway and Jacomb, 2000; Brook and Johnson, 2006; 
Metcalf, et al, 2016). Humans are ecological mega-disruptors on 
an order comparable to natural catastrophes (Zalasiewicz, 2010; 
and Revkin, 2011) with no abating in sight.  
 Moreover, and culturally speaking, any of the key terms to be 
presented (destruction, organization, reorganization, resilience, 
sustainability) equally apply to a hero’s monomyth (Campbell, 
1949), here to be taken as an important (realistic) psychological 
model from which to abstract and value psychological becoming 
and to draw analogies from. 
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 As psycho-ecologically intuitive as these connections are, 
the generally accepted goals of psychological functionality and 
sustainability are insisted upon with a therapeutic goal toward 
sometimes vacuous or even noxious social contexts. 
 Neither the therapist nor the “client” nor society (Conesa-Se-
villa, 2006; Fromm, 1955) seem to “get it together,” despite the 
well-wishes, admonitions, theories, and the many interventions 
that are meant to catalyze psychological wellness. Another 
unsettling reality: The best that psychology has posited and now 
offers seems to be a pale benefit when compared to the global 
scope and scale of a variety of woes that the whole of humanity 
and other planetary systems face. During a global epidemic of 
existential discord and dissonance, a few vaccinations for a 
handful of affluent patients simply won’t do.   
 The nature of ontological psychological dynamics, its 
stability continually tested and upturned by developmental and 
historical events, was not lost on psychologists like Erik Erikson 
(1950) and Erich Fromm (1955), both writing in the context of 
WWII and the incipient rising of the “throw away” society. 
Psycho-Phenology 
 The term Psycho-Phenology is here coined in order to 
continue bringing greater parity to ecology and psychology 
(Conesa-Sevilla, 2005; Conesa-Sevilla, 2006; Conesa-Sevilla, 
2013). The grand master of phenology, Aldo Leopold (Leopold 
& Jones, 1947), saw the relevance of understanding the cycles 
and seasons in a given environment as a way to comprehend 
the totality of a terroir and make predictions of its likely and 
further development. Psycho-phenology can be considered 
a sub-perspective under a scientifically rigorous and grander 
“ecopsychology.”  
 The term psycho-phenology also implies the study of a 
“sense of place.” In essence it is an intimate understanding and 
account of the cyclical nature of an organism-in-context. Its 
basic assumption is that the dynamics of change is as much a 
value of ecology as apparent constancy and sustainability.  
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 Psychologists are also de facto phenologists if they make the 
following assumptions: 1) The human mind-body system is first 
and foremost an ecological system; 2) The ecology of the human 
mind-body system constantly interacts with diverse aspects and 
multiple kinds and levels (respectively, eigenwelt, mitwelt, and 
umwelt; and micro, meso, and macro) of many other ecological 
systems; 3) Change, disruptions, and turbulence are key trans-
formative elements of any ecology; 4) Apparent stability 
(sustainability) is a limited and partial measure in time (Cone-
sa-Sevilla, 2005); 5) All ecological systems fail, or are designed 
to fail, provided some compensatory maneuvers are also in 
place. Vulnerability to “failure,” in ecological terms, is seen as 
an opportunity for reorganization and transformation; and 6) 
Natural selection, among other mechanisms of evolution, is the 
grand paradigm under which ecology makes the most sense—it 
is a most useful tool for making fruitful predictions and testable 
hypotheses.  
 In this light, Psycho-Phenology is a reconciliation with 
ecology that human beings, without and within, are ecological 
systems, and because they are “systems” they are governed by 
laws that transcend their perceived and actual “infinite cultural 
status.” That is, human culture, for most individuals, presents an 
illusory sense of permanence in that it might psychologically be 
assumed to be a sustainable culture, even though signs of great 
change stir on its historical horizon.   
 Although stability and certainty are desirable conditions 
for humanity under which to succeed, realistically speaking 
and across many of the organizational systems envisioned and 
practiced by humans (political, religious, economic), change 
and uncertainty are equally the norm. To make idiosyncrat-
ic-human exemptions, to ignore the volatility that is “life,” 
or to fail to take into account variables that shape all circum-
stances, actual and potential, is to negate (as in denial) a basic 
constitution of existence. As an example, and in the words of 
Steven Stoll (2016), “Economic growth partakes in this magical 
thinking: the capacity of the environment remains constant at 
infinity.”  
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 Human nature (habits, preferences, likes, and dislikes) tends 
toward stability even though its own biological understrata and 
larger ecological contexts are in states of constant dynamics. 
This mismatch between the ecological ideal and the actual 
leads to underestimating change itself, the rate of change, the 
direction of change, and the repercussion that change might 
have on resilience and sustainability. 
 Viewed from an ecological perspective, boom and bust, 
happiness and sorrow, health and disease, interest and boredom, 
elation and depression, hedonistic and suicidal tendencies are 
one whole cloth of the human experience. They all suggest 
that actual life is subject to the whims, moods, and cycles of 
real events and that no one person can make these onslaughts 
stand still. Siddhartha’s father tried sheltering his son from 
sorrow and harm only to contribute to making him one of the 
most remarkable examples of the rejection of human psycho-
logical stability-permanence. In short, to fathom human-nature 
cycles, to beware of their temporary and superficial constancy, 
ironically, their apparent “dependability” as harbingers of the 
potentially chaotic situation they might become, is the domain 
of Psycho-Phenology.
 In this context, and with a full understanding of psycho-phe-
nological facts and dynamics, one can better appreciate and 
incorporate the disciplines of frugality and non-attachment as 
an ideal being-form; as optimal psychology. If so, and in this 
light, some of the wisdom of Epicurus, Buddha, or St. Francis is 
recognizably “ecological” and even “ecopsychological.”   
 Thus, although one might favor the mostly predictable plot 
of a Bildungsroman novel--youth, step by step learning his or 
her way in society and eventually achieving maturity--this de-
velopmental arc is teleologicaly speaking all too ideal. On the 
other hand, and not surprisingly, the assuredly laborious and 
potentially lethal arc of the monomyth (Campbell, 1949) has 
been the most enduring, and ironically, the most realistic myth 
across human cultures and time. Life is suffering and conquering 
with moments of respite--in a person’s life, in a group’s time, in 
the history of any nation, and further back into prehistory.
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Ecological Panarchy 
 Gunderson et al (1995), Holling et al (2002a), and Holling 
et al (2002c), modified traditional frameworks for understanding 
ecological dynamics. Their work added to an already existing 
phenology, a more realistic emphasis on processes of destruction 
and organization in addition to the traditional ecological foci on 
growth and conservation. Their framework adds two additional 
functions, release and reorganization, with which one can also 
understand the inter-medial mutability of ecological systems—
their inter-phasic dynamics. Within the limitations of the 
panarchy model (Gotts, 2007), there is much that is already 
relevant to an understanding of human systems (see Appendix 
II).   
 Figure 3, adapted from Gunderson and Holling (2002), 
minus the added references to its original (in red), depicts the 
dynamics of Ecological Panarchy. At first look, panarchy, at 
least implicitly, tracks the systemic historical changes that some 
systems are likely to revisit. Panarchy can be made congruent 
with other descriptions that emphasize the dynamics of all 
organisms and systems with regard to life’s basic components 
and interactions of Energy, Safety, and Possibility (Conesa-Se-
villa, 2005).
Figure 3
69
Chapter 5
 Questions of resilience and sustainability arise when the 
establishment and diversity, “functionality,” are understood 
and also tracked as part of the dynamics that panarchy aims 
to elucidate. In the words of Holling and Gunderson (2002b), 
resilience can be seen as “the magnitude of disturbance that 
can be absorbed before the system changes its structure by 
changing the variables and processes that control behavior.” If 
so, then the psychological concept of “coping” suggests a direct 
analogy to ecological resilience, where an increase of coping 
and varied strategies implies greater resilience—“the magnitude 
of disturbance that can be absorbed.”  
 All ecological systems, including human psychology, 
fail eventually, or are so developmentally dynamic that they 
are inherently unstable—a virtue of adaptability. A Freudian 
perspective allows for the notion that human psychology, itself 
dynamically changing, while embedded in changing social 
systems, necessitates innate ego-defense mechanisms in order 
to accomplish the goals of basic survival. Thus reinterpreted, 
a non-teleological view of human development, for starters, 
suggests that psychological failure and collapse are proximal 
and expected in order to learn new strategies for coping (Cone-
sa-Sevilla, 2013). 
 In this light, detachment, physical toughness, stoic 
endurance, civility, selfishness, perseverance, cooperation, 
politeness, generosity, negotiation, or plain stubbornness can all 
be equally effective coping strategies depending on the nature 
of the social or nature-environmental change. In this context, 
psycho-phenology deals with psychology in real historical and 
contemporary contexts, focusing on “what is” rather than on 
idealized conceptions of “happiness” (Seligman, 1991). The 
happy-go-lucky optimist may be the first casualty of the Anthro-
pocene. 
The Resiliency Cycle Revisited 
Figure 3 and Table 2 (a & b) introduce and juxtapose four 
ways of identifying the psycho-ecological passage from ruin to 
riches. It also serves as an anthropological format (nonnorma-
70
Ecopsychology Revisited
Survival
(Reorganization phase ά)
Emergency Disguise
Remedy Hiding/Displacement
Short-term Procurement
Open-ended (O-E) Location
Disorientation Map
Make-shift Strangers
Un-planned Dissociation
No sense of place Estrangement
Basic Needs Disconnection
Vigilance Respite
Pernoctation Necessity
Trauma/Healing Temporary
Flight/flee Otherness
Thriving/Inhabiting
(Exploitation Phase r)
Solace Disclosure
Wellness Inhabiting
Long-term Planting/Harvesting
Less O-E, more close ended Place
Oriented Territory
Enduring/durable Companions
Planned Association
Sense of place Familiarity
Amenities Connection
Monitoring Rest/Recreation
Habitation Luxury
Strengthening Enduring
Stand ground Oneness
Table 2-a
tive, value-free) of mapping different models of psychological 
well-being. For example, idealized notions of human prosperity 
(Seligman, 1991) can be defined by the “thriving/inhabiting” and 
even the “stagnation” phases (shown in Figure 3 and described 
in Tables 2a and 2b).
 Whenever chaos or new possibilities for growth are the 
existential status quo, then, respectively, “destruction” and 
“survival” modalities will be the norm. In ecological terms, 
coping strategies that may work during the “thriving/inhabiting” 
phase may be useless or unwarranted during the “destruction” 
and “survival” phases. During times of plenty, a predilection 
for certain foods, and specifically the religious adherence to 
eating kosher foods, for example, may no longer be sustainable 
without noticeable risk of decreasing the chances of survival. 
These forced changes in the procuring of basic nourishment may 
also lead to new dietary discoveries that themselves shape the 
very direction of evolution (eating more meat, cooking meat, or 
preserving meat; ingesting hallucinogens and fermented brews).
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Table 2-b
Stagnation 
(Conservation Phase K)
Saturation Secrecy
Sedentary Owning
Transgenerational Managing
Closed-ended Homeland
Domicile Cartography/Platted space
Entrenched Neighbors
Traditions Identification
Fatherland Dependency
Luxuries Yolking
Surveillance Industry
Residence Inheritance
Capitulation Legacy
Persevere Is-ness
Destruction
(Release Phase Ω)
Breakage Paranoia
Displacement Trading
Individual/Masses Hoarding
Chaotic Locations
On the move Distances/Time
Volatile Competitors
Uncharted Alienation
No-man’s land Loneliness
Bartering Separation
Look-out Adaptation
Shelter Useful
Hunted Passing
On the move It-ness
 Table 2 (a & b), in addition to encapsulating the functionalities of 
survival, thriving/inhabiting, stagnation, and destruction, presents 
another perspective, albeit in very broad strokes, in understanding 
the psychology of place, or a sense of place. The intertwining of 
psychology and place in psycho-phenological approaches is an 
indispensable and naturally ecological association without which 
human psychology cannot, on the whole, be understood. People 
live in places, they sleep in bedrooms, they identify with a town or 
a city with specific streets and neighborhoods; that is, they thrive 
or struggle in places. People create sanctuaries (temples, natural 
parks, recreational sites) to seek solace, to cope, or to maximize 
already present potentialities.    
 When studying psychology from a humanistic or teleological 
perspective, scholars may tend to emphasize human potentiali-
ties as idealized forms (make them normative) and run the risk 
of ignoring other adaptable human capabilities. Psychoanalysis 
emerges in the context of anti-Semitic struggles and humanistic 
psychology after the horrors of WWII, for example. In both, there 
are implicit and explicit (Fromm, 1955) acknowledgements that 
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human nature is subject to both social and natural environmental 
circumstances, most of the time unavoidable. Whatever intrinsic 
coping strategies may be at hand, whatever new adaptations to 
changing circumstances may be learned, no single standard of 
“adaptability” may be warranted.  
 Panarchy’s Resilience Cycle has been modified (Figure 3 
and Table 2) in order to illustrate an organic interpretation of 
change as it impacts human psychology. There is no singular 
“change” but a series of phases and differing sets of strategies for 
maximizing “survival.” The likelihood that the human organism 
might capably and successfully navigate the contingencies of 
and transitions between each phase demands that the notion of 
resilience be defined as a multitude and variety of behavioral and 
mental accommodations predicated on individual or collective 
definitions of “a sense of place.” “Place” is not a transcenden-
tal realm but the site where real events are unfolding and when 
any organism is forced to figure out what set of strategies will 
best suit the moment and the location. The passage of time in an 
actual “place” where events happen or are self-actuated makes 
psychology a phenology of the psyche in a real, ecological sense.
(See Appendix II for additional applications of Panarchy.)
  
*     *     *
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Nature as Madness 
 
“But his soul was mad. Being alone in the wilderness, it had 
looked within itself and, by heavens I tell you, it had gone mad.” 
(Joseph Conrad) 
 In the west, at least, the praising and exaltation of nature (or 
properties and elements in nature) in contemporary movements, 
in a relatively recent historical romantic past, or as part of 
more ancient approaches of worship and veneration, are just 
a handful of projective emphases to a comparable if not equal 
evaluation of nature as hostile wilderness (Nash) or as the source 
of madness: nature as madness or becoming mad in nature. 
The word “madness” is employed in order to add a degree of 
uncertainty and unreality (psychic flux) to self-nature gestalts. 
Madness in this sense adds a factor of fluidity, which in its best 
sense could be akin to the Taoist notion of free-flow. This idea 
bears inclusion in a serious discussion and inquiry of self-nature 
gestalts, to the extent that nature too changes, unpredictably, 
and new psychic accommodations to its processes demand the 
formulation of new meanings. 
 That is, for almost every description of nature as benign, holy, 
motherly, serene, comprehensible, harmonious, peaceful, etc., 
there are as many corresponding descriptors (evil, promiscuous, 
whore, turbulent, incomprehensible, chaotic, lethal, etc.) which 
suggests that no absolute or fixed ontology of nature is readily 
discernable, but more likely that a humanly projected and shifting 
taxonomy, individually, collectively, and/or historically voiced, 
drives these perceptions and representations. Even within the 
same historical and cultural zeitgeist, both perspectives could 
be ambivalently perceived and expressed. This contradictory or 
oppositional range of perceptions and attributes say more about 
human psychology than about nature. They also express a sort of 
madness in the sense used earlier.  
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 As Roderick Nash writes in Wilderness and the American 
Experience, unkept, distant, and territorially unknown natural 
spaces present a challenge to understanding, and also to cognitive 
coherence and legibility (to use Kaplan’s terms). In this sense, 
nature represents madness or the potential for madness. Later 
we shall see that this is not necessarily a negative description, 
particularly if human existence must choose between different 
types of madness: depersonalization caused by city states, the 
alienation of living in densely populated cities, working in 
factories, or confronting the incessant propaganda to participate 
in senseless consumerism. This description, nature as madness, 
allows for free play and opportunities where nature, even though 
at first perceived and evaluated as a place of madness, may be 
redeemable in the long run, understood and thus accepted as a 
realm, if not wholly rational, then at least supportive of reason.  
 While employing Patrick Fuery’s definition of madness 
(Madness and Cinema: Psychoanalysis, Spectatorship, and 
Culture) in his semiotic treatment of the relation between the 
cinema, spectators, and madness, the following characteris-
tics make the case that defining nature as madness allows us 
to understand many other approaches of relatedness across a 
humanly diverse spectrum of “nature connection” and discon-
nection--sentiments and processes.  
 Thus, borrowing and adapting from Fuery, the phrases, mine, 
‘in nature madness,’ ‘nature is madness,’ ‘madness in nature’ 
can be supported by the following alternating and complemen-
tary propositions:  
Madness/nature… 
• Is excess  
• Has an order of meaning and knowledge within itself
• Is mutable 
• Represents what cannot be done—the impossible/impos-
sibility
• Is knowledge’s (certainty’s) ‘other’ 
• Is resistance 
• Is impossible to represent 
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• Isn’t any-one-thing, but everything 
• Is disorder 
• Resists translation, interpretation, and stability 
• Risks meaning in order to be heard 
(Adapted from Fuery 2004: 1-31) 
 I have merely added the word “nature” next to the original 
text where he defines madness. I encourage the reader to 
look further into Fuery’s work and be gifted with many more 
connections that could be made between his text and mine. For 
now, we have enough to work with. Presenting this thesis of 
“nature as madness” is key to understanding a basic human 
necessity to experience a type of madness, or at least for flirting 
with madness when life is perceived to be incomprehensible 
across other dimensions or when it as absolutely predictable and 
unfulfilling. 
A Sextet of Madness  
 In order to simplify the complexity of relatedness with 
respect to nature and the built-up “civilized” environment, as 
well as psychic life and a need for challenging easy and familiar 
psycho-social dynamics, it might be useful to think of a set of 
relations (affiliations) as illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4
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 Additional modes or relationships of understanding, relating, 
or affiliating to nature as both a solace from madness or as madness 
itself, are possible. The above set of relationships, tropisms, and 
dynamics, allows us, for example, to situate and evaluate—to 
categorize--the influential work of Paul Shepard (Nature and 
Madness) and the romantic writings found in Rousseau, Goethe, 
Emerson, Thoreau, and Muir. More importantly, and as Fuery 
defines “madness,” it frees up the concept from its narrow 
medical definition, and it includes all the important and relevant 
senses in which one can speak of “madness” across various 
disciplines. 
 Many times I have been witness to “city folk” making their way 
into “the wilderness,” in order to seek out recreational activities 
that included fishing, hunting, boating, or snowmobiling, which 
also involved equal parts drinking, partying, rowdiness, and 
letting off steam (madness as excess and disorder). For these 
folks at least, it seems that “going mad” in nature was essential 
to maintaining well-being or offsetting the results of the daily 
toils of living in another setting for madness (city living) or 
trying to beat very mundane and predictable existences. It is as 
if a psychological and social construction of nature had already 
occurred, that nature was madness itself, or that nature allowed 
for the expression of a temporary madness. The thousands of 
broken beer and liquor bottles found in pristine natural settings 
are a testament to this psychologically necessary, so it would 
seem, on the surface, debauchery.   
 The above set also allows for opportunities to judge when 
nature seems comprehensible—legible and coherent—if and 
when thoughtful and inquisitive approaches are followed. 
Going back to Fuery’s definitions, once something is known, 
or is potentially knowable, it ceases to be the source of/for 
madness. The more nature is made legible and coherent, the 
more we understand that its apparent complexities often yield 
to practical, wondrous, and apprehensible realities--its madness 
diminishes—or we have entered its madness so deeply and 
profoundly that its madness is also our own. 
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 Fuery lists additional dimensions of madness associated with 
cinema viewing which can be easily extended as descriptors of 
madness in nature. Slipping into animality, passion, and fear 
are all expressions of madness. In this light, authentic totemic 
identification with a power animal (understanding its anatomy, 
ecological function, and real natural attributes) could be the 
means to enter the madness of nature to a degree of psycholog-
ical functionality that successfully mediates between the realms 
rational and fantastic.   
 Imagined or sought-after experiences such as transcendence, 
bliss, aesthetic eroticism, and many other states (the “divine” 
itself as madness) can also be euphemisms for madness. To the 
extent that there is a semiotic transposition (Fuery) between 
what these states and their function might mean for each of us 
and their readily available cultural descriptors or correspondenc-
es, and a closely delineated path of their discovery in nature, 
then the phrase “madness in nature” is no longer capricious or 
overstated. 
 To reiterate, the ambivalence of nature as representing 
madness or being madness itself, and wilderness as the place 
where conventional morality ends and animality, passion, and 
fear take over, or of nature as a place of solace, tranquility, and 
healing from other forms of madness, points to many natures 
and to many psychologies—nature connection becoming an 
incomplete phrase with which to capture this richness.
Panopticism and Human Nature
 Humans differ, temperamentally and at a basic biological 
level, in their degree of tolerance to crowding and social 
complexity. Hence our individual motivations for preserving 
and partaking of natural spaces, when they derive from these 
or similar basic psychobiological propensities, become an 
important and necessary ecopsychological study.  
 That is, being observed, and our psychological reactions to 
social observation and judgment, elicits predictable responses 
and accommodations along known temperamental continua, 
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extreme introversion and extraversion being the most obvious 
contrast.
 To reiterate earlier assertions, rather than assuming that one 
sort of “nature” exists for all, even casual observations indicate 
that many psychologies interpret, adjust to, and transact with 
highly selected aspects of “nature” in an idiosyncratic manner 
with various degrees of “success” (psychological functionality). 
 Therefore, it is no accident that the need for individual 
privacy, our intolerance of the mundane and the noisy, or a 
needed respite from social casual observation and judgment 
are achieved, in a significant portion of the human population, 
in solace and the very notion of sanctuary. Fences, cubby-hole 
niches, cars with tinted windows, and sunglasses are all proxies 
after the same need.  
 The physical and almost absolute manifestation of wrap 
around surveillance is the panopticon. In Paul Rabinow’s inter-
pretation of Michel Foucault’s ideas:
The panopticon consists of a large courtyard, with a tower 
in the center, surrounded by a series of buildings divided 
into levels and cells. In each cell there are two windows: 
one brings in light and the other faces the tower, where large 
observatory windows allow for the surveillance of cells. The 
cells become “small theaters, in which each actor is alone, 
perfectly individualized and constantly visible.” The inmate 
is not simply visible to the supervisor; he is visible to the 
supervisor alone—cut off from any contact. This new power 
is continuous and anonymous.  
Recently, one of many prisons built around the world and styled 
after the original panopticon design by the English philosopher 
and jurist, Jeremy Bentham, in Harleem, the Netherlands, is to 
be converted into a mall, essentially another panopticon. 
 Before we judge Bentham too harshly, it needs to be said that 
he was also one of the first philosophers to advocate for animal 
rights. Even those who implemented his utilitarian and efficient 
design as a practical way of controlling large populations of 
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inmates were perhaps merely innovating on well-established 
means of managing the masses. 
 Communal living that results in panoptic architectural ar-
rangements (tepees, Yanomami and Viking halls, wigwams, 
and churches) is very ancient indeed. Essentially, the panoptic 
arrangement, new and old, is equally the inward and inescapable 
public gaze looking for signs of troubled psychology and a forum 
for seeking and reaching consensus. The family unit and the psy-
chological and material restrictions of its dynamics is perhaps 
the first panoptic circle. 
 An adolescent’s rebellion is an affront to this first communal 
panopticon and part of a necessary “cry for freedom” that 
has long lasting consequences to society as a whole. As Paul 
Shepard observed, wherever youth has “nature” at its disposal, 
empty spaces can be a liberating canvass on which to explore an 
emerging identity free of unnecessary prohibitions. 
 But youth is running out of places to explore. In its more 
recent panoptic reiterations, as intensely scrutinized and be-
haviorally tracked shopping malls (e.g. Mall of America, 
Bloomington, MN), airports, and libraries, monitoring the 
behavior (and intentions) of large numbers of people necessi-
tates specialized architectural plans—many variations of cells.
 However, several features distinguish older from newer 
panoptic designs, most importantly, the notion of having a 
vote toward the formulation of a consensus. Another important 
feature is that after exiting a tepee or a Yanomami central hall, 
open nature, and not a serial continuation of socially panopti-
sized spaces, awaits exploration with minimal social judgment.
 Granting as a testable hypothesis that a significant percentage 
of the human population is biologically designed to better thrive 
in smaller and more private dwelling spaces, needing as well 
daily access to open prairie, sea, mountains or forests, then an 
inclusive ethics of social accommodation and planning ought 
to respect these psychological imperatives—make accommoda-
tions for its exigencies, for the good of all.
 Even gregarious types, every now and then, may have a need 
to seek out the inwardness of nature, finding true solace only there. 
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Eyes in the Forest
 A fair and balanced exploration of panopticism, both its 
manifestation in communal life and perverse psychological 
effects, in an attempt to understand “madness,” starts with nature 
itself as the primordial backdrop exemplifying observation and 
judgment.  
 What about “nature” is panoptic? From a biosemiotic 
perspective the answer is everything, depending on the psy-
chological orientation of the subject, or most everything, but 
in different ways. Panopticism is, in this biosemiotic sense, in 
nested and multiple levels of existence (eigen-mit-umwelten), 
by virtue of constant and inescapable reiterative interpretation, 
an inescapable ingredient of “human nature.” 
 Cries for “freedom” and the romantic and absolute vision of 
“free will” may very well be protestations against this inescapable 
reality. The “gods,” an ultimate expression of panoptic existence, 
watching and judging our every action, thought, and emotion, seem 
to be a proxy extension of a cognitive and “virtual” projection of 
the ever present inquisitive and judgmental social hub.
 Even in “nature” we cannot completely escape unwanted 
rumination or the consequences of our actions. In biblical 
mythology, Cain cannot escape or hide from god’s eye and 
judgment:
And Cain said to Abel his brother, "Let us go out to the field," 
and when they were in the field Cain rose against Abel his 
brother and killed him. And the Lord said to Cain, "Where 
is Abel your brother? And he said, "I do not know: am I 
my brother's keeper?" And He said, "What have you done? 
Listen! your brother's blood cries out to me from the soil. And 
so, cursed shall you be by the soil that gaped with its mouth to 
take your brother's blood from your hand. If you till the soil, 
it will no longer give you strength. A restless wanderer shall 
you be on the earth.”
The “restless wanderer” can never truly escape from many other 
instances of perceived and projected panoptic observation and 
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judgment from “nature”--the tepee, the great hall, a cave, a 
cubby-niche becoming only temporary refuge. Eventually, even 
these safe spaces can become yet another microscopic investiga-
tion of self, a micro-panoptic cell (e.g. a vision quest).
 One explanation for this never ending biosemiotic reiteration, 
and its likely etiology as “madness,” is based on the inescapable 
situation that even casual social observation could, at any time, 
turn into jealousy, judgment, retribution and punishment. 
 For example, in interpretative terms, when several parties 
are existentially engaged and interdependent, it may very well 
be that the easiest way to interpret any sort of discomfort and 
pain is as punishment to the extent that, usually, some sort of 
punishment follows judgment. This is an assumption that Michel 
Foucault makes as well when he wrote about panopticism in the 
grander context of “the great confinement.” In his own words:
Confinement, that massive phenomenon, the signs of which 
are found all across the eighteenth-century Europe, is a 
“police” matter. Police in the precise sense that the classical 
epoch gave to it--that is, the totality of measures which make 
work possible and necessary for all who could not live without 
it […]
In this context, and assuming that the situation has worsened 
since the 1700s, even eyes-with-minds in the forest following 
our every move might be an acceptable “natural panopticism” 
(as seen in Figure 4, swapping Madness in the city for “Madness” 
in nature) considering the societal alternative of wrap-around 
scrutiny, surveillance, and “security” in places such as the Mall 
of America. 
 Other minds sense our presence. This is obvious to anyone 
who has existed within or in the vicinity of wild spaces. Again, 
from a biosemiotic perspective, little occurs in the forest that 
is not noticed (interpreted) by some creature. Natural surveil-
lance is everywhere. In this context, camouflage, concealment, 
mimicry and subterfuge can be seen as anti-panoptic tactics and 
strategies both in nature and in society.  
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 In this sense, the full acceptance and immersion of “self” 
in nature, as the grand or original panoptic realm--living by its 
panoptic rules and conditions--may be as close as one gets to the 
existential condition: Un-maddening Nature (see Figure 4).  
Trickster as a Mad Comedian 
 One sure sign that madness and nature go together is that 
humor is equally a salient coping strategy for madness, its 
expression, or its resistance (Fuery). The exploits and antics of 
Hermes, coyote or raven are psychological lessons, told in myth-
ological terms, exemplifying the often-contradictory nature of 
our individual and collective self-nature gestalts.  Coyote and 
raven often stand for our own human incapacities to understand 
the often-incommensurable nature of these relations. What a 
chicken is to coyote, is not the same chicken to another chicken, 
or to another coyote.  
 While facing the fluidity of natural forms and processes a 
human being must realize acts and produce modes of thinking 
that can be quite extant from civilized, social reality. Coyote and 
raven, as our role models, are norm breakers out of necessity 
and because human societies, left to their own tendencies and 
inertia, might not keep pace with nature itself.  
 The tension between conservativism and progressive trends 
is one example of this ancient dialectics. 
 In the midst of collective “madness,” the gurus, tailor made 
for a problem, emerge as charlatans. In their efforts, often 
sincere, to make a person whole again, if that is even or ever 
possible, they can become as strict as any conservative—-as any 
fundamentalist.    
 From a serious (critical, falsifiable) “ecopsychological” 
perspective, it may not be quite fair to attribute, to claim, that 
certain popular writers, for example, are consciously taking 
advantage of basic human credulity and gullibility by muddling 
and oversimplifying the complexities of physics and con-
sciousness. The more basic fact might be simply that their own 
credulity and gullibility coupled with the real study-complexi-
ties of areas such as quantum physics and consciousness studies 
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(cognitive science and the philosophy of science) made more 
mud than clear water.  
 The writings of authors like Fritjof Capra, Gary Zukav, and 
Deepak Chopra (Respectively, 1975, 1979, & 1983) to name 
just one esoteric trio, might have represented, at least initially, 
a genuine effort on their part to make sense of and synthesize 
personal areas of interest, for sure, but equally to address 
or appease some deeply personal yearnings-—more art and 
literature than physics or psychology.   
 Assuming that additional (vetted, peer-reviewed) studies on 
quantum physics, consciousness, human-“mind,” “evolution,” 
health, and their purported intersection, have not yet produced 
the types of syntheses the above authors were (are) proposing, 
we are then, for the time being, classifying their work as “art and 
literature.” Their work, to be fair, is imaginative, creative, and 
inspiring to some, but is realistically short of truly tantalizing, if 
by that word we mean that their collective insights have opened 
up new frontiers in the above-mentioned sciences or produced 
testable hypotheses. On the other hand, if any of their work, past 
and present, is sold as “spirituality,” then we must take it at its 
presented face value: inspirational opinion. 
 In the above context, it is usually an important psychological 
question in the study of art and literature, and in “the history 
of science,” to inquire into the basic motivations that drive any 
author to commit certain ideas to ink and pages. 
 In parsing any author’s thoughts and words (ideas) we might 
come to understand much about his/her need to give free reign 
to h/his imagination in the context of, let’s assume, genuine psy-
cho-social explorations—personal quests and necessities, and 
other perturbations. 
 Genuinely so, they seem to be making sense of their own 
madness as well as critiquing the madness they witness around 
them. There are psychological needs for writers to write and for 
readers to read, and then to almost-believe, and then to make 
believe. At the end of this creative process, and in new age 
circles, the chicken ceases to be a featherless, legless carcass on 
a butcher’s table and comes to resemble painted disembodied 
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feathers wildly dancing in a Brazilian Carnaval, which like many 
other similar festivities, allows for the free reign of “madness” 
as culturally sanctioned rituals of psychological cleansing.    
 The manner in which a person or a society deals day to 
day with the slippery nature of “madness” is ultimately their 
choice. Any sort of formula exists or has been tried from the 
extremes of few freedoms with many rules, to fewer rules and 
many more freedoms; from the extremes of arbitrary socialness 
to becoming a hermit. However, to do so in a natural historical 
vacuum where no consideration is taken, no thought given, to 
the role that natural spaces, wildness, and natural processes play 
in the equation eigenwelt—mitwelt, is to exist, it seems, outside 
normal parameters. 
 Although “madness” may be a necessary function of our 
original self-nature gestalt formulations, the madness that Paul 
Shepard and Erich Fromm speak of, on the other hand, is of 
a different class and magnitude. To the extent that madness is 
equally rejection, acceptance, questioning, disruption, accom-
modation, transformation, and destruction, then it dances, feet 
with feet, with anthropocentric wishes or with a universe of 
natural things.    
 There may be no rhyme or reason (no teleology) for natural 
selection, but what it has left behind is true and tested madness 
of the sort that humans very much need. To step aside and invent 
our own separate dance seems, at the very least, rude and selfish.
  
*     *     *
85
ChaPTer seven 
 
We Know What We Know and Make Up the Rest 
 
“He who wishes to find his way to the origin of the crisis must 
pass through the lost domain of truth, in order to revise it pos-
sessively; must traverse the domain of perplexity, to reach 
decision concerning himself; must strip off the trappings of the 
masquerade, in order to disclose the genuine that lies beneath.”
(Karl Jaspers) 
 In Man in the Modern Age, the German philosopher Karl 
Jaspers (1931/1957) wrote about the explosion of information 
(earth and social scientific discoveries) and the necessary and 
ensuing dialectics in the sciences as a means for maintaining a 
more or less credible and sustainable professional communica-
tion enterprise of checks and balances: a falsifiability process for 
disconfirming and confirming arguments in the face of recurring 
and new evidence. 
 One of the dangers of the proliferation of scientific 
information, for Jaspers (1957, p.151), included the likelihood 
of distorted and cacophonic interpretations and competition by 
parties ancillary and secondary to the main and more orthodox 
scientific enterprise:
A faith in science that has degenerated into superstition is 
closely akin to humbug. Anti-scientific superstition, in its turn, 
will masquerade as science, proclaiming ‘a true science which 
has superseded the science of the doctrinaires’. The mentality 
of our generation has been clouded by astrology, Christian 
Science, theosophy, spiritualism, clairvoyance, occultism, 
and the like. Anti-science stalks abroad to-day amid all parties 
and sects and manifests its influence among persons of the 
most diversified outlooks, pulverizing the very substance of 
rational human existence.     
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 The almost universal ubiquity of the internet and of its 
seemingly endless possibilities for authorship only make Jasper’s 
observation in 1931 that more poignant today.
 Cognitively speaking, an individual’s need for keeping 
up with and making sense of an ever-expanding information 
horizon almost guarantees that misunderstanding, oversimplifi-
cation, and misapplication—pseudoscience—will be a common 
accidental and even strategic occurrence. In a different but 
related context, neuroscientist Peter Brugger (2001) wrote about 
the psychological phenomenon of apophenia, or our human 
tendency to naturally seek connections, to make sense, and derive 
deeper meanings from data. Although scientists share these 
natural human leanings toward elucidation and interpretation, 
the scientific method and the very public process of verification 
of results and methodology both act as proxy rationality and ob-
jectivity—a “critique” in the words of Michel Foucault (2010).
 Oftentimes, pseudoscientific arguments are expressed as a 
“Texas sharpshooter fallacy,” or the over eagerness to utilize 
and manipulate a privileged subset of data while ignoring the 
entire (unknown) data set. In astrology, for example, a limited 
set of properties (birth times, locations, and trajectories), from 
an arbitrarily chosen planetary system (Earth’s solar) and target 
planet (Earth), are taken to be causal determinants of human 
personality.
 In this sense, then, pseudoscience is not only the diminished 
experience of rationality, but could take a more insidious role 
as a usurper of the centrality that it is to be a “human being.” 
This is the case because so-called rational processes (cognitive 
and proxy) are harder to teach and train, sustain in the long 
run, and then recuperate from in their absence or neglect. 
Their diminishing subtracts from human noetic potentiality. 
An astronomer and an astrologer are, no pun intended, worlds 
apart.
 This work began as a study of meaning in the context of 
humanity’s consideration and interpretation of feelings and other 
ways of knowing that attempt to clarify our place in “nature.” 
Whether orderly, chaotic, ministered to, utilitarian, or seen as 
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adversarial, different individuals and cultures throughout history 
define and redefine the rules and relational modes of “being” in 
“nature” or of “becoming” in “nature.” 
 The continued discourse human-nature, and its exegesis in 
various forms of “relationship” or “connection,” has been at 
the center of human becoming for most of human pre-histori-
cal and historical existence as an assumed logic and dynamic of 
being in the world. As part of these interpretations, geography is 
transformed into something else. In the words of Yi-Fu Tuan:
 
Certain human environments have figured prominently in 
humanity’s dreams of the ideal world: they are the forest, the 
seashore, the valley, and the island. The furnishing of an ideal 
world is a matter of removing the defects of the real one.  
The last sentence of the above excerpt, and particularly its use 
of the words “defects” and “ideal,” sum up both, oftentimes 
contradictory, tendencies of a Super-Ego dutifully at work with 
its dual task of sanctioning and praising--cajoling us toward the 
next best thing, whether it was a figment of our imagination and 
thus an impossibility, or a basic fact of survival. 
 It is not surprising then, that we get it wrong so often, 
and by that I mean that our conflicted responses and manners 
of “becoming” end up canceling each other out while in the 
questioning of “nature” within and without. Our carrot-and-
stick psyche approaches profoundly miss multiple chances at 
integration and reconciliation. One supposes that this psyche 
duality is profoundly fixed in genes as a quick and dirty motiva-
tional force propelling the human organism forward, most of the 
time, whatever “ahead” means for individuals or groups. Another 
explanation for this disjunction is that we are forever removed 
by virtue of language and self-awareness from “nature.” There 
is some relation between the two because it is through language 
that we classify and judge—idealize and misinterpret.  
 In a manner similar to a pre-linguistic babe, encoding and 
relating to “nature” should be easy until, as Heinz Werner 
(Werner and Kaplan, 1963) might have observed, we babble our 
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first words and make proximity distant and the feeding breast 
a long-forgotten conjecture and fetish of sexual pleasure. With 
language and self-awareness, even our most sincere, deeply felt 
and expressed missives go on unanswered. Nature, as it turns 
out, is mostly deaf to our Logos: one can shout at trees and 
rocks for days and expect no answer. Wild fox and raven flee in 
response to our approximation whether we shout or not. They 
too keep their thoughts to themselves.
 Parceling psyche into selves and nature into capital venture, 
plots to be sold or traded, soon follows. We are left then with 
only fragments and a few clues about how to assemble these into 
a thing of beauty, constant and nourishing, if we are so lucky.  
 A few of these fragments we call ‘rationality,’ ‘common 
sense,’ ‘reason,’ or ‘explanations’. But even these, as psycho-
logical science reports, are not sure bets. As David Dunning and 
Justin Kruger summarized (1999): 
People tend to hold overly favorable views of their abilities 
in many social and intellectual domains. The authors suggest 
that this overestimation occurs, in part, because people who 
are unskilled in these domains suffer a dual burden: Not 
only do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make 
unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of the 
metacognitive ability to realize it. 
The Dunning-Kruger Effect, as it is now referred to, provides a 
basic psychologically verifiable principle that cuts across several 
important issues and could answer the questions:   
1. Why do a significant number of people underestimate 
the reality (scientific, clear, and present) and impending 
inevitability of anthropogenically caused environmental 
mayhem? 
2. Why do a significant number of politicians, who have 
access to the science of climate change, underestimate 
the reality and impending inevitability of anthropogeni-
cally caused environmental mayhem? 
89
Chapter 7
3. Why do a significant number of leaders of large corpo-
rations underestimate the reality (scientific, clear, and 
present) and impending inevitability of anthropogenical-
ly caused environmental mayhem?  
4. Why do a significant number of people OVERESTI-
MATE the potential benefit of signifying “nature” as 
“spiritual,” as a realistic means or correcting path to 
address the impending inevitability of anthropogenically 
caused environmental mayhem?
 
 If “nature” can’t read, write, or do arithmetic, how are 
prayers and wishful thinking a more useful Logos?  
 Another way of thinking about the potential and real incom-
mensurability that could divide inner biology, shaped in natural 
spaces, and our interpretation and transfiguration of “geography” 
into increasingly artificially modified environs, is expressed by 
Charles Lewis:  
We live in two worlds. Within the envelope of our skin is a 
biological entity which, through evolution, has been fine tuned 
for survival in natural environments. Around us lies not the 
green world in which we learned to survive and carry forward 
our species, but rather a world of our own creation, built of 
inert materials. The juxtaposition of our ancient biological 
selves with contemporary settings creates a conflict which 
is increasingly becoming the concern of environmentalists 
and psychologists… Problems arise because of discontinu-
ities between the two worlds. Not only is there a physical 
difference between flesh and stone, but also a difference in 
rate of change for each. 
Flesh and stone, and more specifically, the weakness of flesh 
(greed) when faced with the seemingly timeless substances of 
the world that yield bounties without protesting, together with 
the personal urgency of making a dent in the world, in a mere 
generation, vis-à-vis the timeless but ever-present features of the 
natural world, often pits “want” against “needs.” 
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 Saudi Arabians drained ancient aquifers under their desert 
in order to grow hay fields and feed cattle. Presently, Saudi 
Arabian companies are buying desert land in Arizona, digging 
into equally ancient American aquifers and doing the same, to 
then export hay around the world—“virtual water.”   
 That a new moral code has not been established that prevents 
thoughtless greed from causing these sorts of calamities is dis-
heartening. That there is no sense of outrage, that we are so jaded 
and accepting of these and so many other greedy practices is a 
really bad sign. This is another case of the shortsightedness of 
flesh and bones trying to out-think timeless substances.   
Denial 
 Most rational people of a factual-humanistic and 
progressive bent are rightfully irritated, frustrated, and even 
angered by “deniers.” One suspects that getting our collective 
“goat” is both fun and a principle motivation for deniers—just 
because they can. But surely, at some point, even flat-Earth 
believers, climate science deniers, and many others who act 
from implausible epistemologies, know better. But admitting it 
to our faces, giving us the satisfaction of the facts being what 
they are—facts—and accepting the loss of profit that this would 
entail, or risking the mere appearance of diminished power, are 
not options. Instead of facts and rectification, their arguments 
are chosen on the merits of their Sophist’s rhetorical brute 
force. Old vendettas and the continuance of bullying might 
explain the rest.  
 Verily, there is nothing new under the sun. Reason vs lust, 
sensibility vs pride, common-sense vs bloated affluence, equality 
vs privilege, humility vs hubris, reform vs dynastic glut--these 
forces and many more have led us into social conflict, war, and 
carnage before.   
 The unthinkable has happened. Sophist-deniers now hold the 
reins of power and are bent on retribution. For many indignities 
suffered, for every argument lost on the merits of “the weight of 
the evidence,” there stands a sophist-denier ready to dismantle 
the very edifice of reason. At the moment, this is the only 
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psychology that could explain what has already transpired and 
what is likely to unfold. 
 Once again, human dignity, freedom from ignorance, 
tolerance and reverence, as well as a commitment to sustaining 
natural processes, are on the chopping block. Despair is, 
however, not an option. 
 That this continues to be the case in the 21st century makes 
most rational people frustrated and even angry. Writing for 
the New York Times, Curt Stager (2017) reviewed a recently 
published propaganda booklet published by the conservative 
think tank, The Heartland Institute, dubiously titled “Why 
Scientists Disagree About Global Warming.” Stager wonders 
about the potential impact of disinformation when it comes to a 
significant percentage of American teachers who are themselves 
doubtful about global warming:
The cover letter inside, however, made the book’s premise 
clear. “Claims of a ‘scientific consensus’” on climate change, 
it read, “rest on two college student papers, the writings of a 
wacky Australian blogger, and a non-peer-reviewed essay by 
a socialist historian.” In fact, multiple surveys of the scientific 
literature show that well over 90 percent of published climate 
scientists have concluded that recent global warming is both 
real and mostly the result of human activity.
Despite the widespread availability of scientific and public data 
reports that make global warming itself and its consequences 
on planetary stability a reality to be faced by present and future 
generations of humans and accompanying animal brethren, 
Stager wondered about the likely impact that disinformation 
may have on just a small percentage of teachers and the students 
they teach (Plutzer, et al, 2016):
Judging from the responses of educators I know who have 
received “Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming” 
in recent weeks, most copies of it are likely to be ignored or 
discarded. But if only a small percentage of teachers use it as 
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intended, they could still mislead tens of thousands of students 
with it year after year.
Reiterating previous positions, critical thinking in general 
matters if we are going to raise future generations of conscien-
tious and educated citizens. Democratic principles themselves 
are at risk. Democracy, being fundamentally an agreement 
around verifiable facts, crumbles when information is deviant or 
when credible, reputable experts are silenced.
The Presumption of a “Rational Agent” 
 Friedrich Engels used the phrase “false consciousness” to 
explain and signify the complex collusive dynamics (intended or 
unconscious) between ideological thinking, its material reality, 
and the structuring of societies (its people) around value systems 
(economic-political-religious). 
 The assumption that people are basically rational beings and 
that with enough information they can be trusted to make the 
right choices is an aspect of false consciousness. That is, the 
ideal of a free and empowered person is also an aspect of the 
propaganda, “the rational agent,” when the agent has no clue of 
the major forces creating his/her reality.  
 An overhaul of human consciousness, at times an impish 
endeavor within new age circles, quickly crashes “head on” with 
the realities of the perversity of a diverse human lot, each head/
heart going its own way. The devilish fantasy is that with enough 
wise sheepherders and coyote-tricksters around, humanity will 
follow in the direction of infinite possibilities, or at least, toward 
happy marigolds and forever sparkling waters. Genghis Khan, 
who was not so keen, we are told, on docile conversions—gentle 
persuasions--slaughtered thousands for naught; long walls still 
came down and the Chinese forgot how to hunt for food and 
pray to their dragon and monkey gods.  
 The market forces (and its political propaganda) that drive 
consumers to make seemingly “rational” choices are an or-
chestrated masquerade of self-interested motives on the part of 
people who wish to make a profit and a public who believes their 
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limited range of “choices” matter. In this context, I have adopted 
and expanded Engels’ semiotics in an attempt to elucidate how 
entrenched are the thinking and behaviors that undermine 
sustainable approaches. 
 I favor the voice and text of Paul Shepard (1998) because 
his own synthesis takes us further in diagnosing the problem 
of “false consciousness” vis a vis the impotency of making 
sustainable approaches work for all of us: 
In the face of predominant anthropocentric values, the vision 
of “natural” human kind seems eccentric, regressive, even 
perverse. Our idea of ourselves embedded in the context of 
the shibboleth of growth places us at odds with the notion 
of kinship with nature. When we grasp fully that the best 
expressions of our humanity were not invented by civilization 
but by cultures that preceded it, that the natural world is not 
only a set of constraints but of context within which we can 
more fully realize our dreams, we will be on the way to a 
long overdue reconciliation between opposites that are of our 
own making. The tools we have invented for communicating 
our ideas and carrying information have actually impaired our 
memories. We must begin by remembering beyond history.  
The analogy semiosis : psychology :: biosemiosis : eco-
psychology describes anthropocentrism as a form of “false 
consciousness” in light of a revision of these values and in the 
context of a healthy ecological standard where “mind” is returned 
to authentic “natural” existential evolutionary theaters. It is not 
an argument (never was) to revert to an essential primitivism, 
but a “recuperation,” a rescuing of a whole set of sustainable and 
resilience values that makes for a more agreeable psychology. 
That ideal balance it seems, if ever reached at all, is the “ecopsy-
chological” as the main text (ecosemiotics).  
 This ideal might take the form of a revolutionary imperative 
for some, or for others a day to day healing that incorporates, 
little by little, a few and important features that make for “better 
living.” Halfway between these two approaches are the small 
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scale Epicurean communal ideals when a handful of friends, a 
chicken coop, and art lessons come together into a simpler and 
more real life—economies with “being” values. 
Thinking with Fairies  
 It is perhaps not a coincidence that the Victorian and 
Edwardian eras coincided with the revival of and renewed interest 
in fairy lore (Silver, 1999). This was mostly an urban preoccu-
pation when, at the same time, people lost their “knowledge of 
the woods.” For an urbanite returning to the dark woods, barely 
able to distinguish between hedgehog and robin tracks, most 
signs might have appeared as a fairy afoot. In the 1960s, with 
the help of “mind-manifesting” drugs, re-channeling fairies, 
extraterrestrials, and other energies, Findhorn was founded. A 
benign microclimate and good manure, not “devas,” reasonably 
speaking, accounted for the size of the vegetables.   
 A scientific oriented “ecopsychology” should inquire 
about the psycho-social and historical interactions that give 
rise to all sorts of magical thinking. If it is “psychology,” 
fairies are symptoms, not ontological-objective certainties. If 
“ecopsychology” has anything to do with “ecology,” then au-
tecological and synecological approaches should provide a 
definitive description of fairy population distributions and rela-
tionships therein.  
 If it can be shown that a good portion of an individual’s 
thinking is, in fact, based on erroneous, fanciful, or habitually 
preferred assumptions, and furthermore that h/her psychology 
derives from a fictional core, idiosyncratic or collectively 
shared, then easily identifiable and catalogued ideological and 
magical thinking (wishful thinking) of any type is either fiction-
alized psychology, or psychologized fiction. This would be the 
case in claims pertaining to transpersonalization processes that 
overreach (conjure up) into preferred transcendental formulas 
that, when sufficiently analyzed, are all-too-familiar-fantas-
tic—-a literature of the mind.  
 The fact that human minds are naturally prone to fictionaliz-
ing psychology or nature, or to naturalizing and psychologizing 
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fiction, is deeply interesting in its own right. These observations 
are of some relevance, particularly when studying the many 
ways in which humans have fictionalized “nature” and adapted 
these fictions to psychological “ways of connecting.” 
An Alternative Hypothesis: The Idiotsphere 
 In contrast to a “Noosphere,” or as a logical consequence of 
this idea, it is proposed that recent and past events suggest that 
humanity is mostly uncaring, selfish, self-centered, and self-serv-
ing and, therefore, that in the aggregate, should “planetary 
consciousness” be considered a factual force, lack of thought-
fulness will spread faster and wider than rational thinking. 
Therefore, thoughtlessness, like faster weed propagation, will 
outpace the growth of Kumbaya presumed contravening forces 
that aim at a “rise of consciousness.”
 Unknown at this point is whether negative or positive 
feedback loops are involved in this process. If the former, extreme 
thoughtlessness selects itself out of natural adaptive processes to 
acceptable (tolerable) levels. If the latter, consciousness reaches 
levels of instability where it might be hard to tell what’s unhelp-
ful-deviant or thoughtless, and what isn’t. 
 Last year, the Pew Research Center conducted a poll on 
attitudes and information about climate change among adult 
Americans (“The Politics of Climate,” May 10-June 6, P.R.C., 
2016a). Some of the results were as follows:  
• 48% believed that global climate change was due to human 
activity  
• 31% assumed these changes were due to natural causes 
• 20% said that there was no evidence of global climate 
change 
That is, more than half of the Americans sampled were clueless 
about the realities of global climate changes as publicized by 
reliable scientific information sources. As one might suspect, 
political ideology matters when it comes to interpreting and 
accepting scientific evidence: 
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• Conservative Republicans: 15% human activity; 48% 
natural patterns; & 36% “There is no solid evidence” 
• Liberal Democrats: 79% human activity; 14% natural 
patterns; & 7% “There is no solid evidence”  
The above two extremes and ends of a normal distribution 
are somewhat ‘balanced’ by intermediate or more moderate 
ideological identifications with response patterns that are never-
theless not very reassuring: 
• Moderate/Liberal Republicans: 34% human activity; 46% 
natural patterns; % 27% “There is no solid evidence” 
• Moderate/Conservative Democrats: 63% human activity; 
22% natural patterns; % 15% “There is no solid evidence” 
In the same poll, means for addressing global climate changes 
were split into two camps: 
• 61% believed that major changes (attitudes and behaviors) 
within the next fifty years would address climate change 
• 55% believed that technological advances would address 
climate change 
The above data suffice as a preliminary a means to inquire 
into the possible psycho-social causes driving these almost 
polar opposite trends. In general terms, it could be said that a 
continued utilitarian interpretation of “nature,” a neglect of the 
unconsciousness of “mind,” a persistent and collective denial 
that prevents concerted and collaborative actions—sustainable 
behaviors--are important factors in understanding our present 
inability to effectively address global environmental challenges 
(McKenzie-Mohr & Smith, 2008). 
 In many ways that matter, personal denial, unconscious and 
conscious collusion, the inability or unwillingness to openly and 
honestly examine unconscious motivations, and a dependency on 
the goods that “nature” provides in order to maintain a perceived 
97
Chapter 7
“high standard” of living, could be sound starting points from 
which to begin a Psychology of the Anthropocene.   
 From a psycho-social perspective, the question is: What 
other mainstream social scientific ideas, constructs, or factors 
could be employed or investigated in order to shed light on 
these complex and dire challenges? The above main factors 
[1. Personal denial--unconscious and conscious collusion; 2. 
The inability or unwillingness to openly and honestly examine 
unconscious motivations and processes; and 3. A dependency 
(continued exploitation of) on the goods that “nature provides” 
in order to appease unsustainable life styles] could be broken 
down into and expanded to include at least ten socio-psycho-
logical, cognitive, and affective tendencies (dispositional and 
situational) which, in tandem, do not bode well for a timely 
resolution of these pressing challenges.  
 En toto, and provisionally, these may be named and 
categorized as a Collusive Credulity Complex Construct (CCCC) 
to signify their social effects of both ill-action and inaction. They 
are: 
1. Self-serving propensities (self-serving and confirmation 
biases) 
2. Self-deception (Dunning-Kruger Effect) 
3. Subservience (conformity, compliance, and obedience) 
4. Wishful, magical or fantasy thinking 
5. Impulsivity and reactivity (unreasonableness) 
6. Misunderstanding or misapplication of in-group 
traditional knowledge 
7. Decontextualized (ineffective, irrelevant, or antagonis-
tic) “spirituality” 
8. Shallow (‘green-washed,’ decontextualized) tribalism 
9. Adult but immature over-identification (‘persona’ cults) 
10. Lower levels of education and scientific literacy 
Extreme ideological group identification alone could account for 
factors 1-4. Level of education might account for factors 5-10. 
There is also a significant overlap between factors 1-4 and 5-10. 
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We Live in Interesting Times 
 In 2016, a significant number of U.S. voters elected a new 
president who, presently and swiftly, has acted on rationaliza-
tions or base impulses that a serious and thoughtful person could 
characterize as potentially injurious to vulnerable people and to 
life on this planet. As social experiments go, Americans will be 
the first subjects to be exposed to the results of these rationaliza-
tions and impulses, with seemingly very little power to prevent 
many questionable policies from being enacted. 
 Sound psycho-social theory and research, originating from 
accepted areas such as the Psychology of Religion, have already 
provided theories, models, perspectives, and data from which 
to make testable inferences and inquire about our collective 
inability to act upon a basic and necessary understanding of the 
exigencies of global climate threats. For example, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (1769), writing almost 250 years ago, described the 
pervasive overlap and effects of religious dogma in civil society, 
referring to it as “civil religion.” Other authors have written 
about the psycho-sociological effects of this overlap, specifical-
ly when describing the U.S. main societal orientation as being 
a “civil religion” (Bellah, 1967; Greely, 1972; Wilcox 1996; 
Wilson, 2000; and Green, 2000).  
 The proposed ten dimensions of the Collusive Credulity 
Complex Construct introduced herein could be applied to the 
study of other and seemingly benign, alternative lifestyles and 
belief systems that are equally fundamentalist in their attitudes 
and actions (e.g. so-called “New Age” movements). That is, to 
the extent that an aversion to scientific inquiries (the scientific 
method and scientists) and the embracing of pseudo-science 
make for a reduction of rational and systematic approaches to 
information (less information literacy and critical thinking), “a 
diminution of being” might be suspected (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999; Dunning, Johnson, Ehrlinger, & Kruger, 2003; Cone-
sa-Sevilla, 2017).  
 There are some reasons for cautious optimism. Since the bulk 
of the aforementioned research began (circa 1960s), generation-
al shifts have caused significant deviations in social trends.  
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Although millennials worldwide are less likely to participate 
in politics than voters from the baby-boom and X generations, 
they, nevertheless, across several core social identification 
dimensions (national customs/traditions, traditional religion, 
or nationalism), seem to be less attached to ideology (P.R.C., 
2016b). 
 Ignoring the socio-historical roots of multiple, complex, 
and interacting global crises or the many and ever-increasing 
ramifications of our collective, conscious and unconscious 
denudement of nature (Wendling, 2009) comes at a high price.  
 Although the scientific method is, by a long and painstaking 
historical process, a product of Greco-Roman-Islamic-Europe-
an thinkers, its fruits and promises pale in comparison to the 
pernicious anti-science and pseudo-science tendencies here 
described as the Collusive Credulity Complex. 
 We are now faced with different situations and increasing 
occurrences and volumes of world population displacements 
with concomitant erosion of individual and collective (envi-
ronmental) resilience. At best, our efforts seem reactionary and 
reflexive. To the extent that we have a responsibility as scientists 
and individuals to address these problems, an emergent paradig-
matic nexus begs for new forms of intervention (McKenzie-Mohr 
& Smith, 2008). 
 The psycho-historical investigation of the reasons behind 
the systematic destruction of entire ecosystems, starting with 
the Mediterranean basin (Hughes, 1975; Ehrlich, et la, 1978), 
coupled with similar and concerted efforts by other areas in 
psychology, point to a new direction and paradigm with an 
urgent mission-focus: Psychology in the Anthropocene. 
*     *     *
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The Murmuration of Transfixitive Wants 
 
“Culture now signifies something which never acquires a form, 
but is to emerge with extraordinary intensity out of a vacancy 
into which there is a speedy return. The associated estimates of 
value are typical. Men are quickly satiated with what they have 
heard, and are therefore ever on the search for novelties since 
nothing else tickles their fancy. Novelties are acclaimed as the 
primal knowledge of which people are in search; but they are 
whistled down the wind a moment after, since all that is wanted 
is sensation.”  (Karl Jaspers)   
 global warming is only one example of human-caused en-
vironmental problems. To the extent that these problems 
reflect the paw-tracks of intentions, activities, and behaviors 
of human beings, they are, more accurately defined, psy-
chological problems with underlying social, economic, and 
political forces. In this sense and context, “ecopsychology” is 
also the examination of the interface between thinking, affect, 
and behavior and the perception and interpretation of “nature” 
for whatever human means or ends. Under one description, 
the study of the interactive effects of ‘thinking, affect, and 
behavior’ is also the study of “personality,” and in this work, 
of a unique sense of that construct: Psyche-Natur. These efforts 
continue to be an extension or continuation of mainstream 
psychological studies, or deserving of their own emphasis or 
perspective, given the fundamental importance of the afore-
mentioned construct.  
 In this sense and context, human-caused environmental 
problems signify problematic (shortsighted, avaricious, ignorant, 
etc.) or even dysfunctional psychology.   
 At an existential level, the eternal and psychic reality of a 
world coming together into new forms, syntithenai (construc-
tion), and also being pulled apart into components, analyein 
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(destruction), are foundational assumptions and formulations in 
the sciences and in their derivative poetic, other artistic, and/or 
bastard intuitive liturgies. 
 Recently, the Italian towns of Amatrice, Accumoli, Arquata 
and Pescara del Tronto were hardest hit by an earthquake. The 
human horror and confusion in the aftermath of natural ca-
tastrophes such as this is beyond words. It is terrible! We say 
to ourselves, “I hope I never experience their suffering.” In the 
media, phrases such as “acts of god,” “terrible nature,” or “mother 
Earth’s doing” are imperfect forms (childish, uninformed, or 
tentative) for acknowledging the geological and “brute” reality 
of a changing planet.   
 But no virgin sacrifice or heartfelt prayer ever stopped Pele 
or Chimborazo from erupting. There might be comfort in these 
actions, however, earthquakes and lava eruptions are physi-
cal-natural processes, not beings—deaf, blind, and unfeeling to 
our desires or supplications.  
 The native populations of Amatrice, Accumoli, Arquata and 
Pescara del Tronto, and countless visiting tourists, took these 
picturesque surroundings for granted--took their daily toils, 
small and grand pleasures, one suspects, as a steady-state and 
given existence. 
 Heraclitus observed (ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν, 
ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ), “Ever-newer waters flow on 
those who step into the same rivers,” and (τὰ ὄντα ἰέναι τε πάντα 
καὶ μένειν οὐδέν) “All entities move and nothing remains still.” 
An inclusive science of “ecopsychology” has to be accepting, or 
at least aware, that the world, nay, the universe, coming together 
into new forms, syntithenai, and also being pulled apart into 
components, analyein, are foundational and ongoing processes 
without exceptions. Earlier, we presented the idea and reality of 
a world in flux in panarchic ecological terms.  
 That is, psychology and ecology, as sciences, operate 
under the assumption that there is potential suffering and cha-
os-transcendence--in destruction (analyein) as well as in 
creation (syntithenai). The transitional, steady-state forms (e.g. 
“happiness”) are a mere short-lived illusion. The artist too takes 
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this fluidity and dynamics to heart. This foundational interplay 
is, after all, what we term “art.” 
Biophilia and Other Euphemisms of Nature Affiliation  
 A sign of our desperate times and perhaps misplaced 
optimism is the exclusive and absolutist sense in which people, 
even professionals, overuse and, eventually, semantically 
calcify favored tags. It is of particular interest when self-iden-
tified “ecopsychologists” latch onto terms such as biophila and 
make them into some sort of hopeful mantra that attempts to 
explain everything. In general, this happens for many words that 
are judged to carry great psychological import (“god,” “justice,” 
“nature,” “heaven,” “sustainability,” etc.).    
 Tags come and go, thus one suspects that next year they’ll be 
onto something else—or not.   
 That the very term biophilia has a rich and complex history 
(E. Fromm, E. O. Wilson) and that its meaning is nuanced toward 
several possible but precise aims is oftentimes lost to some folks 
who lean in the direction of senseless mantra chanting.  In the 
context of Howard Gardner’s proposal of multiple intelligences, 
biophilic tendencies are exemplified in his “naturalistic intelli-
gence.” Because this is a bona fide intelligence, one suspects 
that it is not so widespread, pure, or manifested in its fullest 
capacity equally in every person. For if every person expressed 
naturalistic intelligence with concomitant biophilic tendencies 
in full form and function, our planet would be a very different 
place.   
 Another argument is that like all the other intelligences 
(linguistic, interpersonal, logical, etc.), some aspects of natural-
istic intelligence can be taught. When this argument is made, it 
is usually in the form of efforts to ensure that important concepts 
of environmental education are taught early on. Another way of 
making this argument is that this is part of a greater effort for 
raising planetary, “green consciousness.” It is not clear, however, 
if proponents of these (latter) efforts privilege “consciousness 
raising” as some specialized personal transformation toward 
oceanic enlightenment. If so, this seems an exclusive enough 
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journey not to matter, in critical short and practical terms, for 
expediently “saving the planet.” 
 Furthermore, and as presented in the previous chapter, if 
this notion of “consciousness raising” implies the hope that a 
“noosphere” of sorts is teleologically progressing toward ultimate 
perfection, then we have us another sort of religion with little 
to show in the form of evidence. Present and past circumstanc-
es, however, point to the very opposite of this claim, and in fact 
suggests that we live in an ever spiraling downwards “idiotsphere.” 
 Proof of this horrible descent is that major and minor 
religions and countless nature “cults,” past and present, have 
failed to achieve these or similar goals or to prevent our probable 
apocalyptic demise. This is evidence that there are significant 
psychological limitations to personal growth and transper-
sonal enterprises—that these efforts were always limited to a 
handful of conscientious people. Thus novo-Druid approaches 
and corresponding sentimentalities seem to be of psychologi-
cal importance to a few mistletoe collectors but useless when 
it comes to the science of planetary intervention. It seems as 
though “primitivism” will not be a universally accepted model 
for collective transformation any time soon—unless a truly 
horrific and dystopian future befalls us.    
 Moreover, the semantic calcification of terms like biophilia 
into polarized overly optimistic goals obscures the fact that 
gardeners, for example, kill for a living. That is, naturalistic in-
telligence with its supposedly concomitant biophilic tendencies 
make room for processes of death and decay (destruction 
even) as integral to “life.”  To loudly and continuously cheer 
for “love” and “life” without accounting for the natural reality 
of death processes is tantamount to neuroticism. It has always 
been a psychologically important reality that the repressed and 
unconscious anxiety of death and decay is suppressed, displaced, 
denied, or sublimated. 
 That most people can and do experience a rich variety of 
deeply felt sentiments, emotions, insights, images, and other 
mental experiences, in nature or elsewhere, does not necessarily 
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imply a credible-solid (unquestionable) and confirmable 
metaphysics. A failure to recognize that complex nervous 
systems, for reasons of evolutionary adaptation, are bent on 
forced semiosis, leads some to privileging subjective experience 
as a channel-effect of ‘marvelous and mysterious forces.’ Be that 
as it may, it takes some effort to begin accepting the profound 
inadequacy of metaphors. Even when these are oftentimes apt 
approximations of internal, subjective experience, they may say 
nothing about stand-alone metaphysics.    
 Some philosophers (and the average speaker) have taken 
for granted that familiar words are more than metaphors which 
describe existing ontologies, when in fact they could be instances 
of catachresis, or using words in the wrong, reality context. For 
example, according to Jacques Derrida, the founding concepts 
of metaphysics (e.g. logos, happiness, natura) are instances of 
catachresis and not actual (demi-causal) metaphors. No matter 
how fervently and religiously a person claims to have had a 
“magnificent nature connection,” no one truly knows what 
this experience is about, and even if we could know, it would 
more likely be a descriptor of subjectively bound or contained 
experiences.   
 The giddy jump from “I feel this” to “fairy dust” is both a 
disturbing and telling aspect of human psychological semiosis. 
To the extent that, early on in development, we begin to associate 
certain feelings with less than certain metaphors, words and 
their meanings come to be feared and are also comforting. Like 
comfort foods, comforting words manage, as placebos do, to 
reduce anxiety taking us into the familiar. Words, their meaning 
valences, are the actual currency irrespective of their implied, or 
hoped-for metaphysics or ontology. This fundamental acknowl-
edgement ought to be the beginning of scientifically serious 
psychological discussions—a first premise.  
 In this sense, the phrase “nature connection” is a case of 
compounded catachresis. That is, it reveals next to nothing about 
the intricacies of “nature” or what is meant by “connection.” 
Intuition is usually in the eye of the beholder. 
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Our Many Disabilities 
 To the extent that “ecopsychological” scientific research 
is minimal at best and testable constructs need to be newly 
invented and vetted, there are some analogical approaches that 
could inform the general public about the “raison d'être” for 
pursuing such work. 
 The term “disability” could be easily applied to most forms 
of extreme nature alienation where body, mind, affect, and 
social relations are distant and extant from natural adaptations 
and from tested and enduring social organizations. That is, one 
could identify artificial umwelts as being antagonistic to or only 
prosthetically supportive of numerous human interactions today. 
 For example, and in this very sense, the over consumption 
of fats and sweets, their resulting effects on greater lipid mass 
and on the onset of earlier sugar metabolic diseases; the physical 
changes made to furniture in order to accommodate our more 
corpulent bodies; the redefinition of space and locomotion 
(walking); the structural rethinking of buildings and modes of 
transportation, to include just a few umwelt situations, can be 
defined in terms of actual disabilities. The term “impairment” 
would also apply if changes in human genotype and phenotype 
are detrimental and limiting to the types of activities, survival 
obligations, and possibilities that humans once enjoyed while 
still embedded in natural pursuits. The strong argument is that 
most people who live in developed countries are dependent on 
artificial modes of transportation, live in urban situations where 
social estrangement or alienation are the norm, and generally 
consume in excess of their genomic and phenotypical needs, are 
in fact disabled and impaired in fundamental and testable ways. 
 To reiterate, to the extent that so-called indigenous cultures 
and their accumulated wisdom, too, fell victim to candy and 
burgers, not only was transmitted culture a poor defender of 
unhealthy trends but one cannot even rely, like Jungians do, on 
the notion that some unknown ‘genetic’ force will come to their 
(and our) rescue. 
 To wit, the terms “ancestral,” “genetic,” or “racial,” when 
used in the context of the construct “memory,” are sometimes 
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used interchangeably, usually to imply or directly signify a 
Jungian form of “collective unconscious,” still operating and 
directing seemingly innate psychological tendencies. 
 That “collective unconscious” was ambiguous and 
misinformed to begin with does not deter Jungian followers from 
continuing to make incredible claims, mostly in order to justify 
any number of outlandish beliefs that might include (a short 
list): reincarnation, autistic giftedness, and the continuation of 
“esoteric wisdom” that might be tapped into via, for example, 
hallucinogenic admixtures, trance states, or mindfulness 
practices, that is, “anything-goes psychology.” 
 Presumably, and in a Jungian sense, the human mind can 
“tune into” the ancestral memories of indigenous cultures who 
had an inside track and affinity with “nature,” “channeling” 
these insights in order to solve present-day woes, from infertility 
to midwifing “planetary consciousness.” 
 Of psychological interest is the characterization of Freud’s 
approaches as “male-centered” (animus) and those of Jung’s, 
particularly the late Jung, as being less so (anima). The former 
seriously embraced evolutionary ideas as a step toward under-
standing the human psyche. The latter opted for actually religious, 
pseudo-religious and mythical interpretations of culturally 
available symbols in order to account for the biology and the 
cognitive science he did not understand—which developed 
after his death. It is an empirical question whether modern-day 
“Jungian lovers” are drawn to his psychology as a type of anima 
projection—as a need to feminize the psyche. 
A Whole World of Good (Better) Science 
Has Come after Jung  
 As a matter of historical fact, at the time of C. G. Jung’s 
death, June 1961, the gene-centered view of the then modern 
evolutionary synthesis was just being formulated by W. D. 
Hamilton, George C. Williams, and John Maynard Smith (early 
and mid-1960s); thus Jung’s knowledge of genetics, if he had 
any intellectual sophistication at all in these sciences when he 
was alive, was lacking in fundamentals—what was to come. 
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Equally, when it comes to cognitive advances in understanding 
memory, Jung’s death in 1961 precedes the important founda-
tional work of Atkinson and Shriffin (1968) and of Craik and 
Lockhart (1972). 
 Without the above foundational work in the biological and 
the cognitive sciences, which comes after the Jungian “era,” it is 
next to impossible to grant Jung a deeper, informed understand-
ing implied in the tags “genetic” and “memory.” 
 Additionally, most present-day scientifically credible 
definitions of “memory” emphasize three basic processes: 
encoding, storage, and retrieval. Moreover, dividing “memory” 
into implicit and explicit, or into procedural and semantic---mod-
ular systems—allows for the neurocognitive empirical testing of 
actual (in present and real time) neuronal pathways and cerebral 
modules. 
 Given this present-day scientific literature, there is no iota 
of support for continuing to justify the ambiguous use of these 
terms (e.g. “ancestral,” “genetic,” or “racial”) as if they relate 
to anything important and known about neuroscience and neu-
robiology. Specifically, Karl S. Lashley looked for engrams 
everywhere in the brain only to discover that memory is widely 
“distributed.” No ancestral memories have been found in the 
human brain. 
 It seems only appropriate then to talk about “ancestral 
memories” in metaphorical and literary terms. That is, in this 
sense, orally transmitted stories and biblical or Buddhist texts, 
for example, that are written, become, with time, “ancestral 
memories.” 
 The fact that they were written does not imply, however, that 
they are free of factual errors or that the “wisdom” they espouse 
is actually relevant to solving the unprecedented and multi-di-
mensional problems modern humans face today. 
 It takes arduous scientific and statistical training, thinking 
and skills to understand the implications of the gene-centered 
and neurocognitive revolutions which a non-sensical and empty 
phrase such as “the collective unconscious” (genetic, ancestral, 
or racial memories), cannot even begin to “gloss over.”  
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Feathers and Drum Medicines 
Placebo effects (Dunlop, et al, 2012) are, assuredly, the hopeful 
and tenacious workings of a complex “mind” fulfilling and 
reaching out to desired outcomes—prompted by the appropriate 
context. The motivation to “get well,” when properly channeled, 
is the companion co-variant benefit of the placebo effect. That 
a percentage of humans, through expectation and hope, can 
temporarily or routinely alleviate physical pain, on their own, 
suggests that a previously unreached ceiling of latent psychoso-
matic capacities has been broken.  
 As useful and important as these findings are (Dunlop, et 
al, 2012), no one should magically conflagrate the body’s 
previously unrecognized (underestimated by medical science) 
aptitude for natural self-healing. The healing successes attributed 
to any shaman depend on it, for without the expectation of this 
normal distribution of natural or spontaneous recuperation in the 
population, medical interventions would seem less miraculous 
or scientifically prognosticable.  
 More prosaically, then, “nature” is a “healer” only to the 
extent that we wish it to be, that we allow it to be. Now, to turn 
the knowable upside down, it is equally likely to assume that 
feathers and drums, and a few choice incantations, are the cause 
behind a placebo effect—the independent variables and determi-
nants. More often than not, though, one suspects a feather is just 
a feather, and a beating drum and continuous chanting no more 
than repetitive noise, where the patient simply wants to escape it 
all as soon as possible.  
 So-called “authentic shamans” tend to be, after all, rather 
frightening, shabby, and squalid characters. And therein lies 
the other third of their “powers.” Appeasing and pleasing the 
shaman are as much an outcome of “wellness” as nimble feet 
and harder stools. 
 To wit, much of so-called “magic” is both verbal and 
behavioral polysemy. Polysemy refers to a multitude of meanings 
that a given word could convey in different contexts. The word 
Venus, for example, might refer to a planet, a mythical figure, or 
a famous tennis player.  
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 For Dick Hebdige polysemy means that “Each text is 
seen to generate a potentially infinite range of meanings,” 
making, according to Richard Middleton, “Any homology, 
out of the most heterogeneous materials, possible. The idea of 
signifying practice — texts not as communicating or expressing 
a preexisting meaning but as ‘positioning subjects’ within a 
process of semiosis — changes the whole basis of creating social 
meaning.” 
 The following are examples of Polysemy that can be extended 
toward an understanding of the ease with which humans make 
arbitrary labels to mean much more than meaning object/idea:
Venus 
1. A planet; 2. A goddess (mythology); 3. A famous tennis player
 
Crane 
1. A bird; 2. A type of construction equipment; 3. To strain out 
one's neck  
Examples of “nature” as a Polysemy: 
1. a thing (female or male, good or evil); 2. a cause (prima 
causa); 3. an effect; 4. absolutely nothing; 5. a psychological 
tendency; 6. a propensity; 7. a process; 8. a force; 9. a deity; 10. 
recreational space; 11. a TV show; 12. a girl I used to know  
 Grammarians (Strunk & White, 1979) recognize the confus-
ability and arbitrariness of language with respect to our use of 
the word “nature”:   
Nature should be avoided in such vague expressions as 'a 
lover of nature,' 'poems about nature.' Unless more specific 
statements follow, the reader cannot tell whether the poems 
have to do with natural scenery, rural life, the sunset, the 
untouched wilderness, or the habits of squirrels. 
(Strunk & White, "The Elements of Style," 3rd ed., 1979) 
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The above fairly innocent and innocuous linguistic habits 
demonstrate that it is fairly easy to be careless with the words 
we use, particularly the most important one of all, “nature.” In 
addition to remediable ignorance, there is also deliberate con-
fusability that makes, as with any aspect of magic, the chicken 
entrails appear as if they were human parts extracted under the 
auspices of a “medicine man.”  
 Polysemy in language reflects our thinking. When left to 
our undisciplined devices, a sort of murmuration of transfixitive 
wants runs amok in mind and language. We say things we want 
to believe in, we believe the things we say or want to say, and we 
keep saying them: “nature” is a bird, my mother …  
 If disciplined discernment matters, then like Alice in 
Wonderland, we are always called to a questioning of discourse 
at a basic level despite bizarre and uncanny challenges. The 
following exchange, revised to make a final point, is one we 
might face when arguing with a proverbial stoned caterpillar 
who seems too sure that no rules apply to a valid and critical 
inquiry. 
Another “Nice Knock-Down Argument”: 
Alice-Earth Egg Revisited 
 - “I don't know what you mean by ‘nature,’” Alice said.  
 - Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course, you 
don’t-till I tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down 
argument for you!’”  
 - “But ‘nature doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’” 
Alice objected.  
 - “When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean-nei-
ther more nor less.” 
 - “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make 
words mean so many different things.”  
 - “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be 
master, that's all.”  
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 - Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a 
minute Humpty Dumpty began again. “They've a temper 
some of them- particularly verbs: they're the proudest-ad-
jectives you can do anything with, but not verbs-however, I 
can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That’s 
what I say!”  
(Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, Ch. VI) 
*     *     *
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Feathers, Crystals, and Plenty of 
Whiskey--in the Apocalypse 
 
“It was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking 
thirteen.” (George Orwell) 
 undeniably so, a good number of environmental problems 
are human-caused, impacting both local and global ecology and 
climate. These include: deforestation, extinction of multiple and 
once abundant species, emission of greenhouse gases, overpop-
ulation, industrial use and scale of pesticides and fertilizers, 
among many others. There is no “Planet B,” there are no second 
chances, and no foreseeable rescue missions coming from “out 
there.” Mars is a dead planet where Angel’s Falls do not majes-
tically tumble from tepuis.   
 Humanity and fellow species have seldom experienced an 
intrusion of this magnitude and duration to the whole of life—on 
a planetwide level of assault. The severity (quantity and quality) 
of these problems has intensified in the last three hundred years, 
even though humans have been altering their environments and 
causing significant environmental changes (the loss of mega 
fauna around the world) since Homo erectus. 
 This new order of magnitude of abuse and destruction has 
direct consequences to human psychology as well as to the way 
societies organize themselves. It is very difficult at times to know 
what interventions are more important. The genesis and continu-
ation of these major disruptions took time, so, equally, correcting 
and normalizing them (merely stabilizing these trends) will also 
take time.   
 The psychological dynamics contributing to and exacerbat-
ing the above situations are themselves complex and require 
sophisticated methodologies--serious science. Words like “sus-
tainability,” “harmony,” or “co-existence” mean very little if we 
do not understand how these relate to actual ecological and/or 
psychological science. 
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 In one way or another, and while employing diverse 
approaches, “ecopsychologists” around the world begin their 
work under the assumptions depicted in the following illustra-
tion (Figure 5).
 The ecopsychological vicious circle here produced is a 
systems’ view of cause-and-effect dynamics and interactions 
illustrating the folly of expecting easy or quick fixes to these 
intricate and complex challenges. In view of this, “ecopsycholo-
gists” are in for the long haul.  
 Two major challenges for future reiterations of “ecopsychol-
ogy,” for it to be taken more seriously by mainstream ecology 
and psychology, follow: 
1. An increased implementation of evidence-based 
approaches that can shed light on the specific and varied 
ways in which humans interpret ‘self,’ ‘nature,’ and 
‘connection’ (Self-Gestalt Nature Affiliations).
2. Increased collaboration between professionals in other 
areas within psychology and across other social and 
behavioral sciences in order to put forth and validate 
constructs of “nature connection” (Nature Affiliations).
 Since the beginning of “civilized” life, and through almost 
uncountable cycles of psychological, social, and ecological 
Figure 5
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upheavals, there has never been a greater need to capitalize on 
the insights of “ecopsychology.” 
 To the extent that “ecopsychology” is both an evaluation of 
an existing self-gestalt ‘circumstance,’ and a means toward new 
accommodations of meaning-action-directions (toward new 
self-nature gestalt configurations), it promises and fulfills an 
important function in the whole of psychology.  
 More importantly, ecopsychology fills in an essential 
knowledge niche as part of a new set of psychological survival 
and resilience skills now sorely needed if we are to survive on 
this planet beyond the next millennium.  
Otherwise, Carry On… 
 As we have seen, a recurring theme in “ecopsychology,” in its 
present and inchoate form, is the continuation and extension of 
“spirit” in juxtaposition with other privileged and/or habitually 
preferred (perhaps even psychologically needed) practices or 
causes, such as spirituality-somethings; farcical chemistry or 
physics; yoga; coopted and partially understood indigenous lore; 
extreme diets; and a multitude of fetishes. That is, its inchoate 
form resembles and revisits earlier efforts to make “the soul” a 
central study of psychology.  
 That these mostly emotion-laden, unreasoned, and/or id-
iosyncratic amalgamations are prevalent says more about the 
psychological needs of the persons espousing these sentiments 
or beliefs than about “nature.”  Certainly, it is nothing new that 
humans project their hopes, desperation, and wish-fulfillment 
thinking onto the shifting and accepting canvas, “nature.” No 
new “ecopsychology” is needed to state the obvious. Devotion 
toward a particular aspect of or force in nature and our many 
votive offerings are, after all, the staple of archeology.  
 Devotion, however, no matter how deeply felt or practiced, 
does not a real god make, nor do rumors and whispers of “spirit” 
a real spirit make. But when these intentions and projections 
come with psychology degrees and names, they are also wrapped 
and presented in an aura of imprimatur credibility. Then, it is a 
question of great interest and value to inquire further whether 
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these unreasoned expressions of “nature connection” are 
themselves the byproducts or even the very symptoms of “eco-
anxiety” or aspects of other more fundamental psychological 
work that needs tending to. To be fair, that an aspiration toward 
a communal, planetary praxis centered around spiritual motifs 
(votives) is seen as desirable therapeutics is understandable.  
 It is also understandable that these idiosyncratic amalga-
mations could be an attempt to bring greater coherence and 
meaning into our psychological lives. However, the fact that 
mostly well-meaning therapists are themselves the origin and 
sustenance of these ideas could blind us to more central (psycho-
logical) questions: Is the “spiritual” in “nature,” or do we bring 
“it” (invent it) there? Does this even matter if while in this psy-
chologically confabulated process we end up saving “Mother 
Earth”?  
What’s Next?  
 The 2016 American election crystalized the significant divide 
existing between groups of people who have, one presumes, 
always co-existed, everywhere. The list of differences that divide 
these groups seems to fall into the categories shown on Table 3. 
 There are, of course, many more attributional aspects and dif-
ferentiators to these divides which social scientists will continue 
to tease out while formulating a grand explanation of how and 
why these divisions emerged in pointed form during these past 
elections.  
 Assuming that we trust the different polls, then at least 40% 
of the American electorate fall, in one way or another, under the 
attributions listed under “A.” These percentages have not varied 
for the last four elections, suggesting that entrenched ideology, 
impermeable-foreclosure identifications, absolute ethnic-gender 
divisions, various social ills, and lack of educational opportuni-
ties have fixed these numbers for some time to come.
 According to the best scientific evidence (often negated by 
those in List A), time is running out with respect to the concerted 
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Table 3
List A List B
Nativism Globalism
Fear Hope
Ignorance Education
Animus Anima
Complacency Proactivity
Rudeness Assertiveness
Insular Outward
Absolute Relative
Extrinsically/Motivated Intrinsically/Motivated
Literalist Interpretive
Grievance Reconciliation
Propaganda Data-driven
Pubescent Mature
Apocalyptic Progressive
 The conundrum is that working toward an apocalyptic 
resolution precisely validates the ideologies of members in List 
A. In this light, the hopeful claims that some folks in List B 
make with respect to a peaceful and rational resolution (e.g. via 
“consciousness raising,” “indigenous wisdom,” magical inter-
ventions) seem to be misguided and naïve.  
 Answering the question “What’s next?” under the governance 
of those in List “B” should include addressing the underlying 
causes of these deep ideological divisions. That seems unlikely 
to occur in the next four-year cycle. That is, things are likely to 
get much worse before they get any better. At least in the near 
future, the probable answers to the question “What’s next?” are 
mostly terrifying or unanswerable.  
and collective measures that must be undertaken in order to 
mitigate and rectify the onslaught of human-caused local and 
global environmental disasters.
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Pre-Apocalyptic Realism 
 In this unhopeful context, a reasonable position to take, 
let’s call it pre-apocalyptic realism, steers “ecopsychological” 
discussions (including debates in conservation and environmen-
tal activism) toward the following axiom points:  
1. Humans are self-serving (or justify self-serving under the 
guise of political or religious affiliation). With increases 
in human population, diversity of views, and a continued 
appetite for creating for-profit-in-a-vacuum enterprises, 
humanity is unlikely to reach a timely consensus that 
would seriously alleviate environmental stressors. It is 
the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) multiplied 
to levels never seen before. My family and sheep first. 
2. Humans are ignorant or self-deceptive. Because of 
unfair circumstances or by design, most humans 
lack the educational level, the scientific sophistica-
tion, the deconstructive sagacity, actual experiences, 
or the open-mindedness to closely study the central 
and branching environmental issues (global warming, 
to name just one environmental stressor) that are now 
deciding the fate of “LIFE” on planet Earth.  
3. Humans are fantasy-prone. When it comes to making 
choices between scientifically based arguments and 
their preferred ingroup, political or religious positions, 
devoted ideologues deny, undermine, sabotage, or 
misunderstand evidence-based findings. The institution-
alization of a clear and legally consistent line between 
“church” and “state” continues to be challenged by 
persons or groups who oppose objective-neutral means 
for establishing “truth.” ‘Believing in something’ trumps 
‘facing something.’  
4. Humans are followers. Political courage and enforcement 
of sensible “commons” laws that protect basic necessities 
(clean water, clean air, and diverse wild environments) 
are often lacking, or when demonstrated, are diluted as 
part of slow, “democratic” compromises that are unlikely 
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to reach a timely consensus to seriously alleviate environ-
mental stressors. Humans follow charismatic ‘leaders’ 
with fan-full ardor and zeal—to the end.  
5. Humans are reactive. Only under situations where 
extreme changes in weather demand proactive measures 
(extreme climate and latitudes), or where geography 
and geology dictate that humans organize into capable 
working collectives does one see efforts to “think ahead” 
and take necessary measures for dealing with potential 
disasters and unfavorable or taxing circumstances. 
Otherwise, most humans are “loafers,” waiting to see 
what the next door neighbor might do.   
6. Traditional “wisdom” is misapplied. This point harks 
back to one of the misconceptions about “ecopsycholo-
gy” presented in Chapter Two. When human communities 
were small in number and history was passed on as part 
of a necessary drive for survival, proactive, sensible, 
or practical behaviors and attitudes were more or less 
easily shaped into respected laws that most members in 
a community could test, if needed, by empirical means. 
However, oftentimes, “traditional” or “ancient wisdom,” 
when offered out of context (ancient vs modern) and 
misapplied (small scale vs large scale) to solve more 
complex problems (indigenous communities vs global 
communities) fails to deliver its once true-and-tested sus-
tainability formulae. At other times the tags “traditional” 
or “wisdom” appear as idiosyncratic and very personal 
descriptions by individuals who have little knowledge of 
the authentic cultural and geographical contexts within 
which these behaviors and attitudes evolved.  
7. Humans are “tribalists.” In the worst sense of this tendency 
humans display an innate need to belong and define 
themselves in superficial and irrelevant ways as they 
join preferred groups and clicks (“cat person,” “tattooed 
person,” “dog person,” “Ferrari driver,” “gun owner,” 
“snowmobiler,” etc.). Tribalism can be a relevant force 
for social cohesion toward conservation, for example, if 
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it does not focus solely (or mostly) on the acquisition, 
maintenance, or ownership of “things.” Frugality is seldom 
seen as the principle and virtue of most hobby dabblers. 
 To the extent that, according to the most recent physical en-
vironmental evidence, we have already passed the point at which 
a concerted and serious global effort might have diverted or 
mitigated the most grievous of these effects (human-caused en-
vironmental problems: overpopulation, rampant consumerism, 
pristine habitat destruction, greenhouse gases levels, species 
extinctions, etc.), then preparations that matter should now be 
undertaken under this new existential priority: pre-apocalyptic 
realism.  
 The psychological (“ecopsychological”) dimensions implied 
in pre-apocalyptic realism both foreshadow and harken back 
to eras of depravation or forward looking sustainability with 
an emphasis on resilience, gratitude, frugality, temperance, 
equanimity, and pragmatic know-how.
 One cause for optimism is that the scientific method has 
proven its worth and it is too systemically engrained for it to 
be easily abandoned when its methodologies may be the only 
means for bridging salvageable patches of integral nature still 
present with a sustainable and verdant future.
 The most challenging accommodations and uncharted 
transitions remain ahead for our children and grandchildren. 
Like it or not, seven generations henceforward, scientific prac-
ticality and magical thinking are likely to be companions on the 
same road.
 Regardless, from this point in time and perspective, it looks 
like more feathers, crystals, and plenty of whiskey--in the 
Apocalypse.
*     *     *     
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aPPendIx I: 
“eCoPsyChology” as 
euPraxsoPhy: 
Marg and PréCIs
“Nothing is enough for the man to whom enough is too little.”
-Epicurus
Introduction: “Ecopsychology” as Eupraxsophy
 After reading the preceding chapters, two reviewers 
suggested that I summarize most of the content of this book into 
a literary form more amenable to today’s competing demands 
for time and reading. To that end, I borrowed and reinterpreted 
the forms marg and précis, an abridged delineation and boundary 
of what in this book is presented as the eupraxsophy of “eco-
psychology.” The following entries may be read independently 
from the main book and text.
 Throughout this book, I have made Epicurean arguments 
of practical living that exalt ideas of community, simplicity, 
frugality, creativity, and non-dogmatism. In the 20th century, Paul 
Kurtz coined the term eupraxsophy to describe a similar mode 
of being (thinking and acting) which values living an ethical, 
rational and exuberant life (biophilic). Admittedly, many of us 
fall short of consistently living up to all three. Nevertheless, they 
are noble and ennobling endeavors worth pursuing—thinking 
about. In the context of a diverse and oftentimes cacophonous 
field of ecopsychological trends and ideas, I argue that they are 
also necessary—an Occam’s razor. 
 This perspective will deter some readers from reading these 
pages, no doubt. For others, who wish to delve deeper and 
explore further the implications of what might mean to be a 
natural human being, a signifying and emergent organism in a 
natural world, I offer a non-dogmatic (i.e., it assumes that no su-
pernatural forces or destiny shape our existence) narrative that is 
deconstructive, in the general sense of that word, of close-ended 
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and idiosyncratically preferred self-nature assumptions. In so 
doing, it is my hope that “Ecopsychology,” as eupraxsophy, is 
understood as a serious effort at distilling basic notions and ex-
plorations about “being in the natural world” without resorting to 
supernatural (unproven) or unwarranted (unjustifiable) esoteric 
arguments.
Appendix I
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1. There is no one “self.” There is no one “nature.” “Self” is not 
he-she. “Nature” is not he-she. “Self” or “nature” are neither 
nouns nor pronouns. They are verbs—processes--dynamic.
2. Singularizing “self” does not make it more understandable 
or accessible. Singularizing “nature” does not make it more 
understandable or accessible. A noun is never the process it 
singularizes. Although words can and do shape subjective 
reality, they are not, reality.
3. A singular “self” seeking “communion” with singular 
“nature” is already bound to find projections—confirm ex-
pectations.
4. If there is no singular “self” and no singular “nature,” what 
“connection” do we speak of?
5. “Nature” is not a singular sentient entity, thus needs no 
defending—seeking, worshiping, idealizing as such.
6. From S. Freud we inherited the semiotic lens with which 
to begin examining eigenwelt—mitwelt—umwelt processes 
as they give rise to the emergents “self” and “nature.” Alas, 
this foundation, important as it still is, emphasized (and 
others overemphasized) eigenwelt-miltwelt interactions 
and dynamics, oftentimes, at the expense of eigenwelt—
mitwelt—umwelt integral processes. That is, and analogically 
speaking, he and others paid attention to psychology-se-
miosis interactions without formulating an equally robust 
ecopsychological biosemotics (and ecosemiotics).
7. Without taking away from an understanding of psychologi-
cal semiosis, nevertheless, the shift we propose is as follows: 
 
psychology : semiosis :: ecopsychology : biosemiotics* 
 
The right side of the above analogy represents truly 
integral approaches whereas the left is derivative. 
 
*(In certain cases one can replace biosemiotics with ecose-
miotics and still retain the meaning of the intended shift.) 
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8. The implications of the preferred (right) side of the above 
analogy is the study of self-society-nature systems or “eco-
psychology.” This study is an intricate and complex endeavor 
demanding philosophical, mathematical, and scientific 
training. 
9. Lest one should think the above studies are only open to id-
iosyncratic and/or overly discrete formulations (low brow 
humanistics), a more fruitful (evidence-based) approach is to 
begin describing the above analogy in mathematical terms. 
That is, the elements “self,” “society,” “nature” (and subcate-
gories thereof) are amenable to manipulation via differential 
equations (ordinary or partial). The complex-intricate nature 
of these interactions, at all levels, demands sobering math-
ematical expertise and follow-up experimental testing (e.g., 
the Lotka-Volterra equations as they are applied to human 
overconsumption in the context of limited resources).
10. Naming a cloud does not essentially (scientifically) explain 
“cloud.” However, it is quite acceptable that “cloud” becomes 
the informed shorthand tag after a thorough and essential 
(scientific) knowledge of multiple processes involving water 
vapor dynamics in the atmosphere (e.g., a water cycle). 
11. An emotion-driven “self” seeking answers in “nature” is 
bound to find (invent) cyclops, mermaids, fairies, nymphs 
and many other projected magical or turbulent forms. Oh, 
the gods! They behave so human-like. 
12. Rather than “connection,” “self-nature” affiliatory processes, 
should one persist in using these terms singularly, are supported 
by multiple processes deserving in-depth examination. In this 
sense a “self” consists of both transient and deeply entrenched 
interpretative codas, behavioral plans and actions, both creating 
additional meanings and redirecting the organism toward or 
away from new definitions and assessments of its situation 
in any given environment—time. This dynamic organization 
is ever-changing and can be described as self-nature gestalts. 
With a full understanding that these modalities are fluid, only 
then can one be safe in using the terms “self” or “nature.” This 
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organismic fluidity is to be expected in a curious and creative 
fission-fusion species.  
13. Natural processes, outside self-aware consciousness, do not 
bargain, cajole, trick, deceive, supplicate, or demand tribute.
14. Equally, the truly monstrous, that is, the inability of human 
reason to understand or change basic instincts as these defy 
and foil our sublimated and/or idealized human propensities, 
originate in “nature.” 
15. The attitude, expressed in the statement “anything goes in 
‘nature’,” is not scientific. It is more likely a psychological 
projection fueled by subjective and idiosyncratic expec-
tations or desires. The above statement is an example of 
trivialism, or the assumption that every statement is true 
[ⱯpTp; Trivialism (the opposite of skepticism): Given any 
proposition, it is a true proposition]. It is true that natural 
processes are diverse and varied; however, these processes 
are governed, for example, by observable and measurable 
(testable) physical and biochemical constraints. A diversity 
of forms and mechanisms of natural existence, with the 
above restraints in mind (and in place), is not a proposition 
for supposing that anything is possible, including very 
intelligent but diminutive fairies. 
16. The human animal seeks kinship with, is inspired by, and 
depends for survival on non-human animals. This is under-
standable. Humans also mistreat and torture non-human 
animals. This is reproachable and disturbing. Humans also 
keep non-human animals as pets. This is also understand-
able. When humans are tamed by civilization and they 
become but comical or disturbed shadows of ancestors 
who were self-sufficient, frugal, brave, resilient, and 
practical, their pets too become farcical creatures. This 
makes psychological sense. Then, the descent to petness 
on both sides, becomes a special interest study within 
“ecopsychology.”
17. Many species of animals, including humans, replace their 
own kin with token or fetish trans-species or object relation-
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ships. It is psychologically important to study and understand 
why and how it happens that the favorite poodle becomes a 
“child.” 
18. Humans do the darndest things is search of “love” and 
affection, including hugging trees and/or snowmobiles. 
Nobody knows what the tree or a machine understands by 
this, if anything. 
19. A dog is never a person. However, it could very well be that 
a farcical human being indulges in, expects and induces 
farcical behaviors from h/her preferred companions. To 
confuse this (descent to petness on both sides) with true 
humanity or original animality deserves a thorough psycho-
logical analysis.
20. Earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and fires kill people without 
intention. Without sentience and motive, these naturally 
occurring events cannot be “brutal,” “vicious,” or “out to get 
us.” On the other hand, the “brutality” of “nature” seems all-
too-human. Furthermore, to say that they are “acts of god” is 
suggestive that the equivalency “nature” = “god” is a human 
psychological feature or characteristic.
21. Humans can be very destructive, vengeful, spiteful, and 
petty—dogmatic, misinformed, and psychologically 
unstable. In contrast, humans can also be constructive, kind, 
forgiving, and enlightened—well-informed, curious-smart, 
and psychologically stable; with mixes in-between.   This 
is a sobering realization for anyone who thinks that magical 
formulas (e.g., “changes in consciousness,” converting to 
the ‘right’ religion, practicing yoga) are likely to be time-
ly-effective universal engines toward a more enlightened 
future that makes natural ecological stability and global 
human mental health more prevalent.
22. For anyone who has a scholarly and skeptical bent for asking 
basic questions and doing due diligence when it comes to the 
historicity of any movement, “ecopsychology,” like many 
other conveniently confusable trends, seems to have blended 
an array of incongruous ideas by selectively appropriating 
an assortment of religious concepts, social movements, and 
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personal preferences into quirky catechisms.    This is under-
standable to the extent that the compound terms “ecology” 
and “psychology” are altogether negated, bypassed, or 
reinvented to mean just about anything, or everything. 
23. The dogcatcher sees the reality, every day, of infantile or 
dysfunctional humans projecting the best and worst of their 
humanity and inhumanity onto otherwise innocent and 
trusting non-human animals.
24. The environmental consequences of keeping pets, farcical 
or otherwise, are demonstrably (quantifiably) shocking and 
equal or surpass any other forms or sources of environmen-
tal degradation.   It is fair to say that keeping pets is another 
human-caused environmental stress veering into catastrophe 
whose prompt solution will be stubbornly resisted—for psy-
chological (and economical) reasons. 
25. There is usually hope in a hunting camp that the rain, grasses, 
and game, will return. That trust, as hope, is warranted to 
the extent that ecological viability and predictable climatic 
recurrences endure.
26. Nature becomes what we ascribe and describe. Long-run-
ning myths preserved and interpreted anew in a variety of 
narratives, both accurate and false, partially define our re-
lationship with “reality.” Take away actual sweating and 
bleeding bodies, wild gathering and hunting, the fragility of 
human existence and certain death, and replace it all with 
four-square meals and traffic lights. What form of existing, 
evolved long ago, and imprinted deep in our mind and 
marrow, saw THIS coming?
27. It likely that earth systems will fall back into old cycles--
that many life forms will survive—or that new ones will 
be established after global disintegration occurs. It is also 
likely that pockets of humanity will survive. However, lest 
anyone believe this end to be destined or heroic, we would 
have committed, collectively, a sin for which there is no 
redemption or atonement.
28. I have witnessed unseemly packs of stray dogs and cats, 
from Milan to Hawai’i. They survive, barely, in dark, damp, 
Ecopsychology Revisited
142
and liminal spaces. In some cities they are also found with 
the human homeless or the vicious; all manner of human 
socially discarded forms, desperate, powerless, and hopeless, 
living day-to-day. In a different time or place they would 
all, I fantasize, be thriving. Dogs would hunt in packs, wild. 
Cats would crouch in tall grass, their roaming distances 
appropriate to their temperament. Humans, would know 
how to scavenge or hunt away from refuse and unjustifiable 
“civilized” complexity. 
29. Children say the darndest things, like, “I want to go outside 
and play in the rain.”   
30. Parents teach children how to pray, but to what end?
31. Harking back to the ecosemiotic presentation of self-nature 
gestalts, it is not surprising that a diversity of subjective 
concoctions of meaning-interpretation (“thinking”), the 
cultural or natural context of “reality,” behaviors, and 
motivations would produce almost any sort of psychologi-
cal profile. In this vein, a person who dabbles in Buddhism, 
pseudo-mysticism, animal totemism, drives a car without 
guilt, thinks their three dogs are children and should be 
treated as such, spends hours indoors, and seldom gets h/
her feet wet or dirty, is inertia-prone to continue interpreting 
“reality” in a vacuum.
32. How does a Deepak Chopra-type steal your “conscious-
ness”? Are you that needy? How does one detect and reject 
pseudo-profound bullshit?  
33. There are no shortcuts to saving our planet (from ourselves).
34. Any form of ideology, by definition, is close-ended. 
Ideological thinking rarely produces, true (fair, well-in-
formed, honorable) discourse. Ideology survives through 
propaganda. A central aim of propaganda is to suppress 
competing (factual) sources of information. Therefore, when 
ideologs speak of task-oriented problem-solving approaches, 
they are speaking in oxymorons.
35. It is almost certain that coyotes do not give a fig about 
humans except when we threaten their livelihood and their 
lives.    
Appendix I
143
36. “Old school ‘ecopsychology’” and “new school ‘eco-
psychology’” should have environmental history as their 
inquiry foundation and bridge. To assume that environmental 
problems are new and/or that our psychosocial accommoda-
tions (or failures) to changing situations represent a new turn 
of human consciousness is, to say the least, myopic.   
37. Americans (other peoples as well) inherited the gambles, 
excesses, and tradeoffs of our grandparents. Our children 
and grandchildren will inherit ours.    
38. Even the best-intended and orchestrated parenting befuddles 
children. This is because children are, on the whole, observant 
and smart. Eventually, they catch up to our lies, contradic-
tions, hypocrisies, insecurities, and faults. It is better to tell 
them the truth (fact-supported and corroborable) early on. 
For example, no child older than eight should believe in 
Santa Claus, fairies, or that the Earth is six thousand years 
old and flat. The latter is, at least, farcical and, at worst, 
dangerous.
39. Nowadays, it seems to me, youth believe and look forward 
to dystopias more often than dream about creating edifying 
utopias. The pastoral has been substituted for a bloody 
end-of-days mythology. This is very troubling. It is under-
standable that youth, while forging an identity, hanker for 
recognizable heroes. It is also understandable that heroes 
inhabit both dystopias and utopias. But why “go there,” the 
dystopia, and waste so much emerging talent, when there is, 
still, some time to correct our collective demise-course? 
40. I urge all youth to learn how to grow gardens, butcher 
game, recognize bird song, and vacate the empty spaces of 
Facebook. Your selfie is only one among seven billion. 
41. What is “compassion”? Indeed! The old Zen masters would 
tell us that compassion hurts—‘tis a sharp sword cutting off 
the unfeeling, useless limb.
42. Little Leagues are major ego boosters for parents. Oh well, 
at least they are all outdoors. 
43. The stock market dropped a thousand points today. Now, tell 
me something real.
Ecopsychology Revisited
144
44. Colleagues (and whole departments) seem to have forgotten 
what “psychology” (evidence-based) is all about. There is no 
other way to describe what passes for higher education these 
days. (The cracker-hardtack psychologist is born.) 
45. What is “tolerance”? One answer is: Enduring the same old 
druid-turned-expert pretending to be “a scientist.”
46. The real environment is, sometimes, missing from “ecopsy-
chology.”    
47. To collude with the credulous for fear that one might hurt 
their feelings is not good psychology—not even compas-
sionate.
48. Bears are not “into” you. They are into grubs and honey. 
They are only “into you” if you take away their grubs and 
honey.   
49. Alice traveled from one panoptic reality to the next—the 
latter she confused, at first, with anarchy. That is why the 
mirror-metaphor-transference works very well. Verily, true 
delinquency varies in a linear function with “civilization.” 
That is, more rules and increased surveillance, aimed to keep 
us on “the straight and narrow path,” beget disobedience 
and natural hostility—and neurosis. Eventually, even Alice 
recognized this game cannot be played with rubber-necked 
flamingoes.   
50. Humans’ ambivalence to ‘nature,’ from a semiotic 
perspective, admits both enslaving and liberating meanings. 
When operating as a grand symbol, intrapsychically and 
externally, it borrows from and conjures up a multitude of 
associated archaic symbols: mother-father, womb-fight-
ing arena, home-jail. Not surprisingly, our individual and 
collective responses to whatever we think ‘nature’ is are 
bound to be complex and contradictory. A serious psycho-
logical analysis (psychological semiosis) begins with the 
premise that ‘nature’ comprises the minotaur’s past, his 
mind, the labyrinth, a surrounding island, the open sea, and 
the stars beyond; all these spheres semiotically intertwined.
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endnoTes for aPPendIx I
  “Communication, defined as a sign process which involves a 
sender and a receiver, occurs not only among humans, but also 
between all other organisms throughout the whole biosphere. 
Not only cultural semiotics, but also bio- and zoosemiotics are 
hence concerned with processes of communication. Significa-
tion, by contrast, which concerns sign processes without a sender, 
predominates in ecosemiotics, where organisms interact with a 
natural environment that does not function as the intentional 
emitter of messages to the interpreting organism.” Nöth (2001)
  “When it comes to our own species, there is no doubt that, by 
nature, we form fission–fusion societies. And nor is this merely 
a reflection of our current, highly mobile lifestyle within indus-
trialized settings. More than 99% of human history was spent 
in a hunter-gatherer existence, characterized by dynamically 
shifting social groupings at multiple levels. At the highest tier 
in hunter-gatherer societies is the ethno-linguistic group or 
‘tribe’, formed by several local ‘bands’ that fuse together when 
resources like water are clustered during dry seasons. Bands 
themselves, which are made up of around 30 individuals, break 
up into smaller foraging parties during daily forays out from a 
base camp.” Couzin and Laidre (2009)
  “The model population consists of individuals with no inherently 
altruistic attributes, just self-centered attributes, namely an 
aggressive will to dominate and a bitter resentment against being 
dominated. We show that when language skills reach a critical 
level at which gossip becomes the primary means of reinforcing 
social ties, the egalitarian transition occurs spontaneously as a 
phase transition. At this critical point, individuals who resent 
being dominated become capable of forming and sustaining 
coalitions that make the individual alpha position progressive-
ly unstable, ultimately motivating its avoidance by all members 
of the population due to retaliation (or fear of retaliation) by a 
stronger anti-dominance coalition.” Calmetes and Weiss (2017)
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  “Magical beliefs involve an acceptance of mysterious or su-
pernatural forces to explain phenomena, and where the use of 
prescribed rites of precisely defined actions (often verbal) are 
believed to produce mysterious effects. This may involve the 
manifestation of mystical forces to cause a specific effect, or 
ritualistic acts that are believed to produce results elsewhere. 
Magical thinking is the cognitive process that embodies such 
beliefs.”  Garrett and Cutting (2017)
  “[…] …it takes 0.84 hectares [2.07 acres] of land to keep a me-
dium-sized dog fed. In contrast, running a 4.6-litre Toyota Land 
Cruiser, including the energy required to construct the thing 
and drive it 10,000km a year, requires 0.41 hectares. Dogs are 
not the only environmental sinners. The eco-footprint of a cat 
equates to that of a Volkswagen Golf. If that's troubling, there is 
an even more shocking comparison. In 2004, the average citizen 
of Vietnam had an ecological footprint of 0.76 hectares. For an 
Ethiopian, it was just 0.67 hectares. In a world where scarce 
resources are already hogged by the rich, can we really justify 
keeping pets that take more than some people?" Vale and Vale 
(2009).
  “[…] …given the rise of communication technology and the 
associated increase in the availability of information from a 
variety of sources, both expert and otherwise, bullshit may 
be more pervasive than ever before. Despite these seemingly 
commonplace observations, we know of no psychological 
research on bullshit. Are people able to detect blatant bullshit? 
Who is most likely to fall prey to bullshit and why?” Pennycook 
et al (2015)
  “The histories of coyotes and humans have many parallels, but 
one difference is that across our own evolutionary history, we 
humans have created thousands of philosophies of meaning we 
call religions, while coyotes, so far as we can tell, embrace no 
religious tradition beyond being alive, sacred existence.” Flores 
(2016)
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  “Environmental historians have given attention to these con-
temporary problems, but they also realize that the relationship 
between humans and the environment has had a formative role 
in every period of history, from ancient times onward.” Hughes 
(2006)
  “~Buffalo Dusk~ The buffaloes are gone.//And those who 
saw the buffaloes are gone.//Those who saw the buffaloes by 
thousands and how they pawed/the prairie sod into dusk with 
their hoofs, their great heads down/pawing on in a great pageant 
of dusk,/Those who saw the buffaloes are gone.//And the 
buffaloes are gone.” Carl Sandburg
  “Environment can be understood to include the Earth with its 
soil and mineral resources; with its water, both fresh and salt; 
with its atmosphere, climates, and weather; with its living things, 
animals and plants from the simplest to the most complex; and 
with the energy received ultimately from the Sun.” Hughes 
(2006)
  Excerpt from ~The Bear and the Garden-Lover~ One time as 
the gardener had forgot himself in a dream/And a single fly had 
his nose at its mercy,/The poor indignant bear who had fought 
it vainly,/Growled: “I’ll crush that trespasser; I have evolved a 
scheme.”/Killing flies was his chore, so as good as his word,/
The bear hurled a cobble and made sure it was hurdled hard,/
Crushing a friend’s head to rid him of a pest./With bad logic, 
fair aim disgraces us more;/He’d murdered someone dear, to 
guarantee his friend rest.//Intimates should be feared who lack 
perspicacity;/Choose wisdom, even in an enemy.” Marianne 
Moore (1982)
 *       *       *
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aPPendIx II: seMIoTIC 
MaTrIx Theory (sMT): 
aPPlICaTIons To PanarChy
(To insure continuity and exact reiteration, some text repeats 
from Chapter 5)
 Semiotic Matrix Theory (SMT) is an evaluative model 
(Conesa-Sevilla, 2005) with which to gauge the relative and 
dynamic systemic contributions of Possibility (P), Energy (E), 
and Safety (S) constraints (elements, factors, or variables). Its 
applications are widespread across most disciplines and include 
the theoretical and practical evaluations of the validity of eco-
logically valid systems-based assumptions. As a predictive tool, 
it makes allowances for a diversity of interpretations (factor 
inputs) about P, E, and/or S.  SMT is particularly useful in 
ecological theory, research and practice. To this end, SMT was 
employed to model the assumptions that Panarchy makes with 
respect to stability and change. Panarchy’s adaptive cycle is 
confirmed by SMT modeling.
 To continue and reiterate from Chapter Five, Ecological 
Panarchy, as described by Gunderson et al (1995), Holling et 
al (2002a), and Holling et al (2002b), builds up on and extends 
traditional frameworks for understanding ecological dynamics. 
It adds to phenology a more realistic emphasis on processes 
of destruction and organization in addition to the traditional 
ecological foci on growth and conservation. Their framework 
adds two additional functions, release and reorganization. 
Ecological Panarchy is theoretically malleable and can be 
applied to questions in economics and sociology, to name just 
two areas, while focusing on problems of resilience and sustain-
ability.
 Within the limitations of the panarchy model (Gotts, 2007) 
there is much that is already relevant to an understanding of 
human systems.  
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 Figure A-1, also adapted from Gunderson and Holling 
(2002), depicts the dynamics of Ecological Panarchy. At first 
look, panarchy, at least implicitly, tracks the systemic historical 
changes (catastrophic and phenological) that some systems are 
likely to endure anew or revisit (Leopold, 1949; Menzel et al, 
2006). At first glance, Panarchy can be made congruent with 
other descriptions that emphasize the dynamics of all organisms 
and systems with regard to life’s basic components and inter-
actions of Energy, Safety, and Possibility (Conesa-Sevilla, 
1999, 2001, 2005a, and 2005b). A first attempt at finding such 
congruency is the main aim of this work. (Figure A-1 follows.)
Figure A-1
 Questions of resilience and sustainability arise when the 
establishment and diversity, “functionality,” are understood 
and also tracked as part of the dynamics that panarchy aims 
to elucidate. In the words of Holling and Gunderson (2002b), 
resilience can be seen as “the magnitude of disturbance that can 
be absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing 
the variables and processes that control behavior.” 
 As an example of the potential interdisciplinary versatility 
of Panarchy, the psychological concept of “coping” suggests 
a direct analogy to ecological resilience, where an increase of 
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coping strategies implies greater resilience—“the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be absorbed.”
Semiotic Matrix Theory (SMT)
 Semiotic Matrix Theory (SMT) was originally conceived and 
applied as a means of assessing the frequency and regularity of 
text terms across time, styles, and literary genre (Conesa-Sevil-
la, 1999). Specifically, frequency of words related to (synonym 
and antonym comparisons) the Alpha categories of Possibility 
(P), Energy (E), and Safety (S) were studied via text analyses 
(Conesa-Sevilla, 2001a). Early modeling was promising and 
suggestive of its potential application to the assessment of 
ecological models, vis-a-vis psychological theories.
 Subsequent revisions of mathematical relations led to 
further applications (and confirmation) which extended to the 
study of territoriality across species (Conesa, 2001b). Interac-
tions of Alpha categories gave rise to multiple levels, increasing 
the probability for more accurate predictions (Beta level: Power 
(Pp) Control(C), Generativity (G), Nurturing (N)). Furthermore, 
interactions between levels and conditions (e.g., P+C) made it 
possible to model a greater number of existential conditions.
 The simpler and original (and later derivates) mathematical 
relation described a “matrix,” as any “organism” that exhibited 
(could be described as, internalized or was sensitive to) the actual 
and/or analogous conditions of growth, maturation, emergence, 
and survivability, as follows:   
M=P+E
     S
 “M” denotes a “matrix” (or matricial conditions in larger 
systems: buildings, cities, colonies); “P” represents possibility 
(opportunity, information, intelligence), which includes 
the presumption of information growth and its intelligent 
maturation. “E” expresses energy requirements for birth, growth, 
and sustainability of any organism or systems that behave as 
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“organisms.” Finally, “S” stands for the safety requirements 
(ambient assessment, internal homeostatic sub-systems, repair, 
and defense) necessary for survival and beyond, thriving.
 Since its original conception, the above and straightfor-
ward model has been mathematically expanded and adapted 
to evaluate and model more nuanced relationships (events and 
states), including time, random (stochastic) “luck,” and more 
determined (non-stochastic) conditions (e.g., Wiener process).  
 
M=P+E(t)
     S
 This work made use of SMT theoretical assumptions while 
evaluating the four phases of ecological panarchy as seen in 
Figure A-1. 
 Before proceeding to the methodology and analysis an 
obvious caveat needs to be mentioned. It is safe to say that most 
natural processes, under the influence of entropic forces, undergo 
cycles of “birth,” “growth,” “ultimate maturation,” deteriora-
tion, “death,” and decay. However, the terms sustainability or 
resilience are anthropocentric descriptions of these cycles. 
Stars, galaxies, ecological systems, the universe itself, are not 
at all perturbed (as systems), nor do they “bother” to examine 
the conditions of their existence. Only self-aware “matrices” 
are capable of tracking these cycles: prepare for them, avoid 
unsavory consequences, attempt to change them. Notwithstand-
ing these efforts, death will visit us all.
 We should be mindful of the limitations and misapplications 
of the above cycles outside observable and confirmable scenarios 
lest we, unduly so, imbue the cosmos with consciousness (e.g., 
Gaia; a teleological “progressing” universe) willy-nilly. 
 Both metaphorical (symbolic) and confirmable (real) 
matricial descriptions are possible (the notion of “god” or 
currency as “matrices”) and useful, but one must keep in mind 
their ontological origin and distinction (Conesa-Sevilla, 1999; 
2001a; and 2005). 
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 These ranges, although originating from an arbitrarily 
designed scale, are nevertheless theoretically descriptive 
and summarize, for example, the ecological progression and 
regression of the life and death history of a forest (a recognized 
and defined integral ecology).
 The K-Phase represents, for example, a forest (“organism”) at 
its peak diversity and ecological functionality (stable, sustainable). 
Even at the peak of maturity and sustainability P, S, and E values 
are not fully expressed (at their highest values) to the extent that 
other phases in the cycle are more dramatically identified (scien-
tifically described) with rampant growth, habitat reallocation, and 
competition by species (1st, 2nd, …N order colonizers).  
 The Ω-Phase is characterized by dramatic (unforeseen 
catastrophic and/or phenological and expected) events that 
Methods
 Excel modeling features and capabilities were applied under 
these assumptions:
1. P, S, and E values were arbitrarily set on a 1-5 scale. 
Higher numbers on the P and E columns correspond 
with a Positive (+) ascendency of their attributes 
whereas lower numbers under the S column suggest that 
homeostatic controls have achieved a great degree of 
stability. A higher number indicates a stress in the system 
and the deployment of increasing survival modalities 
(Conesa-Sevilla, 2016).
2. Prior to modeling, and based on ecological theoretical 
assumptions, Panarchy cycles were evaluated to exhibit 
the following “matricial status”:
P S E
K-Phase (Conservation) 3 2 3
Ω-Phase (Release) 1 5 5
α-Phase (Reorganization) 5 4 4
r-Phase 4 3 4
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threaten the sustainability achieved in the K-Phase. Under these 
conditions diversity is greatly reduced or non-existent (P value 
at 1) and the struggle to survive is at its maximum (S value set at 
5).
 The α-Phase represents in our example of a once forested 
and sustainable environment a few weeks, months, and years 
after a devastating fire. These conditions of colonization, intense 
competition, increased diversification, and meager stability are 
represented by the numerical profile above described of: P=5, 
S=4, and E=4.
 Finally, the r-Phase represents and portends the promise of 
a sustainable ecological system on its way to stable diversifica-
tion—filling in the final blanks. Higher expression of Possibility 
and continuing dependence on outside sources of Energy prevent 
this phase from being fully (long-term) sustainable. 
 Matricial values are to be read as follows: Higher scores 
approaching 5 describe a fully functional, highly diverse, 
stable, and sustainable “organism” or system (K-Phase). Under 
its natural and unperturbed conditions this is the very best the 
system is capable of. Scores close to 1 suggest that the system is 
being challenged by internal or external influences (Ω-Phase). A 
relative and comparative evaluation will describe reorganization 
and exploitation phases as being medial or interim to the other 
two.
Results
 Predicted scaling of four phases of ecological Panarchy 
yielded the following matricial values:
Matrical Values for:
K-Phase (Conservation) 3
Ω-Phase (Release) 1.2
α-Phase (Reorganization) 2.25
r-Phase (Exploitation) 2.67
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 Matricial values logically align themselves with the four 
Panarchy phases. Higher matricial values denote ecological 
stability, whereas lower values denote ecological turmoil.
 Consistent with Panarchy descriptions, as predicted earlier, 
and to reiterate, higher scores approaching 5 describe a fully 
functional, highly diverse, stable, and sustainable “organism” or 
system (3 for the K-Phase). These higher scores represent peak 
and stable performance. Scores close to 1 suggest that the system 
is being challenged and in a rapid state of deterioration (1.2 for 
Ω-Phase). The values for the reorganization and exploitation 
phases show an expected progression and interim development 
between the Ω and the K Phases.
 At first glance, it is understandable to suspect that some 
tautology is at play between both models (SMT and Panarchy). 
Two observations make this acceptable. First, SMT was first 
developed and applied independently, without the knowledge of 
Panarchy principles, to other problems (semiotics, biosemiotics, 
ecological psychology). Second, although arbitrary, the scales 
employed above must possess construct validity with respect to 
real ecological events and states. One would expect theoretical 
convergence to the extent that both SMT and Panarchy describe 
observable ecological scenarios. 
 That is, instead of tautologies there appears to be an almost 
forced theoretical convergence to the extent that both models 
are true to and explicit about the functional prerequisites of 
“systems” (Parsons and Turner, 1951/1991; Conesa-Sevilla 
1999).
 Sullivan’s dictum (1896) comes to mind: “Form ever follows 
function.” A fundamental description of existence, its form 
and function, must abide by clearly recognizable and testable 
principles. From a single cell to a sentient organism, from clay 
burrows to loftier cities, from concrete to abstract, “form ever 
follows function”:
Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight, or the open 
apple-blossom, the toiling work-horse, the blithe swan, the 
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branching oak, the winding stream at its base, the drifting 
clouds, over all the coursing sun, form ever follows function, 
and this is the law. Where function does not change, form 
does not change. The granite rocks, the ever-brooding hills, 
remain for ages; the lightning lives, comes into shape, and 
dies, in a twinkling.”   
Discussion and Conclusion
 The original formulation of SMT (Conesa-Sevilla, 1999) 
extended Parsons’ and Turner’s (1951/1991) idea of functional 
prerequisites beyond their sociologically exclusive application 
to encompass and be applied to questions of evolutionary 
psychology and ecology. In this context, SMT’s interpreta-
tion of functional prerequisites are, depending on the reader’s 
perspective, on a higher order or more fundamental: consistent 
with a vertical and horizontal integration of physical, life, and 
behavioral sciences. 
 Whatever formulation is preferred, matricial dynamics are the 
fundamental and abstracted explanatory substrate of existential 
dynamics (or classification therein) that sentient beings project 
onto objects and symbols. 
 Although limiting their theoretically attributable functional 
interactions and integrations to social structures, Parsons’ and 
Turner’s notions of functional prerequisites, as originally stated, 
were challenges initially encountered in the formulation of SMT:
 
The problem of functional prerequisites is a protean problem 
because of the variety of different levels on which it may be 
approached. What we propose here is to start on the most 
general and therefore formal level of action theory and proceed 
to introduce specifications step by step. It should be possible 
to do this in a sufficiently orderly fashion. (P. 17:1991)
 SMT got around this seemingly apparent “protean” impasse 
by making assumptions which were concordant with physical, 
life, and behavioral systems. Although incommensurable in the 
details, physical, life, and behavioral systems operate “com-
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mensurably” as a whole cloth. The connections with Panarchic 
thinking were anticipated but not fully applied outside the social 
context by Parsons and Turner:
Thus a social system in the present sense is not possible 
without language, and without certain other minimum 
patterns of culture, such as empirical knowledge necessary to 
cope with situational exigencies, and sufficiently integrated 
patterns of expressive symbolism and of value orientation. 
A social system which leads to too drastic disruption of its 
culture, for example through blocking the processes of its 
acquisition, would be exposed to social as well as cultural dis-
integration. (P. 21:1991) 
 SMT incorporates the semiotic emphasis given to the role of 
language and applies it, as biosemiotics, to an understanding of 
systems toward a fuller, integral interpretation (the vertical and 
horizontal integration of physical, life, and behavioral realms). 
That is to say that, in this context, the Panarchic ecological cycle 
incorporates the transformation, transfer, and transmutation 
of “meaning,” restating the basic existential forms Possibility, 
Safety, and Energy (and Beta elements: Power (Pp), Control(C), 
Generativity (G), Nurturing (N)). 
 In consubstantial fashion, the health of a “matrix,” as form, 
follows matricial functions. According to matricial constraints, 
one would never expect, ordinarily, a quadruped running blind 
and backwards, or a hut built upside down, or a hammock hung 
from “sky hooks” (Dennett, 1995), or happiness “forever after.” 
 The health of any matrix is expected to undergo changes, 
some internally produced (with purpose), some of stochastic 
nature and unforeseen. A forest as a matrix; a city as a matrix; 
a society as a matrix; the value of a dollar as a matrix; the idea 
of god as a matrix; or an individual, as the most recognizable 
matrix, all, are subject to fundamental and irrevocable existential 
parameters both cyclical and stable. Although much more work 
needs to follow in order to fully understand and apply the 
simplest of matricial relationships,
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M=P+E
     S
it is both hopeful and tantalizing that consilience and commen-
surability are possible scenarios of future or different reiterations 
of SMT. Panarchy itself, as it has been shown, has at least a very 
robust heuristic value.
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